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P R S F A C g 
The topic chosen Indo-Pak conf l ic t i s one 
vhich i s contamporary and alto of obvious h i s tor ica l 
importance of course, as M.Lib.Sc. d issertat ion, (the 
paper cannot claim any comprehensiveness). 
Scope 
The topic Indo-Pak relations even in this 
limited aspect i . e . conf l ict and war, i s very wide and 
i t had to be curtailed to make i t manageable within 
the time available. The bibliography has been confined 
to two major open conf l ic ts between the two countries 
v i z . the 1965 and 1971 wars. 
Further even within th i s f i e ld only books and 
ar t i c l e s direct ly relevant to these two conf l ic ts have 
been included. Material of a more general nature 
concerning the Indo-Pak relations has been excluded 
except in so far as necessary for indicating the 
perspective. 
iL 
Keeping in view the scope of the subject area 
of the topic , a general survey was made to familiarise 
the writer with various facets to be covered in the 
bibliography, to make the preliminary select ion and to 
decide the method and scheme of organisation. 
As a result of the th i s preliminary study, 
i t was f e l t that i t might be better i f attention was 
concentrated on news papers and news magazines (micro 
thought) in preference to books (the m^cro thought) as 
the former const i tutes , a primary source material 
embodying the immediate firsthand reaction to events. 
This explains the predominance of micro thought in 
th i s bibliography. 
The writer has been forced out of necessity 
to be highly select ive in the choice of material. 
However notwithstanding th is s e l e c t i v i t y i t has been 
her sincere endeavour to make the bibliography a valid 
introduction to the h i s tor ica l scene in which much of 
the more recent evidence has yet remained lantouched by 
ur 
research and analysis . 
In the etiioice of magazines and news papers 
attempt was made to cover as eadiaustlvely as possible 
the views e:q)ressed In Pakistan papers, especial ly as 
th is other side of the picture I s not generally 
available* Access to these magazines was not easy. 
They were available only at a very few l ibraries and 
In 1971 after the formal rupture of diplomatic 
re lat ions , these magazines were not available to even 
these few Inst i tut ions . Because of th i s non-avallabll l ty 
such a source material has not been very adequately 
covered by bibliographers so far . 
Besides l i terature from Pakistan, Items 
representing views of Big Powers - Russia, DBA, UK and 
China have been Included. The magazines preferred are 
those which are recognised as 'opinion foimlng' In the 
countries of their publication. Authors credentials too 
have been an Important consideration In making the 
choice. 
ff 
Oa the home front s in i lar cr i t er ia has been 
adopted with an additional attempt at covering, different 
view points esqpressed on the i s sue . 
Method of Organisation 
The abstracts have been made according to 
I#S.I . Standards ( 1 ^ ^ - \ ' = \ t > " ' C k )and Principles 
laid down by Dr. S.R.Ranganathan (Docmentation). As 
far as possible attempt has been made to make them short, 
neutral and objective. The writer has however diverted 
from the practice prescribed by Dr. Ranganathan to the 
extent of occasionally quallng the actual words of the 
author of the art ic le in the abstract. l*hls has been 
done to mlnlaise the subjective elonent, very real 
danger indeed in dealing with contemporary history, 
particularly so i f one's own country i s Involved. 
A narrative^has been included to indicate the 
basis of arrangement and to make the bibliography 
coherent. At the end of the bibliography a chronology 
of events covering Indo-Pak relations has also been 
included. This i s to f a c i l i t a t e the reader in this 
bibliographical search. Once date of particular event 
i s known i t becomes easy to locate the relevant news-
papers and news magazines. 
In the appendices, text of Important resolu-
tions of treat ies has been included. 
Entries have been arranged in a c lass i f ied 
order. A depth schedule for th i s was devised and 
various feature headings have been obtained through 
the chain procedure. Index to the schedvile has also 
been provided. 
While devising the depth schedule, the 
writer e:qperienced the d i f f i cu l ty of deciding the 
c i tat ion order of various i s o l a t e s . This was especial ly 
an acute problem with regard to the East Bengal c r i s i s . 
Whether to have the East ^jmgal c r i s i s under History -
India « Pakistan - foreign relations - Etiology or 
under the History - Pakistan - Internal policy was a 
matter of serious consideration %Aiich posed much 
d i f f i cu l ty in expanding the schedule for the bibliography. 
I t was f ina l l y decided to treat i t as part of Pakistan, 
NTI 
internal c r i s i s . Wherever necessary India's in -
evitable involvement h&.s been Indicated with a phase -
relation device, 
Xhe entries have been catalogued according 
to I . S . I . Standard (ISi 2381-1963). Similarly for the 
abbreviationsa of the t i t l e s of periodicals cited in 
the bibliography, the practice laid down by IStlHP \'^-V^^C) 
specification has been observed. 
Model Entry 
KUNZRU (BN) 
Lessons of Indo Pak war. 
India quart 22,3*, 1966,3'uly-September;215. 
means this particular art ic le appeared in India 
Quarterly, Vol. 22 , No.3, dated July-September,1966 
on pages 215-217. In the case of a newspaper the 
coluan number has also been indicated with the help 
of i e .g . 4*3 stands for page 4 and colunn 3 . 
Despite the l imitations of time and the d i f f i -
culty of data col lect ion mentioned above, an hmble 
effort has been to make the present bibliography a 
useful docuaent. 
V\l 
fflOBJBS. PIBCTQB«S,itfi MP PATAfcWPBg PSfiP 
1) Aacrlcan Llbraritt Book Procurtment Centcfli^ ^ 
Aectstion U«t« India, VI ; 1947 - ; Monthly 
MBBttily Si9pl«Bi«nt;< Aecetsion l i s t of ser ia l s annual 
2) Alphabetical l i s t of ser ia ls on Pakistan available 
in Delhi Libraries. Ratan Tata Library, UniTersity 
of Delhi, 19eB. 38?. 
3 ) Bibliography of Asian Studies (Being the No.5 of 
the Journal of Asian Studies) AnnArbor (Michigan). 
Annual. 
4 ) Qidvani(MM)i Indian Periodicals; an annotated guide. 
Jaipur. 1969 y i i , 1916 
5) Guide to Indian Periodical Literature. VI 
1964 ; Ourgaon. Prabhu Book House. Quarterly. 
6) Index India, VI ; 1967 Jaipur. Rajasthan. 
University Library, Quarterly. 
Cumn, Annual. 
7) Indian NaUonal Bibliography. VI ; 1958 . 
Calcutta National Library. Monttily. 
Cmm, Annual. 
8) Indian Periodicals in Print. Vidya Mfndal,Delhi, 
1973, 32Parts. 
9) Readers Guide to Periodical Literature. VI \ 
1900/04 , Minnespolis, Annual. 
10) Wajid (JA) and Kaul(TN)t Periodicals in Hinanities. 
London, iiinemann, 1971. 
11) Union l i s t of Social Sciences Periodicals,Delhi , 
Social Sciences Documentation Centre. 25Ip. 
1) India International Centre, New Delhi. 
2) India. Ministry of External tffairs. 
3) Indian Council for World Affairs, Hew Delhi. 
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LIST OF PERIODICALS CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1. Afro-Asian wld aff = kfro Asian world a f fa irs . 
2 , AICC ocan ret > All India Congress Conmittee review. 
3* Asian Surv , « Asian Survey, 
4« Bangladesh obs'^ Bangladesh observer. 
5 . Capital ~ Capital 
6. Cent Asian Rev » Central Asian Review 
7« China rep - China report. 
B, China Quart* China quarterly. 
9 . Daily telegraph ~ Daily telegraph. 
10. East econ ^ Eastern econ(»ist . 
11. Econ po l i t wkly » Economic and p o l i t i c a l weekly. 
12. Econ wkly ^ Economic weekly. 
13 • Econ B Economist 
14* Far East econ ref ^ far eastern economic review. 
15. Foreign aff record* foreign affairs record 
16. Foreign rep (London) * Foreign report. 
17« Guardian - Guardian 
18* Hindustan Stand ~ Hindustan standard 
m 
19. Hindustan l i a t t » Hindustan Times (City Sdit ion) . 
20* India Quart » India quarterly. 
21 , Int . aff (London)* International af fa irs . 
22. Int . stud "^ International studies. 
23. Indian Horizon ^ Indian Horizon. 
24 , Int aff (Moscow) « International affair8(Mosoov). 
28, Int aff (London) » International af fa irs . 
2€. Int Herald tr ib « International Herald Tribune. 
27, Jerusalm Post » Jerusalan Post 
28, London Times » London Times 
29, Mainstream » Mainstream 
30, Manila Chron - Manila Chronicle 
3 1 , Marxist rev = Marxist review 
32 , Military rev « Military review 
3 3 , Nation - Nation 
34 , Imprint » Imprint 
35, New age * New age 
36, Kew Middle east » New middle east 
37, New Times ' New Times 
38 , New York Times Magazine "= New York Times magazine 
<"l 
39 . N«V8%ratk > N«v8V«6k 
40 . 0rg«i^8«r > Organiser 
4 1 . Orlbls = Oribis 
42 . Pacific aff » Pacific affairs 
43 . Pacific Community - Pacific community. 
44 . Pakistan Horicon » Pakistan Horizon 
AS. Pakistan limas - Pakistan Timas 
46. Pakistan Wkly - Pakistan Vaekly. 
47. Paking rav > Paking rayiav 
48. Rav Znt aff » Reviaw intamational affairs* 
49* RaT i n t stud » Rariew Intamational studies. 
50. Hound table - Hound table. 
51 . Seminar - Seminar. 
52 . shakti » Shakti. 
53 . South Asian Stud - South Asian Studies. 
54 . Soviet rev » Soviet review. 
55. Statesman ~ Statesman 
56. Time = Time 
57. United Asia - UoiUd Asia 
XIV 
58* UB N«vs vld r«p » US N«W8 world r«port« 
59. Wkly round tabl > Weekly round table. 
60. Wld PollUcs == W r^ld Polit ics 
61, Wld to-day = World today 
62, Yojana '^ Yojana 
M A f l B A T I Y i S 
1 
INDO-PAK TENSIONS IN HETRQSPBCT 
''Hunpty Dtnpty sat on a v a i l 
Huspty Dumpty had a great f a l l 
All the King's horses and a l l the 
King's men could not put Huapty 
Duapty together again'• 
Indo Pak Tensions in retrospect 
This nursery rhyme expresses steply and 
forceful ly the impact of partit ion on vhole of 
Indian sub-continent. Huapty Duapty symbolises 
United India and after i t s f a l l (partit ion) inspite 
of a l l e f forts harmony and cordially has yet not 
been established. 
Indo-Pak relations from the outset have been 
characterised by a sharp antagonism periodically 
intensifying and breaking into mil i tary h o s t i l i t i e s . 
The sources of th is antagonismf have been traced back 
to the rel igious factor, h i s tor ica l background 
including character of national l iberation movement, 
and to the mode of trensfer of power by the Brit ish 
OoyemBent. The geo-political situation of the two 
countries I including big power interference and 
Pakistan's reluctance to accept India leading role 
on the sub-continent are some of the reasons for this 
tension. 
Al. fleUy^iftft »s t^^tqr 
Ihe history of Pakistan, %diy i t was created 
and especially the events of 1945-47, would convince 
one that friction and conflict between the two 
coiaitries was inevitable. Pakistan was founded on 
the basis of religions affil iation and consequently 
i t s polit ical set up was theocratic and authoritarian. 
Religious fanaticiSB i s a cardinal aspect of Indo-Pak 
relations* Religion which was the basis of partition 
become later basis of conflict. (25-26,29,83,94,180, 
233, 251, 271). 
A8.tffln9n§l IA^rfl^Jl9n MffTOTwtf 
Historical struggle between Muslim League and 
Congress ingrained hatred and suspicion in the minds 
of political leaders of both the nations, so much so 
3 
that th«y had no f l e x i b i l i t y of approach l e f t . Scholars 
both at home and abroad regard character of national 
l iberation movement as one of the s ignif icant causes 
of strained relations between the two nations (20-21, 
94, 137, 154, 181, 205, 251, 271). 
AS. Tranrfer of Power by British Government 
According to some the mode of transfer of power 
i . e . procedure prescribed for lapse of paramountcy was 
not only faulty but mischievous. Bach side interpreted 
i t in tezms prejudicial to the interes ts of the other. 
(20-21, 25 , 27, 29, 32-33, 47, 94, 137, 181, 230, 243, 
251, 271, 305-306). 
A4 India'a dominant role 
Pakistan's set reluctance to accept India's 
leading role in South East Asia also contributed 
towards bitterness and f r i c t i o n . Pakistan could never 
reconcile i t s e l f to a lesser status than India and 
resented the p o l i t i c a l dominance of India in the 
sub-continent. This obsession with "Big India" made 
4 
i t indulge in aiUtary hostilities (311). 
Ag fQWlm P9wra iBttrftwnc§ (5,10,11.14.15.17,23, 
25,33 ,43 ,44 ,50 ) 
A81 g.fitAi Military Aid 
I t hasbesn said that foreign arms aid, especial ly 
by U.S.A., has helped to keep th i s a hot area in the 
international cold war. India vieved w^ Lth suspicion 
U.S. military interference in the sub-continent. 
Powerful American groiq;>8 were stationed in Pakistan 
and a radar station was bui l t in Gi lg i t . Besides free 
siq;>ply of arms to Pakistan, Kumar Manglu c a l l s th i s 
"all part of the USA attempt of bring to power anti-
democratic governments in Asia". Ihe imperialist 
powers through economic and mil i tary aid tried to 
bring Pakistan within the orbit of their influence 
(4ICM^) Pakistan's membership of mil itary pacts and 
treat ies - Seato, Cento, e t c . undoubtedly had adverse 
• f f e e t on Indo-Pak relat ions ("it)* Pakistan considered 
Merican fool ish to lavish aid on ungrateful India 
presumably, the policy of non-alignment and peaceful 
eoezistance was taken as sign of ungratefulness. 
(16, 18, 22, 23, 52). 
ASS China* a roH 
Later Pakistan's growing InvoiaeKAnt with 
China contributed much to keep the tensions alive. 
Chine*s impact on Indo-Pak relations has been discussed 
and rediscussed by polit ical scientists , at home and 
abroad ^j^p) China's moral, dipl(xnatic and material 
support changed the whole attitude of Pakistan. It 
was in no mood to settle the problem amicably. Instead, 
with China's backing, Pakistan was ready to risort to 
ams. Bhutto i s said to have boasted that in the 
event of war with India, "Pakistan would be helped by 
the most powerful nation in Asia* (9-13, 18, 23, 154). 
A6 Intamal conditiona 
Ihe Indo-Pak tensions have been influenced by 
and have in turn influenced, al l major aspects of l i f e 
social, econcMBlc and polit ical in the tvo counx^ries. 
G 
A high d«gr«« of p o l i t i c a l s tab i l i t y in a given country 
i s not necassarily conducive to econooiic development, 
but a high degree of in s tab i l i t y tends to have a negative 
inpact upon development. Due to Indo-Pak tensions India 
had to step up i t s defence spend in considerably, in 
tune with Pakistan's increase. Many studies have 
documented the economic c r i s i s of Pakistan in context 
of Indo-Pak relations .facxxxzzxxiQi While few observers 
have seen the economic c r i s i s in India • • an after-
e f fec t of conf l i c t , h o s t i l i t i e s have inevitably had 
their Impact on India's genered economy and upon 
development planning in particular (128-129, 245). 
While Pakistan i t s e l f exploited the rel igious 
fervour of the masses to divert their attention fr(xa 
internal c r i s e s , i t accused India of conjuring up 
menace of external aggression as part of i t s strategy 
to divert people focus from deepening cr ises at home 
(^3). However the history of Indo-Pak relations proves 
the contrary. (231,237, 239, 242, 245). 
7 
4^1 JJfiatfami^Y In PiUaa^an 
Instability of Pakistan's pol i t ical set up has 
been one of the significant factors for the conflict. 
One Pakistan writer even has accepted that the war with 
India could bring considerable reservoir of religious 
fervouvthat Pakistan could draw upon for purposes of 
national unit^ isCsocxxx:^  Ihe history of Indo-Pak 
relations reveals that result of general elections 1966 
disappointed the ruling party. It afforded the ruling 
party only 60 percent votes and consequently people's 
attention was diverted towards armed conflict with 
India 4ffatk)» The 1971 war confirms this assertion when 
Pakistan tried to convert i t s internal crises into an 
Indo-Pak confrontation, (53, 60, 230, 237, 239, 245), 
Agga fQlltlgftI Strata to ^ndia 
Pakistan has often sought to take advantage of 
India's economic and polit ical strains. In 1965 
Pakistan attacked India because i t relied extra-
ordinarily on weakening of New Delhi's HX authority 
3 
after the death of Javahar Lai Nehru. During th i s 
period India was facing a niuber of problemS| p o l i t i c a l , 
econoalc and l lnguiat lc and I t encouraged Ayub Khan to 
aimed conf l ic t . (31, 48 , 50, 52) . 
Kaahalr since 1947 h<bt% bith a continuous 
i rr i tant and a symbol of various tensions (23-27 )• 
Some writers, l ike S i s l r Gi;^ta, have attempted to 
trace the origin of the conf l ict between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, back to the days before 
partit ion %dien Muslim League leaders tried to persuade 
the ruler to declare independence, Xhe reference of 
the Kashmir issue in 1948 to the Security Council by 
Government of India gave wide dimensions to th i s 
conf l ict between India and Pakistan. The dispute over 
Kashmir was also used as a pawn in the international 
power game (23B). Thus i t appears that th is "incurable 
cancer" has defied a l l solution. ( 1 , 10, 25, 28,29,33, 
34 , 37, 38, 94) . 
9 
kill fnUnX^i Tlw 
The Pakistan view Is that accession of Kashmir 
to Indian Union Is neither valid nor legal, a plebsclte 
to \^lch India agreed at the time of accession, was the 
only valid solution acceptable to Pakistan (35,43, 53, 
86, 87). 
A71S JrfidlflB Yin 
Indian view Is that accession was both legal and 
valid (4BB^3«8Sr^e^^?^. According to India Pakistan's 
Intralslgencles and the Internal situation In Kashmir 
have made plebiscite an Impracticable proposition 
{^^^9%)» LB pointed out by many writers Kashmir Is 
not an Isolated Issue I t has to be seen and solved In 
larger context, B.G, Terghese quotes Llaqat All, Prime 
Minister of Pakistan as saying "episode of Kasdimlr 
considered by Itself would look like a sentence out 
of context" (38, 88, 99, 177, 228). 
A713 Security Council 
tOie Security Ck>uncll has failed to arrive at a 
solution acceptable to both parties^ Ai a matter of fact 
IJ 
th« fai lure of the 8«ciirlty Coimell In resolving this 
conf l ic t has brought the va l id i ty and u t i l i t y of UNO 
I t s e l f Into question. People both In India and 
Pakistan have begun to doubt the eff icacy of UNO as 
an Instrument In resolving International confl icts* 
Some writers have called I t a 'Signal fai lure of the 
UNO". Pakistan has successfully avoided discussion 
on Issue of Kashalr Inf i l t ra tes and the ir subversive 
a c t i v i t i e s and Intervention, ^ l l e India hasbeen 
emphasizing these to bring the gui l t of Pakistan 
before UNO. The role of UNO In th is general c r i s e s , 
and particularly In Kashmir conf l ict has been 
discussed and debated by many writers. Significant 
among these are studies by Rahmatullah Khan "Kashmir 
and United Nations", Frederick Nossel "United Nations", 
and Sarwar Husaln's'Pakistan and United Nations' (3B, 
39 , 4 1 , 42 ) . 
Indus basin Issue created some heat but sense 
prevailed and I t was decided through a mutual treatyClS)) 
11 
Ih« deteminatlon of the Rann of Kutch boundry proved 
another occaaion for open h o s t i l l t l e a . I t led the two 
countries almost to the verge of fu l l scale of war. 
Later through British mediation in the form of an 
Award, settlmient was reached, although the Indian 
prime Minister was much cr i t ic ised at home for accepting 
th i s award (31, 45, 49). 
A8 CrittgiaB Of fowlgn BQIACY 
Some foreign observers have laid the blame for 
the continuance of these tensions on India. (12,13,15,24), 
However, the Indian point of view i s naturally better 
documented in th is bibliography. 
^ 8 At hMf 
There has been criticism of Indian Oovemment*s 
foreign policy in respect to Pakistan from the point 
of view.of various ideologies and po l i t i ca l pa r t i e s . 
In both countries, and more part icular ly in Pakistan, 
Indo-Pakistan relat ions have been mainly a non-partisan 
i) 
± hi 
Issut. DU0 to strict censorship thsrs Is greater 
semblance of uaanlalty K in Pakistan on this issue 0 J S~ 
13 
Chapter *B* 
IWPO PAK WAB 1 8 g 
Vlhen a couatry i s divided into two parts and 
where botindariea, as a result of part i t ion, are not 
natural, a conf l ic t on the border issue i s an obvious 
l ikel ihood. India and Pakistan have not been free 
froa stieh a conf l i c t . The Radcllffe Award decided 
the boimdaries between the two countries but S<M% 
dispute did arise (10) Pakistan i s spoken of as a 
particularly 'frontier conscious' country, Ihe 
reasons s lay not so aueh in h i s tor i ca l or geographical 
fac tors , as in i t s social and p o l i t i c a l structure. 
The some thing can be said of India (38-39, 84-87, 
98-99, 172). 
Ihe f i r s t large scale direct confrontation 
between India and Pakistan was on Augiist 5,1965. In 
the conf l ict each side accused the other of being the 
aggressor and the old arguments were repeated on both 
s ides . I t has been remarked, with some truth, that 
14 
in recording 1965 war much d«p«nd8 on % «^ro tha 
arguient begins (85). India declared that this 
conflict starts from August 5,1966 lAen Pakistan 
aimed personnel made massive infiltration into 
Kashmir (84-86). Pakistan's view not only contradicts 
this stand but characteris#te i t as a 'clever attempt 
to confuse the entire nation' (85,88). 
In context of world pol i t ics i t i s argued that 
the Chinese pressure on northern borders of India 
provided Pakistan the correct timings to create 
trouble for India in Kashmir (99). 
B8 yqaftl Pt^laratton of War 
Actual hos t i l i t i e s may conveniently be supposed 
to commence vith this mass infiltration \^ich according 
to Pakistm point of view vas a 'liberation struggle'. 
The counter attack by the Indian army led to direct 
confrontjration between the two countries. On Sept. 3 , 
1966 President of India in a broadcast to the nation 
announced Pakistan's declaration of a state of war 
with India (84, 95-96). 
1 J 
Bg gtralwgy ma tacttca of War 
The strategy and tac t ics of th i s by now v e i l -
kaown co l l i s i on have been reviewed from point of view 
of Pakistan and Indian tact ic ions . Ihe tac t ics of 
Pakistan amy have been cr i t i c i sed by military 
experts at home and abroad* The conf l ict spread and 
Indian amy advanced towards Lahore. Ihe two armies 
were engaged in f ighting a l l along the western borders. 
The major factor for Pakistan's set-back in 
th i s conf l ic t was tiiat Pakistan's aimy advanced without 
ensuring an adequate l ine of supply in i t s rear. 
Another contributory factor i s said to be Ayub Khan's 
miscalculation with regard to h i s anticipation of a 
rebell ion in the val ley of Kashmir (106). Ihe Indian 
tac t i c s i s cr i t i c i sed for not advancing to Lahore, 
especial ly %iiien they were in a coounanding posit ion. 
But i t i s said that i f Indian amy had advanced any 
further, i t would have led to intervetion by China. 
I t has been said that the Indian Government did not 
u 
vlah to take the responsibility of lav and order in 
a major city. (4-8, 16, 106, 113, 138). 
K8 Saitgm Sordtr and China* a roH 
On the eastern "border peace was hanging by a 
mere thready Both countries had their own weaknesses 
on th i s front. Indift was not prepared for a second 
front in the eas t . Pakistan lAiad not suff ic ient ly 
equipped i t s e l f mi l i tar i ly on the eastern border. 
Chinese protest notes to India, for violat ing her 
borders acted as the dterrent ^ i e h prevented India 
from crossing into Eastern Pakistan to release the 
pressure on western border. Pakistan banked too much 
on i t s good relations with China and thought that 
China may suceed in airaing India. China* s support 
did not come iqpto Pakistan's l eve l of expectation. 
This was another miscalculation of Ayub. In th i s 
conf l ic t Great Powers turned to China with an eye of 
suspicion as China was interested in 'prolonging 
Pakistan's war e f f o r t s ' . Indeed i t s brazen attitude 
brought the war to abri^t end. I t i s suggested that 
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Chinese intazrentlon in the form of pxx>test notes to 
India Inclined India to an early cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s . 
Chinese role in th i s conf l ic t has been one of 
the contxoversial aspects of th i s controversial %rar 
in lAiich both sides continued to claim victory t i l l 
the ceasef ire . (10-12, 149, 154-56). 
In this conf l ic t the World Powers though s i l ent 
vere not free from their ovn anxiet ies . Ihis conf l ic t 
was viewed by th«i from point of view of furtherance 
of their own interests (138) 
Muslim countries of West Asia aided with 
Pakistan. Turkey and Iran offered moral and material 
8iq>port. Jordan backed Pakistan's claim in the Security 
Council while Saudi Arabia, Aman co l l ec t ive ly disapproved 
Indian stand at the Jeddah conference (139-40). 
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Brit ish partly supported India's stand as far 
u 
ai Inf i l trators ver« concerned, but also accused India 
for creating such conditions that compelled Pakistan 
to start this war. Oie Brit ish f e e l that Kashair isstw 
i s a genuine factor of dispute between Indian and 
Pakistan (137, 172). 
P4g 988B and P8A. 
Soviet attitude vas that of one interested in 
maintaining peace in the sub-continent, Ihis could 
only be possible i f she played the role of active 
neutral by making the tvo parties agree to a conference. 
(11, 13-14, 144, 166). USA too offered to mediate but 
i t s policy of appeasement made American diplomacy 
ineffect ive (11,15,16, 22-23, 61-62, 93, 98, 136-37). 
^ g<airf.trt 
Ceasefire vas declared on September 22,1966 in 
Indian Parliament by the Prime Minister of India. 
"In deference to the resolution of Security Council 
(146). Pakistan also agreed to i t because of 
i n s t a b i l i t y at home. One reason vhy Ayub delayed 
acceptance of ceasefire was the "problem of curbing 
Id 
the havks in the country". (213-16), 
ni6 Qbstftclaa to Rapproaehment 
Inspite of ceasef ire , permanent peace between 
the two countries eluded the leaders of these 
countries. Xhere vere many reasons for I t (212). 
USA Interference in Pakistan's affairs and their 
mil i tary assistance to Pakistan's authoritarian 
Govenoient led to the of the hope of rearmanent of 
the Pakistan, Ih is obviously led to an attitude of 
resistance to peace in Pakistan, Pakistan armed by 
USA to re s i s t the coomimist esqptansion was allowed to 
use the weapons against India. 
r^e Battle of principle 
P o l i t i c a l l y the Kashmir issue provided the 
rock on which peace was wrecked. Ihe old bitterness 
and mutual suspicion continued to remain in hurdle 
in the way to peace. Ihe bone of contention between 
the two countries was both ideological and p o l i t i c a l . 
I t was d i f f i c u l t for a theocratic and authoritarian 
Pakistan to c(»ie to terns with secular democratice 
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India. Rashvtuddin Ehan correctly c a l l s conf l ic t 
betveen India and Pakistan '*a batt le of principles" 
( 1 , 180-81). 
Ihe credit for bringing the tvo coimtries to 
conference table in the 1965 %rar goes to 1:he Soviet 
Onion. On January 6, the Russian Prime Minister 
Kosygin invited the Priae Minister of India Lai Bahadur 
Shastri and Field Marshal Ayub Khan President of 
Pakistan to a conference* Table at Tashlcent to 
negotiate for peace* After many hitches \itie two 
leaders agreed to the Tashkent agreement i^ich vas 
signed on January 10, 1966. After signing the 
agre«&ent, da the night of January 10, 19<36 
unfortunately Lai Bahadur Shastri passed avay. 
This agreement vas viewed as Important stage 
in the development of Indo-Pak re lat ions . The 
agreement stipulated the withdrawal of forces 
ccnpleted on either side by February, 1966,. I t led 
to an exchange of POW s and the sett ing up of India 
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Pak Observer Mission, JQie execution of the schedule 
vas aaoothly completed according to the schedule. 
When i t vas signed the Soviets hailed I t as broad 
platform for nozuallzatlon of Indla-Pak relat ions . 
A welcome feature of the agreement was that b o ^ sides 
renoimced use of force and agreed to evolve peaceful 
procedure for settlement of disputes. As such, I t 
was considered a great contribution towards peace. 
In Pakistan the declaration was welcomed as a magna 
carta in the history of the sub-continent. In the 
eyes of some rlght%rlng po l i t i c ians i t was a 
'betrayal of the blood of martyrs*. There was also 
an overall fee l ing both in India and Pakistan that 
I t constituted diplMiatie victory for Russia. 
Ihe 2ak had not dried on the Tashkent decla-
ration when some c r i t i c s started interpreting i t with 
suspicion on either side* within a year tlie two 
coimtries were back again to their former ];>osition of 
deakloek. The only tangible result of th i s declaration 
was the withdrawal of forces and resuiption of diploaatic 
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re la t - lons . The f u t i l i t y of the agreement was stated 
by aone foreign observers. Ih^re again appeared the 
same alarming symptoms in Indo-Pak relations occasioned 
by reciprocal accusation of mutual suspicion and 
alignments* 
!Die success of agreement was to dei>end on how 
far ladia was prepared to please Pakistan on the 
Kashmir issue* Ihe Indian view has been made clear 
that Kashmir was not c negotiable, while Pakistan was 
prepared to stake anything to grab Kashmir, l&ider 
these circmstances i t was but natural that Oefore 
the hopes could be raised, they were dash s^d to pieces . 
One American Commentator has pointed out that 
*this declaration had eolred nothing in tlae long run*. 
I t would not be wrong to say that the agreement 
carried the seeds of future conf l i c t s as the two 
countries carefully eyadod both problem and solution 
Kashmir issue the real bwie of contention. As a matter 
of f a c t , the Kashmir dispute has beccNne a symbol of 
Indo Pak tensions, and unless th i s issxae i s settled 
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onc« for a l l to the sat isfact ion of both 1:he countries, 
peace ami vould continue to elvde them. '.Qie decla-
ration aoabodying high platitudes of renouncing warfare 
and aimed conf l i c t s , but we see that within f ive years 
of signing of this declaration the two countries 
started loading their guns and plunged Xirn sub-
continent into war once again in 1971. Ttie mil i tary 
oligarchy and Western vested interests have their 
machinery to keep Indo Pak tensions alive so as to 
enable than to expl4oit the s i tuat ion. (2o , 86, 201, 
214). 
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Chapter *C' 
SAST PAKISTAN CRISES 
The war of 1965 was es sent ia l ly a toundary 
dispute bet%ieen tvo host i l e neighbouring countries 
but the war 1971 had i t s roots in the very structure 
and origin of Pakistan• In 1947 vhen India was 
partitioned for the creation of Pakistan, on the 
basis of muslim majority provinces, Pakistan had two 
wings. The western part of Pakistan conprised 
partitioned Punjab, Sind, Northern l e s t Frontier 
provinces, Baluchistan, \diile the eastern wing 
consisted of partitioned Bengal and some d i s t r i c t s of 
ASSSB. 
East Pakistan was separated from the west 
Pakistan by a distance of Bore than 1,000 miles . I t 
was not the physical distance alone but there were 
also ethnical , eoonoaic, l ingu i s t i c and cultural 
barriers between the two wings. 
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Cl gconcMlc dlroarlty 
Frea the economic point of view WBst Pakistan 
was not a vial^le s tate . As a matter of fact East 
Pakistan provided the W«8t with quite a l o t of foreign 
exchange through i t s Jute industry* The only thing 
that united the two wings was Isltm vtiich was the 
rel igion of the majority of the two wings. Time showed 
that rel igion i s the poorest base for any nation to 
bu i l t i t s superstructtire on and i t could hardly provide 
suff ic ient ly strong bonds to keep the two wings in tact . 
The physical distance between the two wings soon 
began to transform i t s e l f into mental, p o l i t i c a l and 
social cultural d i spar i t i e s . During 1947-70 causes of 
i r r i ta t i on between the two wings began to mount \xp. 
The Eastern wing was e^qploited by west in more than 
one way. 
Before partit ion t ex t i l e was one of the most 
flourishing industry in East Pakistan yet in the 
course of 20 years, since part i t ion, industrial policy 
of Pakistan had so manipulated that the Bast Pakistan 
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produced l e s s than 25 percent of the total t ex t i l e 
products. Thus Pakistan adopted a policy of gradual 
transfer of Industries from Sast to west Pakistan. 
(240, 2 4 4 ^ 5 , 263, 269) 
The Pakistan Govemaent sought to jjipose the 
o f f i c i a l language Urdu on the &iKgin» Bengalee loving 
people of the Sast Pakistan, Internal resistance was 
natural. In March,1948 i^en Jlnnah made the decla-
ration Urdu would be only language of Pakistan, there 
was a strong student agitation led by yoting Mujlb. 
(243, 245, 262.63). 
Oae p o l i t i c a l consequence of the war of 1965 
was the waning Influence of Ayub Khan. He was unable 
to provide stable democratic set up to Pakistan. 
Search for constitutional consensus remained a search 
t i l l the end of h i s regime. I t was fear of aggression 
from India that kept the two wings together. But fear 
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can never provide a last ing basis for unification. 
East Pakistan was dissat i s f ied with t]:ie encroachiaent 
of the executive \d.th the decision making process* 
Ascendency of bureaucracy as synonymous vlth the 
ascendency of the West for the people of 1;he eastern 
wing. 
Dissatisfaction had been gradually growing in 
the East wing, There were many reasons for t^e 
decline industrial production, the east wing provided 
the raw material especial ly Jute to the West and thus 
east was reduced to a semicolony. (238, 239, 242, 249-
5 0 ) . 
Major e^qpenditure on development programmes 
was incurred in the west, although a large part of 
the income came from the eas t . The sense of frustration 
due to these economic factors provided a basis for the 
separatist movement which began to get further strengthen 
from the ethnic l ingu i s t i c and cultural homogeneity of 
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the eas t . The separatist movement took ttie shape of 
a movement foram autonomy. The seeds of 1:he movement 
had been sown early, even during the l i f e time of 
Jinncdi viien western wing attempted to impose i t s 
bureaucracy, language and culture on the east . The 
discontent was siaunering under the apparent calm of 
East Pakistan. (62, 240, 242, 246, 253-65, 263-64,273). 
C5 Constitutional consensus^ 
Xhe vested interes ts of the West Pakistan had 
been sh i l l y shallying with the problem of a ecxistitutlon. 
Democratic constitution would mean the overthrow of the 
mil i tary dictatorship and hegemony of the west wing. 
Ayub Khan had fai led to provide a democratic const i tu-
t ion . He was therefore overthrown and h i s successor 
Yahya Khan, promised a constitution. Utader h is leader-
A i p a search was again made for a constitution which 
could sat is fy the two wings. The eastern wing was 
demanding equal and equitable representation. I t was 
also demanded for tome measure of autonomy so that i t 
could take decision on matters which d irect ly concern 
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the peopl« of the Eastern vlng. In other uords I t 
demanded parity with the western wing. 
Democratic constitution had been put in the 
cold storage. The demand for auton(Xny i f accepted 
veuld hare meant direct assault on the ascendency of 
the West. 
Desire for some kind of autonomy i s based on 
the desire for democracy, but a democratic const i -
tution could not possibly be aeceeded to by the 
mil i tary oligorchy. Ihe East was demanding that 
• l ec t ion be held and democratic constitution introduced 
so that people's wishes could be carried out. In this 
demand they were Joined by democratic forces of tiie 
west Pakistan and the demand began together momentim. 
Yahya Khm saw the writing on the wall and agreed to 
hold e lect ions and establish democratic const i tut ion. 
(247-48, 260, 272). 
C6 General Sleet ions and Six Paint Proer^ i^aie 
in 1971 President Yahya Khan ordered general 
e l ec t ions . Xhe general e lect ions in the eastern wing 
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v«re contested by Avami LaaguB under the leadership 
of Sheikh Mujlb vho cane out with h i s famous ' s i x 
point prograauae'« This programme centred round a 
demand for provincial autonomy. Ihis demiind in the 
vords of Kallm Siddiqui 'stopped short of treason but 
went far enough towards eventual independence', 
Kalim compares th i s demand with National Congress 
demand for dominion status made in 1928 at the 
Calcutta Congress. Kalim i s a West-Pakistan Journalist 
of moderate views and h is statement underlines the 
fact that West Pakistan did not receive with favour 
the £ast*s demands. Ihe demand for autonomy was 
viewed with further suspicion because of tlie fact that 
East Pakistan was more thickly populated and had a 
larger population than the litest. This wuld mean that 
in the national assembly Bast Pakistan would have a 
majority. The results of general e lect ions 1970 further 
confirmed their fears . Sheikh's Awami League swept the 
pollSf giving a clear majority to the East Pakistan 
Awami League. The e lect ion results made Punjabi's 
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Panicky at the prospect of Bangalee d(»lnation. 
^•A. Bhutto represented the fears of the West and 
Sheikh Mujlb s3aiboIlsed the hope of the East. Bhutto 
and the Sheikh held diametrically opposite views almost 
on a l l i s s tus that faced Pakistan. 
Bhutto stood for Islamic Socialism and pleaded 
for a strong centre and strong army. The Sheildi 
advocated Bengali nationalism as against a d strong 
centralized Pakistan. I t was but natural that Sheildi 
should have f u l l support of the Bengalees for h i s s ix 
point programme iidiich 'turned e lect ions into a 
referenduB*. (62, 257, 263-64, 269, 271). 
C7 Bhutto and s ix point progri 
To outwit the Sheikh Mr. Bhutto issued a nmber 
of statements to the press in ^ i c h he tried to 
emphasize that constitution of Pakistan should not be 
based on majority rule i . e . majority of the population, 
but on the consensus of a l l uni ts . In so doing he was 
trying to by<-pass the majority of the East Pakistan in 
favour of the tsi lts of the West. Sheikh was not to be 
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outdone by statements of Mr. Bhutto. He struck to his 
gims and insisted on s ix point programme as the minimrm 
acceptable programme for the people of the East. 
Mr, Bhutto's People's Party insisted on the 
withdrawal of mlnimua programme of the Sheildi. Ihey 
threatened to boycott the national a«=!sembly*s meeting 
which might be held without prior approval of their 
leaders, the SheiMi was not so adamant as Bhutto was, 
he was prepared to negotiate and expressed h i s wi l l ing-
ness to incorporate into the s ix points any suggestion 
of People's Party iiAiich could lead to the reconci-
l i a t i o n of the majority parties of the two wings. On 
principle he was prepared to accommodate, as he was 
keen to have hameny and understanding ^ i c h i s 
necessary for the growth of democratic Inst i tut ions . 
t4^1e he was prepared for adjustment on principles , he 
was firm in the conviction that 'no power can any 
longer enslave the Bengalees.' (256). 
C8 Yahva aian's role 
President Yahya Khan was keen to set up 
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democratic Inst i tut ions in Pakistan, or at least that 
was what he professed. He fixed March 3,1971 as the 
date for cal l ing of the f i r s t meeting of the newly 
elected National Assembly. He also hailed Mujlb as 
the future Prime Minister of Pakistan. His own 
delicate position made Bhutto f e e l insecure. He along 
with other members of h i s NAP tried to impress on the 
President that h i s declaration %iould mean object 
surrender of the west to the East. Pressure was 
brought on Yahya Khan to postpone the f i r s t meeting. 
Postponement was a signal of victory for Bhutto who 
stood for the West's ascendency. Tahya Khan also got 
a new handle in the postponement, he could very well 
play the east against the west and in doing so further 
strengthen h i s mil itary rule. He tried to play h i s 
cards in such a way that he began to appear to be 
playing in to the hands of the People's Party. He, 
therefore, postponed the meeting with the announcement 
that no meeting would be held t i l l such a time as an 
agreement i s arrived at between the leaders of the 
Awaai Leag\]fi and People's Party. 
34 
lh« postponement roused feelings of anger 
amongst the people of the East Pakistan, Some leaders 
in the Vest also, especially those belonging to the 
wall Group, condemned the postponement of the National 
Assembly (256, 267-68, 271-73). 
C8^ MeK9t^ i^ Uofi y l t^ Mu.Ub 
There vas nation wide protest In the Bast 
Pakistan and People's protest led to f i r ing . Taliya 
Khan soon resdised the gravity of the situation and 
in order to ameothen relations between the two wings, 
flew to Dacca for negotiation with the Aweml League. 
In order to create a climate of goodwill, President 
Yahya Khan ordered the array to withdraw to the barracks. 
Negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujlb went on and 
a stage was reached ^ e n Bhutto leader of People's 
Party was called to Dacca for consultation. The period 
of negotiation was ut i l ized by the West Pakistan 
Military ^unta to further reinforce military contingents 
in Sast Pakistan. I t has also been scdd that the 
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negotiations vere a cover for the military preparations 
an excuse to gain time. (273). 
C9 Civil War 
Bhutto was not prepared for any compromise with 
Mujib on s i x point progreanme because this w>uld establ ish 
hegemony of the £ast Pakistan in the p o l i t i c s of 
Pakistan. He, therefore, ins isted that Mujib should 
withdraw f rwi the s ix points prograime and this was 
stipulated as a precondition to the cal l ing of the 
National Assembly. For Mujib, however, th is programme 
was mandate froa h is people. The overwhelming majority 
witii which people voted h i s party was the real source 
of Mujib's strength. Thus could not back out on th is 
programme, i t would have been a complete betryal of 
the people's trust . I t would be not correct to suppose 
that one man (be i t Mujib or Gandhi) can cause p o l i t i c a l 
or social revolution. I t s the masses who are ultimately 
responsible for change. This was the case in East 
Bengal too (79). 
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C91 Futltc Pro^a^ 
Ihe mass uprising against postponement of the 
meeting of National Assembly was so spontaneous and 
widespread that i t created terror among tiie Pakistani 
rulers . They were convinced that no aaount of persua-
sion could deten the people from their demand for 
sutonexny. I t became necessary for the Vest Pakistan 
mil itary oligarchy to crush the people's movement, 
When he f e l t that adequate military force had reached 
Dacca, President Tahya Khan abruptly put end to 
negotiation with Mujib and flew back to Rawalpindi 
(173, 258, 261, 263). 
Sheikh Mujib gave a ca l l for general strike 
and that very night Mujib was arrested and reign of 
terror was l e t loose on the innocent people. Ihe 
leaders of the Awami League ware arrested at their 
residences and army was posted around their homes 
processions were mercilessly fired at . The harrowing 
ta les of a troc i t ies were once part of medieval f i c t ion 
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and history becane contemporary history. The Pakistan 
amy not only commutted massacre, they layonnetted 
babies, maimed boys and l e t loose their l u s t , upon 
innocent women. 
At attempt at select ive genocide was carried 
out, elemlnatlng the Inte l lectuals in the East Bengal. 
Doctors, lawyers and writers became the special target 
of the West Pakistan army, ^ e y were arrested from 
their homes, taken to unknown destination never to 
return. !Diese horrifying misdeeds of Pakistan army 
have been described in the despatches of foreign 
Journalists. The press in East Pakistan was completely 
gagged and the censorship inside was to ta l . 
Foreign journalists who were neutral in th i s 
conf l ic t have reported these ta les of terror to their 
respective papers. Anthony Mascemas in h is book aptly 
ent i t led 'Rape of Bangladesh' has given f i r s t hand 
account of these repressive measures. Just as the gas 
chambers were Hit lers f ina l solution of Jewish problem, 
so was th is military ol igarely army crack down concreved 
as a f ina l solution to the uprising of the Bengali 
3 1 
people. Mascemas has quoted one Pakistan Officer 
saying 've are determined to cleanse our East Pakistan 
once for a l l of the tiireat of session even I t means 
k i l l ing 2 mill ion people and ruling of the province 
as a colony.' (260, 292). 
C93 After affects of repressive measures at c\v\cL 
Muktl Bahlnl 
The blood of the martyrs I s always ttie price 
the Independence. The a troc i t i es by Pakistan army 
could not break the wi l l and determination of the 
people as a matter of fact I t generated courage deter-
mination. Ihe mere they vere suppressed, the more 
firm and loud was their voices for Independence. 
People's l iberation gathered round Muktl Bahlnl. 
Muktl Bahlnl symbolised people's struggle for l iberation 
of East Bengal from the rule of West Pakistan. This 
struggle was not a struggle between centra l i s t s and 
secess ionists or Integratlonlsts and dls lntegrat lonls t . 
I t was a struggle against veiled co lonla l l sa . ' I t was 
a blast to the two nation theory' on the basis of \^lch 
Pakistan was founded. (56, 58, 78, 116, 125, 221,294). 
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1h« a troc i t i e s of the Pakistanis made people 
leave their land of birth and seek refugee elsewhere 
in India, I t vas inevitable for India as such to have 
got involved in th i s conf l ict and i t s repercussions. 
Huge caravans of refugees leaving their hearth and 
home, marched to India. Ihey carried ta les of horror. 
Many women and children, Hindus and Muslims, old and 
young - a l l those ^ o could possibly f lee from the 
scene of horror found their way to West Bengal. On 
hunanitiarian grounds Government of India provided 
shelter to these victims of military oligarchy, soon 
a steady wave of refugees crossed the frontiers into 
West Bengal - Every day tiiey poured in , not in hundred 
but hundreds of thousands, soon their nunber reached 
mi l l ions . They were put up in refugee camps. (21, 63, 
65-67, 73, 97) . 
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Chapter 'D' 
IIBDIA'S MYOLYaiEMT 
Dl Refugee Influx's Impact on India 
The East Pakistan r e f u s e s presence In India 
not only ci^eated the problem of providing them with 
food* clothes and shelter hut also posed problems of 
law and order for Government of India. In order to 
meet the expenditure on these refugees re l i e f tax 
was imposed in the form of a levy on postage and revenue 
receipt stamps. 
Dl l Pakistan point of view 
This action of India was not viewed with favour 
i n West Pakistan. India was charged for encouraging 
the guer i l la f i l t e r s . India was also charged with 
having expeoisionist plans. This was the old tact ics 
of PsJcistan whenever whenever i t was confronted with 
the problem of internal ins tab i l i ty i t attempted to 
embrail India. It repeated the old tac t i c s and vAien 
i t found i t s e l f unable to suppress the popular movement 
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fo r autonomy In East Bengal, i t sought t o d ive r t 
a t t e n t i o n by accusing India of being responsible for 
t h i s secess ion i s t s movement vAilch was the outccftie of 
i t s repress ion. Anti India propaganda was put In f u l l 
swing. (54-55, 62, 66-67, 74-78, 81-82). 
D12 Ind ia ' s point of view 
By the end of June more than s i x mi l l ion 
refugees had made t h e i r way to India. !Qie number was 
growing at an alanDing r a t e . Presence of these refugees 
burdened India not only eoGaanlcally but p o l i t i c a l l y too 
i t created problems. These refugees were foreign 
na t iona ls who had sought refugee in our country. They 
could not be accepted as Indian c i t i zens as ne i the r 
they nor Government of India had any in ten t ion of 
malcing India t h e i r peiraanent home. They were a l l keen 
t o go back to t h e i r homes provided the conditions were 
normal. Theirs was purel^ ?^ a humaiiitariari problem. 
Ihey were in d i s t r e s s aiid i t was our duty t o he lp . 
They were d r i f t i n g mass of homeless, r o o t l e s s and 
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aenaltlve people who could not be refused shelter. 
(56-57, 65-65, 68, 73, 291). 
Reprisals also led to aimed incidents along the 
border between Pak and India. Qie Pakistsui rulers 
diarged India of aiming and training of Mukti Bahini 
which was carrying on the struggle against Pakistan. 
The Mukti Bahini which had the support of the people 
of East Pakistan began to grow in strength and 
influence. !Die increasing popalarity of the Uukti 
Bahini, the guarrilla tactics it adopted created a 
sense of insecurity among the Pakistan army and its 
collaborators, the Razakar. Pakistan army needed 
these razakara to help it. In return for their 
assistance these razakars were allowed to indulge in 
looting, arson and rape (65, 76). 
D3 foreign Powers Attitude. 
Pakistan atmy*s atrocities and the refugees 
tales of terror were ignored by the Goveinments of 
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Other coioitries. JLB a matter of fact world opinion was 
divided en refugee problem. Zhere were some countries 
mostly in the middle East viho were influenced by 
Pakistan diplomacy and propaganda i^ich held India 
responsible for the presence of refugees on i t s s o i l . 
Qxere were other countries l ike U.S.S.R. and U.K. who 
f e l t that refugees must go back to their land. Hoet 
of the countries weres s i l e n t spectator to th i s grin 
drama. Xhe conscience of the world was roused but the 
aorexnments did nothing more than offering l ip sympathy 
and doling out some aid. President Podgomy addressed 
a l e t t er to President Yahya Khan expressing the concern 
of h i s people and Grorerxtaent over the death and destruc-
t ion in East Bengal* Some Gorerxments organised re l i e f 
operators but they were of limited nature. Ihe 
Govenment of United States m£iint€U.ned s t r i c t neutrality 
by declaring that the misdeeds by Pakistan array on 
defenceless people of East Bengal were a purely an 
internal affair and any intezrference would mean inter-
ference In the internal affairs of Pakistan. The U.S.A., 
could escape with th is plea but India could hardly afford 
4 
to Igjiore 8 l z mil l ion refugees on i t s s o i l . India's 
problem was something l ike that 30 years. "Here was 
the deliberate ezterminatiotn of the race for the take 
a mythical realopol i t ik . (62, 70, 221, 505). 
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IIODQ soy IE I TREA!PY 
In the midst of Indo-Pak tensions negotiations 
had been started for an Indo Soviet friendship and 
cooperation trea'fy and the treaty was signed on 
9 August 1971* ^ e dragmatic way in which this treaty 
was drafted aM signed. !Bie speed and seci*ec;y with 
which the negotiations were conducted took the world 
by surprise. According to the tesois of the treaty the 
two countries were to cooperate with each other for 
20 years in the f i e ld of science, culture and economic 
developDent, i t also proylded for mutual consultation 
in tbe case of aggression. 
The treaty was more in the nature of a friendship 
treaty than a military pact between the two countries 
where by they undertook to safeguard each other's 
t e r r i t o r i a l integrity by providing mil i tary aid. 
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£1 Paklfltan's criticism 
But thlB treaty nevertheless did strengthen the 
hands of India and It was natural that Pakistan should 
have viewed th is treaty with greatest suspicion and 
voiced harsh crit icism. !Ehe PsUclstan Times declared 
"Russia and India are two witterest anti-Islaniic 
countries". It doubted USSR's neutarality and went on 
to say that this pact was "reminescent of the Nazi-
Soviet treaty on the eve of Hit ler 's invasion of Poland. 
(217-219, 223-24, 317). 
£2 foreign powers 
She London Times viewed the treaty as intended 
both as warning to China not to intervene if the war 
hrealcs out with PalcLstan and a waxsiing to Pakistan not 
to begin the f i t t i n g . It described i t as "well 
designed stroke". !Ihe world reaction to th i s treaty 
was by and large that of s i l en t observers. China also 
cr i t i c i s ed the treaty with i t s usual vehemence reserved 
for USSR, cal l ing USSR investigators of expansionism 
4? 
and s o c i a l l i ape r i a l l a t s . (22^ '26) . 
At home 
Even in India the t r e a t y did not escape c r i t i c iam. 
Mrs. Gandhi was c r i t i c i s e d by actae for giving up the 
t r a d i t i o n a l pol icy of nonalignment and of a l igning 
herse l f with Soviet Block. I t was however general ly 
agreed here t h a t the t r e a t y was hoth in the i n t e r e s t of 
Soviet Ifaton and India (220-22), 
Impact of JTreaty 
Both diplomatical ly and m i l i t a r i l y i t was an 
achievement for India. I t helped her t o counter act the 
f r iendly ' t i l t * of Peking and Washington from the point 
of view of USSR also t h i s t r e a t y was a b e f i t t i n g reply 
t o the growing Influence of Pekizig in Islamabad. As we 
s h a l l see l a t e r In our discussion of the ro le of USA 
and China in 1971 war, the Enterprise movement was 
nea t ly counter balanced by USSR by moving i t s submarines 
i n t o the Indian ocean. (^1.-2^ Q) 
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caiapter «F» 
INDO-PAK WAR 1971 
Fl Diplonatic tfforts 
Ih«r« was coasid«rable diplomatic aetlTlty 
both eountrias triad intansivaly to mobilisa world 
opinion around thair points of viav. It appaars that 
Indian point of viav did atir tha world's conscianca 
but f ailad to st ir tha goTomaants to any tangibla 
maasura of stuport (55, 5P, 97). 
Iha main affort of Pakistan was to malign 
India and put tha blma for tha atrocitias on India's 
shouldars. It was arguad that tha Nukti Bahini was 
trainad and aquippad by India and i t was this 
guarrilla forca vhich waa oraating law and ordar 
problam for tha Pakistan army vhich had to adopt 
raprassiva measuras. India was said to hava a vaatad 
intarast in ancouraging tha rafugeas bacausa i t 
dasirad Pakistan's spl i t . 
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W#8t Pmkittan't h«t« eompaign against India 
began to gain intanaity. India was viavad as arch 
•namy of Pakistan and paoplo vara mada to baliaya 
that tha prasant troubles of Pskistan vera fostarad 
and fonantad by India. India was ha Id rasponsibia 
for East Bengal's revolt. (54-55,58,68,66-67,74-75, 
80-81,83,90-91). 
Indian contention vas that as a result of 
atrocities conuaitted by the Pakistan army on the 
unanaed Bengalees there vas stream or refugees pouring 
into India* Providing them shelter vas a hunanitarian 
problem, but the return of these refxigees vras 
certainly a political question. (56-57,63,68-70). 
F121,Indian leaders' v i s i t abroad 
Ihe world's apathy and criminal indifference 
tovarda the atrocities inflicted by tiie Pakistan army 
disturbed Indian government. After the moon-soon 
session of Parliament Mrs* Indira Gandhi and some 
other representatives of Government undertook foreign 
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tour to rals« tht oonicl«nee of the vorld on th« 
itsut of r«fug««f now la India, Mrs* Oandhl't main 
•ffort was to clarify India's stand on this vital 
issus* Shs hopsd to convince the vorld of the 
urgency of the situation, She hoped that western 
countries would pressurise Tahya Khan into finding 
some polit ical solution to tSie problem, but ttiis 
exercise in diplomacy proved fut i l e . 
Hrs« Gandhi and her representatives earned 
some donations for refugee relief but even then the 
main burden continued to be on India's shoulders. 
Apart financial consideration the presence of 
9,700)000 refugees threatened to create social 
t u n o i l and revival of coamwal tensions. 
Every effort of India for just and humani-
tarian solution was criticised by Pakistan. Even 
cultural activit ies abroad vera termed as motivated 
to alienate international sympathy from Pakistan. 
Ihe Indian leaders v i s i t abroad to spell out India's 
policy towards East Bengal was naturally viewed wilii 
vesentment* Pakistan Times called these diplomatic 
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•ffortt as "asiault in tht disguise against 
Pakistan. (2,3,63,70,91,96) 
Indian leaders trip abroad did win wide 
display of public syapathy for India's enormous 
burden of the refugees* Ihe British press advised 
the British Government to forego posturing and take 
up fully committed position of s\q)port to India 
because **it was a case of democracy being in danger* 
says the Guardian* In Aaerica too the Herald Tribune 
criticised the Nixon administration for i t s indifference 
towards East Bengal ''Ihere are times for quiet 
diplomacy but to remain silent in the face of horror 
on that scale was too quiet." (64,73,76,124, 175). 
F132. Governments 
World government did nothing to diffuse the 
crises and the stream of the refugees continued. 
Mr. K.P«S» Menon in his book *Indo soviet Treaty* 
attempts to provide an answer to the question as to 
u >w 
vhat was the reatoa for this conspiracy of silsncs. 
(68,70). 
F1321, U.S.A. 
U.S.A. had no blus print for specific points 
of settlement. I t had not sufficient influence on 
India to act as mediator. I t had bilateral treaties 
(Seato and Cento) with Pakistan and did not want to 
intervene too f i n l y instead i t quietly escpressed i t s 
advice to Pakistan for settlement. (69,78). 
Russia sent stem note to President Yahya Khan 
urging him to seek polit ical solution that would end 
the bitter c iv i l %mr in East Bengal and halt the 
exodus of refugees to India. The Soviet also used 
their influence to restrain India from going to war. 
Uhder the terms of the treaty of friendaliip for 20 
years signed in August 1971, Moscow and New Delhi 
were to consult each other vhen either i s threatened 
with attack.(61,69,72,153,166,163-65,169,306,3IS). 
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pl323. China 
Though Ptklng and Ntv Delhi ware negotiating 
to re-astabli8h <lipl<xaatie exchanges, China made 
stinging attack against India in the U«N. and accused 
India of subversion and aggression. China was clearly 
lined up with Pakistan and Peking pledged help should 
Pakistan be subjected to aggression. (61,103,151-53, 
155,306,318). 
The solution was to bring UNO into the 
picture. But the fact was that though a l l the big 
powers willed to avert a conf l ic t on the subcontinent. 
None was anxious to place the issue before the security 
Coincil for the fear that they might OAt be able to 
achieve agreement Isring in hospital U»N. Secretary 
General confided to one of h i s sides "If I am suffering 
from bleeding ulcer i t i s at least in part due to 
my frustrating ef forts over the past eight months to 
do something about the terrible situation in East 
Bengal.*' UNO which represent the governments could not 
help one better that the governments and i t was vrith 
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great difficulty that India could get a resolution 
paased by n«N» recowMnding the creation of proper 
climate for the return of refugees from India. 
Pakistan vieved this resolution as a result of undue 
mmiiptt « influence used by India. It also criticised 
the Western press for unsympathetic attitude towards 
India. 
Pakistan did nothing to Implement the UNO 
resolution for finding polit ical solution to the 
problem. Instead Pakistan press declared that 
Pakistan was being subjected to concerted foreign 
bullying i t cal ls the Western Press's sympathy as 
•hysteria". (71, 146-47). 
F2» war threats 
After her three week tour Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
adopted a 'wait and see' attitude in the Indian 
Parliament. She pleaded for restraint and patience. 
She said that "solutions have been found even to 
seemingly unsoluable problems". Evidently she hoped 
that world would pressurise Pakistan to find the 
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solution tor the ha l t of refugees* But tensions 
continued to mount and though avare of the danger 
of escalation the big powers did not make any efforts 
to solve the crises* Ihe Pakistan army continued i t s 
policy of ruthless terror and refugees s t i l l poured 
into India and guerril la a e t i y i t i e s near the border 
led to Indo Pakistan border skirmishes* These border 
skirmishes made the war inevitable at tex^ leas t in 
the Eastern borders* By putting Mujib Rahman on 
t r i a l Yahya Khan aggrevated the chances of war* (57, 
59,60,76,79,100). 
Tensions began, to mount* The second phase 
of India's involv«Bent in East Bengal cr i ses was over 
on 20 November 1971 when India sent i t s army across 
the £astem borders to end Pakistan military rule in 
East Pakistan so as to enable the refugees to ret\im 
to their homes. India was driven to this step when 
i t s peaceful ef forts failed* I t was not an ent irely 
unexpected more* (97,104-06). 
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f i t ^ r fiUft^H VY f«)ag^m 
Ih« Pakistan air force made preemtlve air 
strikes on the evening of 2nd December 1971• These 
attacks vere directed against India's bases al6ng the 
Western border. They vent right i^to Agra. London 
Times report that Indian government was taken 
completely by surprise by the air attacks on her 
western border. President Yahya Khan justified the 
action "vhen India launched a ful l scale attack on 
us we had no choice but to go to war".(100) 
F5, F9faaa 4093^ fffftt^ 9Q pf yay 
These air strikes marked the beginning of 
host i l i t i es between India and Pakistan. The fomal 
declaration was made by President Yahya Khan on 
3rd Dec 1971 evening. He called this war 'Jehad*. 
On the same night Indian Prime Minister too made 
broadcast about Pakistan aggression on India. 
Mrs. Gandhi announced in Parliament India's recognition 
of Bangladesh. 
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F6. strategy and Tactlca 
The war lasted for 14 days* The fighting was 
different from the 1965 conf l ict to the extent that 
the 1966 var was conflmed to the wettem borders* 
n i l s 1971 conf l ict was more Intense and vide spread. 
(94,97, 126). 
while on the western borders the Indian 
strategy was to keep the Pakistan forces away from 
Indian borders. In the Eastern wing the policy was 
swift penetration into the territory of the Sast Bengal 
in order to force ttie enemfr's forces to surrender. 
In ttie eastern wing the C(MQbined forces of the Mukti 
Bahini and Indian army operated loider a unified command, 
as far as India was concerned the main objective was 
*o u t i l i s e this conf l ict for the l iberation of Bangla 
Desh. So far as Pakistan i s concerned i t s aim was to 
terrorise India and deter i t fxvm interfering in Bast 
Bengal. 
India's strategy in the air and on the sea was 
to cripple the Pakistan air force and navy. Our Indian 
5a 
navy bomberded Karachi and blocked i t in 1:die east. 
I t f a i t that if this coiild b« done sueeetsfiaiy i t 
vould shorten the period of war and take away some 
of the sting out of the Pakistan strength. 
On the western front there %ra8 heayy fighting 
in the Chaab area. The Pakistan army wanted to drive 
towards Kashmir but tbere was strong resistance from 
the Indian side. The reports on the f i t t i n g by the 
foreign correspondents seem to indicate tliat the scales 
were definitely in favour of India. (109-110). 
On the eastern borders the strategy adopted 
by Lt. Commandent Jag j i t Singh Arora %ras a very mature 
one* He ordered his army to march towards Dacca from 
three sides. The Indian army was marching into East 
Bengal - they were fully siqpported by local population* 
On the other hand Pakistan army suffered from many 
handicaps. I t was no longer possible for Pakistan 
army to maintain i t s l ines of simply in East Pakistan. 
Ibis created low morale when line of supply was cut. 
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Ihey had to depend on local rasources uhlch had 
nearly dried up« Ihe Indian air force rendered 
completely In active the Pakistan air force repea-
tedly by attacking the air post at Dacca* This 
further weakened Pakistan*! (109) military position 
depriving i t of air cover, vihen Pakistan army in 
East Pakistan found defeat inevitable, i t tried 
for a time to take higher price for victory from 
Indian army in terms of casualities. (106). 
To avoid blood shed the Indian C-in-C 
General Manekshav advised Pakistan amy commander 
Major General Niazi to surrender to protect the 
l ives of his soldiers. He insured them safe conduct 
in case of surrender, Ihe Pakistan forces accepted 
discretion as better part of valour and on Dec,17, 
1971. Major General Niazi made the fomal surrender. 
General Niazi surrendered so as to avoid 
loss of l ives , without any outside support, he 
eoxild not resist long. He was assured by General 
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Yahya Khan that very shortly soma mlracla would 
happen ^ loh would help the Pakistan army to continue 
the fight. In the meantime Washington decided to 
move the 7th Fleet into the Bay of Bengal ostensibly 
to eyacuate American nationals from Dacca* But i t 
was very obvious that i t had other purposes than the 
mere evacuations of 256 Mericans from East Bengal. 
It was to awe India and counter any Soviet ship that 
might appear in this area« Ihis was met by the USSR 
declaration that i t would not tolerate presence of 
/•erican warships in Bay of Bengal.(111-L2,132,134-3*), 
164,166-68,170-71,178 ). 
With the surrender of Pakistan forces to the 
joint eommsnd of Indian army and Mukti Bahini, the 
Indian Prime Minister declared unilateral ceasefire. 
After the fa l l i t become clear that Indians had no 
military objectives in the west, once l^e declared 
aim ot Bangla Deal's liberation had been achieved. 
(176). 
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Chapf r 'G» 
Bangla Desh i s a nav antrant into the 
community of nations. Ita future polit ical struc-
ture, diplomatic role, economic stabilization are 
s t i l l very uncertain. I t i s a nation bom out of 
% a^t may be called one of the most cruel and bloody 
repressions in Modern History. It i s also a nation 
which was created with the help of Indian aras. 
These factors unevitably leave their impress on the 
national tamper. The jealous nationalism, the search 
for a separate identity and especially vis-a-vis 
Pakistan, the tremendous taste of economic recons-
truction and the internal violence and instability 
are results of this situation prevailing at i t s birth. 
(106,124-26,159,268-70,301-307), 
01, Constitution and Political Problems 
The sheikh was released on P-1-72 and imme-
diately proclaimed that the new state would be secular 
democratic socialist ic and non-aligned. An ordinance 
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vas II issued promulgating a provisional constitution 
of Bangla Desh on 11th J8n.*72 and Fh«i)di Mujlb beeeun* 
Prins Minister* Mr. Abu sased Chowdhry vas the 
President, Thereafter elections were held to form a 
Constituent Assembly % i^ch framed the constitution 
that came into force in Nov, 1972. The f irst Parlia-
ment elected under the new Constitution had an over-
vhelming Avami League Majority, though violence has 
continued to prevail, hindering stabilization at the 
administrative and polit ical level . The polit ical 
and constitutional developments therefore vdll be 
%rat^ ed with interest. 
G2. Economic Hehabilitation 
Ibe pak-repression and the subsequent 
independence movement and war led to widespread and 
very heavy economic destruction, one of the f irs t tasks 
XmkM of the Bangla Desh Government vas to make a plan 
for restarting industries and make the desrt4}ted 
national economy once again viable. The Bangladesh 
announced a 2,000 crores plan for rehabilitation of 
war torn refugees etc . shaikh Mujibur Bshaan appealed 
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to the U.NtO* and the \foTlA community for help. India 
had already offered a 25 ciores i n i t i a l loan and 15 
mill ion foreign exchange to the Bangla Desh Qovemaent* 
The n«&«B*R« also offered large scale tedinical and 
economic aid to Bangla Desh. Some help vas also 
forthconing from the U.s* and Great Britain e t c . 
Hovever, the economy of Bangla Desh has s t i l l to 
recover from the impact of the pak army ravages and 
Uie destruction during the \<ar e t c . In tlie context 
of tae international economic situation and the general 
c r i s i s of developing and under developed countries 
this poses a big problem indeed. Bangla Desh received 
recognition from a nitaber of nation very early. 
G3. International Halations 
Ihe international relations of tlie new state 
are in considerable measure determined by the nature 
of i t s blrtli. Ekiergence of Bangladesh has had impact 
on the po l i t i ca l climate of the world. (304,311). 
G31. BelaUon with India and South East Asia 
Ihe relation with i t s immediate neighbour 
India are understably coordial in th i s i n i t i a l staffs. 
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Hovevtr Bangla Dash i s a new nation and i s vary 
tansitiva of i t s idantlty and indapandanca* It 
%rould naturally lika to outgrow i t s aarly dapandanca 
of Indian bayonats and aid as soon as possibla* 
Its position has lad to tha Bangla Dash laadarship 
claiming thair nation to ba a south-East JLsian 
country and a bridga batvaan the South and south East 
Asian Povars. Its muslim population gives i t soma 
affiraity with tha Watt Asian Arab states despite 
the insistently secular/socialistic image projected 
by the Government and laadaritolp. All these factors 
present special diplomatic problems in Indo-Bangladesh 
relationship* Iha economic cooperation batvaen two 
States has s t i l l to be worked out. Ho%fever, some 
attMspts at a start have been made by discussion on 
possibla Joint trade ventures and joint flood control 
and river harnessing proJects. (308-06). 
032. Helatiorxa witti Pakistan 
d a relations with Pakistan started with 
open and violent host i l i ty and have moved towards 
normalisation somewhat slowly. The fate of the P.o.WSi 
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some of vhoB Bangladesh wishes to try for their crimes 
against hwanity', the problem of repatriation of 
Biharis, or non-Bengalees Pakistanis from Bangladesh 
and of Bengalees from pak^ the Bangladesh claim for 
repatariationy; and the important issue of Pak recog-
nit ion of Bangladesh a l l have to be settled before 
any normal relationship can even be contemplated, 
(301,305,309). 
Q33. qetfiU9P Wi1;h Ruffgia 
With the U.s.S.R. Bangladesh has enjoyed a 
special relationship oving to the Soviet stand during 
the Indo-Pak war and ear l ier , A few montiis after h i s 
release Mujib v is i ted the Soviet Uhion and has received 
economic aluS from n«S«ft«R* as well as dipL>matic 
support. (305). 
G34. B^X^UQR V 4 ^ Gre^t B r i ^ f t 
Great Britain maintained idiat might be called 
on alt i tude of 'naenevolent neutral i ty" during the Bangla 
Desh independence struggle, sheikh Mujib was released 
in London and the British Government gave the State aid 
and recognition. Ihe Bangla Deah Government applied 
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for membership of the Commonvealtii and I t s request 
was accepted. 
She U«s«A« has recognised Bangladesh after a 
brief delay, but the U.S. Support of pak during the 
war and subsequently has l e f t a residue of suspension 
vhich makes cordial relations d i f f i c u l t , china has 
not so far recognised Bangladesh and has Vetoed the 
Bangladesh application for U.N.O. Membership. But i t 
has also kept i t s options partly open and wi l l no 
doubt recognise the country in due course. (3C4,306). 
036. Relations v t^fa Arab countries 
Ihe Arab countries have tried to act as 
mediator between Pakistan and Bangladesh as both are 
Muslim States . The Jeddal Conference of Islamic States 
sent a reconcilation Mission to Dacca (1.3.1972). 
Ibis represents a signif icant diplottatic factor \^ioh 
v l l l exercise Influence not only at Islamabad but also 
in some measure at Dacca in the future a lso . (304) 
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Ih« futurt of Bangladtsh, I ts economle and 
pollt ieal stnxsture, I ts future cultural and social 
trends, i t s role in 'v\brld polit ics and i t s relation-
ship with i t s neighbour India are as yet to fu l l of 
uncertainties and questions to be talked of with any 
definiteness* One can only vatbh with the hope that 
the Bangladesh people v i l l get the peace and happiness 
they deserve so well and that i t v i l l add a factor 
for peace, stability and development of this sub-
continent. 
• • • • 
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The 14-day war vlth Pakistan ended on 16th of 
Dec. 1971. The war had been successfiil from the 
Indlan/Bangla Desh point of view. The liberation of 
Bangla Desh had been achieved. The Pak armies in 
Bangla Desh defeated and 95,000 Prisoners of war taken 
by Indo/Bangla Command. India declared a unilateral 
ceasefire which Pakistan later reciprocated. 
Hi. Issues outstanding after Ceasefire 
However the cease-fire was by no means a viable 
permanent/long term arrangement. There were sound to 
be "incidents" ipiien two armies face each otiier, more-
over India appeared anxious to normalize relations and 
to relax, i f not remove, tensions so that she could 
concentrate on the urgent developmental taks at home. 
For Bangla Desh the achievement of permanent peace 
was also immediate necess i ty . Pakistan reqiilred 
release of her P.O.W's as well as the restoration of 
normality on the Borders, and a return of the Western 
territory under Indian occupation,(185-86,199-200) 
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H2. N«f;9Hati9Rg 
H21, India's atand on bi lateral negotiation 
On negotiations India took an early stand that 
the negotiations with Pakistan on these bi lateral 
Issvies should be direct ly between the two parties to 
the conf l ic t . This stand was clearly stated both by 
the Prime Minister and by the Indian Terms represen-
tative to the U.N.O. Mr. Sen In a l e t ter to the 
Secretary General. Ihe Indian stand was one of the 
firmness In the matter of maintaining the ceasefire 
l ine against v io lat ions , \dille expressing wil l ingness , 
even an eagerness to negotiate on a l l outstanding 
issues with Pakistan directly* 
H22. Pakistan's stand on bi lateral negotiations 
ISie Pakistan's stand was one of expressing a 
desire for peace with India, then declaring that 
Bangla Desh remained a Pakistan Province and seeking 
in various ways to bring in U.N.O. or other mediators 
by cal l ing upon the UNO HOG to supervise the ceasefire 
In Kashmir and upon the signal^ories to the Geneva 
Agreement on P.O.V*s to ensure observance of the 
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agreement etc.*, declaring that Pakistan would negotiate 
from a position of strengtii and would make no conce-
ssions under duress e t c . (184) 
H3. stBunit agreed upon 
Hoveyer after an exchange of l e t t e r s between 
Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto i t was agreed that a Suamit 
Meeting be held in June. The dates suggested by India 
were 7th/8th June, however on Mr. Bhutto's request 
the summit was fixed for the la s t week of June. 
H3. MMT^ ^ yaj^ jcg 
As a preliminary to the Sunmit emissary leve l 
talks were held between Indian and Pak Mr. Dhar and 
Mr. Aziz Ahmad representatives at Muree from the 
25th-29th of May. A Joint statement was issued 
simultaneously at New Delhi and Islamabad on the 
ta lks . (186-87). 
H4, Ihe sunmit 
H41. Ihe agenda for the sunmit 
The main issues at the Summit were the return 
of the vak. POW's, the proposed t r i a l of certain POW's 
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as war criminals by Bangla Desh Government (195), the 
Kashmir i s sue , the withdrawal of troops from each 
others t err i tor i e s . Ibere were no preconditions by 
either side to the Summit and no mediation by any 
outsiders was to be accepted. 
H42, Simla Accord 
Ihe Simla Sinmit took place on the 2Pth of June. 
After a preliminary deadlock ^ i c h seemed to be 
leading to a breakdown, success was achieved and the 
Simla Agreement was signed on the 3rd of July. ISie 
Agreement came into force on the 5th of August,and 
implementation talks were held between Indo-Pak 
representatives on the 25tii of August 1972. "Die 
delineation issue was one which caused much tension, 
there appeared to be a deadlock, s ix rounds of parties 
between commanders led to no resul t . Pakistan appeared 
to be adopting delaying . However, f ina l ly 
Pakistan admitted i t s agreement in Jammu, and l ines of 
delineation acceptable to both sides were arrived at . 
India vacated 5,139 sq.miles of Pak territory. Pakistan 
withdraw for 69 sq.miles of Indian territory occupied 
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by It* over 6,000 were repatriated by Pakistan after 
delineation of the new line of control. (188.91,194). 
H421. Criticiam of accord 
H4211. Oit ic iam in India and Pakistan 
Ihe agreement has had i t s c r i t i c s on both 
s ides . In India the Jan sangh leader A.B.Vajpayee 
has clubbed i t a "se&l out" and a *'black agreement.** 
In Pakistan i t has been termed by some a surrender. 
(179,192, 194, 198) 
H4212. International reactions 
Internationally the Simla Agreement received 
general approval. I t was appreciated not only in 
Britain,U.S*A. and the U.S.S.R. but even the Chinese 
ejq}re88ed their satisfaction declaring i t was '*one of 
tiie factors %fhich could lead to a detente in Asia." 
(193, 196-97) 
H422. Assessment of agreement 
However, i t marked a new stage, a new point 
of departure in Indo-Pak relat ion. The no-war declaration 
7 ) 
and the principle of bi lateral negotiations were an 
achievement special ly welcome from the point of view 
of Indian diplomacy as i t vendlcated a fundamental 
Indian Stand. However, I t was also beneficial to 
Pakistan and lessoning tensions and helping to give 
the s tab i l i ty a to the elected leader of Pakistan, 
Mr. Bhutto. In th i s sense, apart from the immediate 
agreement on withdrawal e t c . , i t was much more posit ive 
than a mere-no-war declaration. The later agreements 
signed s ince, have proved the correctness of this 
assessment of the Simla accord. (194-95) 
H433. Issues s t i l l outstanding 
!Ibe Simla A^greement was only tiie f i r s t small 
step in the d i f f i cu l t task of establishing peace and 
cooperation in the Indian sub-continent. Not only the 
immediate problems of the return of POW's, the recog-
nit ion of Bangla Dash by Pakistan, the settlement of 
the Kashmir issue remained. There are other long term 
factors such as foreign encouragement and military aid 
to the Pak military Janta, jSmerican and other foreign 
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powers activit ies in the area and in the Indian ocean 
s t i l l remain very much unsolved.(196-98). 
At best i t can be said that the Simla Agreement 
provides a useful model for further negotiations. 
P i L ^ I i J t t f Q q A F f f Y 
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V2I19 FOREIGN POUCY, INDIA 
1 . SURENDSR MOHAN 
India's foreign policy - the P.S.P. view, 
India Quart 23. i; 196?; 10-15. 
Vlhile dealing with India's foreign policy 
touches upon Indo-Pak relat ions . Author a PSP leader 
for sees a poss ib i l i ty that "Pakisteoi in her enmity 
against India would become China's cat paw. Large 
scale in f i l t ra t ions in Jaoimu and Kashmir by armed 
personnel of Pakistan and presence of Pakistani 
nationals in Assam shows Pakistan had become a partner 
of China. India needs reappraisal of her foreign 
policy and non-alignment. 
72»19 (zB) ^ g V3J1132 'Nyi . 
EAST BENGAL (6ANGLAD6SH) influencing 
DIPLOMACY, INDIA 
2 . ABDUL MAJID 
Triflers with truth. 
Pakistan Times 25 . 129; 1971, June 17*, 4»3 . 
Reviews with resentment Indian leaders v i s i t 
abroad to spel l out India's policy towards East Bengal. 
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3« MURARKA (Dev) 
Vftiat Mrs. Gandhi got out of Moscow? 
P«ki«tan Tlmag 25, 142; 1971, 12 October, 4*3 
CriUclsas Indira Gandhi for taking trip to USSR 
to earn sympathy for East Bengal. 
V2tl9 (zP) 'NeS DSFBNCE, INDIA 
4 . KAUL (BM) 
Planning Security. 
Seainar 1966, July; 20-22. 
The paper contributed to synposiun on problem 
of Security in Indian sub continent, reviews defence 
planning in India and discusses e f fect of Indo-Pakistan 
war 1965 on planning for defence. 
5 . KUNZRU (HN) 
Lessons of the Indo-Pakistan war. 
India Quart 22, s ; 1966 July-September,p. 215. 
Cr i t i c i ses Govt, of India's unpreparedness to 
meet 1962 Chinese invasion and to face Pakistan during 
recent war, attributes fai lure to meet these challenges 
to lack of a clear policy^ hence the mil itary authorities 
could not prepare the plans before hand. 
7? 
6. MUKHERJE&CS) 
Strategy of war or peace? 
Seminar 1966, July*, 23-26. 
Suggests strategic pr ior i t i e s for defence. 
Examines implication of increased allocation for 
defence in the l ight of Indo-Pakistan 1965. 
V2J19 (zP) "s DSFBNCE, INDIA. S t a t i s t i c s 
7. HARBAKSH SINGH 
Military s i tuation. 
Shakti 7, 1-2; 197i; 6-8. 
Provides mil i tary s ta t i s t i c s^ discusses impact 
of Indo-Pakistan war on the future defence planning of 
India. 
8 . India-Pakistan Military balance sheet. 
Far fiast Boon Rev 44*, 1971 October 30; P. 
Assesses strategic strength situation of India. 
Source of th i s military balance sheet 1971-72 i s Inter-
national Stratet lc InstitiiW^ London* 8 s t a t i s t i c a l 
survey, ; ^\ 
V , . • T i 
n 
V2»19 (zP)JSg V2X193 (zM) 'N?! 
WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, InflUBncing 
DEFENCE, INDIA 
9 . APPODARAI (A) 
Essays In Indian p o l i t i c s and fore ign p o l i c y . 
1971, Vlkas PubUcat ion , De lh i , P252. 
Chapt 14 presents an I n t e r e s t i n g d i scuss ion 
on the Tashkent agreement. The writer says th&t 
Tashkent and preceding Indo-Pak c o n f l i c t s have brought 
h(xae to India* Ihat we should not l i v e any longer in 
an unreal world. 'In context of Pakis tan ' s growing 
fr iendship - with China - %*iich hfls already developed 
Nuclear Capacity, i t behoves India to re-examine her 
dec i s ion not to make nuclear v;eapons. 
V2J19 ( l 2 , 9 3 ) BOUNDARIES,FOREIGN POUCY,INDIA 
10 . CHAKRAVARTI (PC) 
Evolution of India*s northern borders. 
1971, Asia Publishing House, New D e l h i , P179. 
Chakravarti develops the t h e s i s that Ind ia ' s 
northern borders have come to be as they are because 
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bas i ca l ly the Br i t i sh ru l e r s regarded these as the 
northern l imi t for I n d i a ' s secur i ty needs. If other 
f ac to r s (geographical and c u l t u r a l e t c . ) also bear 
upon the border d i spu te , they sl:iould be regarded as 
secondary to the c e c t r s l t hes i s of s t r a t e g i c consi-
dera t ion . There are i n t e r e s t i ng side l i g h t s on 
Br i t i sh des igns . Well worth reading for those 
In te res ted in Indo-Pak and s ino-Indian a f f a i r s . 
V2tig8 IWDO PAK RELATIONS 
11. BHUTTO (Zulfikar All) 
Myth of Independence. 
1969, Oxford University P r e s s , London^ PIPP. 
Chapt 9 on Indo-Pak war^ Chapt 18, o r ig in of 
dispute with Indla^ Chapt 19 confrontation with India . 
12» RAY (Jayanta Kiaar) 
India and Pakistan as f ac to r s in each o thers 
foreign p o l i c i e s . 
I n t . Stud 8, 1-2; 1966; July-October; 49-63. 
Provides analysis of India Pakistan as f ac to r s 
in each other foreign pol icy . Both countr ies are worried 
83 
iiow otiier na t ioas evaluate t h e i r quar re l s e spec ia l ly 
on Kashmir. The a r t i c l e puts forward the theory tha t 
Pakistan drif ted towards China because i t perceved 
danger from India and now chances of f r i end l iness 
recede because China i s egging on Pakistan to 
aggressiveness, 
72:193: g INDO PAK RSLAXIONS Cri t ic ism 
13* A great nat ion be calmed: India d ra f t s in i so la t ion , 
Round Tabl 224", 1966, October; 430-36, 
Nothing would impart ths drive and mobil i ty 
tha t Indian foreign policy needs more than accord with 
Pakis tan . This needs on I n d i a ' s side reappra isa l of 
some of the assunptlons underlying her present pol icy 
and on Pak i s t an ' s side greater realism and sense of 
her own re spons ib i l i t y for t h i s urifortunate muddle. 
Unti l then the s i tua t ion would continue to d r i f t , 
qui te a few fear an armed a t tack by Pakis tan. This 
time with open Chinese sxipport, Russ ia ' s posi t ion i s 
now tha t of an guaranter of Tashkent set t lement. Both 
s ides seek USSR's inf luence. 
8i 
V2t 193 ^ g V2P 1958 'Nee <— N47 
INDO RDSSIAN RELATIONS,Influencing 
INDO PAK flSLATIONS, 1947-66 
14 . KAPOR (Harlah) 
Sov ie t Uolon and Indo Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
Int Sttti gy 1-2; 1966, October*, 150-67. 
Weighs the Impact of USSR on Indo Pakistan 
relations*, t races USSR India r e l a t i o n s from 1947 and 
t e l l s how USSR diplomacy moved from negat ive n e u t r a l i t y 
and expressed I t s concern over de ter iora t ion of Indo-
Psk r e l a t i o n s . Of Tashkent agreement the author says 
I t s s i g n i f i c a n t success l i e s In making the tvo countr ies 
agree to agreement. 
V2tl98 ^ g V3:19 (zS) 
ARKAMBNT POLICY, PAKISTAN l n f l \ » n c l n g 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
15. QUBBSHI (Khallda) 
Aims aid to India and Pakistan. 
Pakistan Horizon 2 0 , 2\ 1967; 136-50. 
Surveys the Implicat ions of the m i l i t a r y pacts 
and al lancesentered Into by Pakistan with foreign 
countries. Ihe author in the process of defending her 
ovn coxmtry loses her sense of object iv i ty . Accuses 
India of exaggerating China's mil itary aid to Pakistan. 
16. RAMA RAO (R) 
Pakistan reams. 
India Quart 27, 2\ 1971, April-June*, 140-45. 
Military build-up of Pakisteoi i s discussed wLth 
special reference to U.S. mil itary aid and i t s impact 
on Indo-Pakistan relat ion. Motivation behind th i s 
defence build-up i s analysed. 
V2J193, 224, Ga 1-1 (MV) 'NSe 
BIG MIUTARY POWERS influencing 
TENSIONS,INDO PAK RELATIONS 
17. CHANDRA (Romeah) 
Forward from Tashkent. 
Afro Asian Wld Aff 3 , 31*, 1966*, p 1-4 . 
The author discussetc tiie imperialist powers 
eagerness to revive the conf l ict to bring the whole 
question back to Imperialist orbit by reviving Kashmir 
question in U.N. According to him Pakistan's membership 
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of mil itary pacts a i s a factor of primary significance 
in allowing imparialist interference in Indo-Pak 
conf l i c t . 
T2tl93, 194, Ga 73 (X) *N6 
QNIISD STATES EC(»I0M1C AID influencing 
TENSIONS, INDO PAK RELATIcaiS 
18, Indo-Pakistan relatione and foreign aid prospects. 
Caciifti 157, 3944; 1967, January 19; 111-12. 
President Johnson has given clear warning that 
economic and food aid to India and PaJcistm would be 
stopped vmless India-Pakistan improve relations 
**Becent Soviet overtures towards Pakistan, including 
reported plan of Kosygin to v i s i t Pakistaii soon show 
Russian anxiety to prevent Pakistan going to Chinese 
sphere of influence. President Johnson's repeated 
reference to India Pakistan well indicate an anxiety 
to prevent Pakistan from fa l l ing into the hands not 
only of China but also of Russia. '^  
8i 
V2:lJ}3, «241 'NQ5 < N47 
CAUSES, TENSIONS, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 
1947-65 
20. BRIHES (RusMl) 
Indo-Pakistan conf l i c t , 
1963, Pal l Mall Press, London. P4R1. 
The aathoJ' tracos tha genesis of Indo-Pak 
conf l ict 1965 rroia partition of India t i l l Dashkant 
agreeaent, the book ends with the question -xR "after 
Tashkent War or Peace," 
V2I193, 2241, N'71 
CAU3SS, TENSlONo, INDO PAK aErjlTia^S,1971 
21 . India and Pakistan^ Poised for war. 
Time 1971, December 6\ p. 8-13. 
A thought provoking art ic le on the tensions 
and motives which hav^ e bui l t \xp the war situation in 
the Indian sub continent* Canaiual hatred, British 
fai lure to make provision for India's 601 princely 
s ta te s , %&en self detenaination was announced and 
e lect ions «<ere ^eld on the sub continent In 1947, 
Katfuair issue which has beccxce a festering wound between 
8J 
the two countries^ foreign powers especia l ly U.S.A.'s 
constant wooing of Pakistan. The refugee Influx and 
constant exdiange of f i re at the Eastern borders 
escalated the dispute between the two countries. 
Analyses the dlplcmatlc situation U.S.A. did not l ike 
to play the role of mediator because I t did not have 
suff ic ient leverage with India Russian sent s tem note 
to Yahya Khan to seek p o l i t i c a l solution to check 
refugees Influx. But I t did not want to get involved 
In war and confront China, China too was not Interested 
in confrontation U.N.O. f a i l e d . 
V2I193, 2241, Ga 73 'NeS 
UNITED STATES,CAUSSS,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK REUTIONS, 1966 
22. SOM DUTT (D) 
Foreign military aid and defence strength 
# 
and po l i c i e s of India sad Pakistan. 
Int Rtud 8 , 1-2; 1966, July October*, 64 . 
l^A aid according to the author changed the 
attitude of Pakistan. I t was not any more In mood to 
s e t t l e the issues amicably. He reveals that Senator 
u 
Fulbright, U.S. Ccmtt on foreign aid, had warned the 
administration against giving mil itary aid to Pakistan 
but Bisenhower adainlstration did not l i s t e n , so ve 
had 1965 war. 
V2I193, «241, Ga 73 »N71 
ONIISD STAX£S, CAUSES, T£NSI(»{S, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
23 . SULHIHI ( ^ ) 
After the Kissinger v i s i t . 
Pakistan Tiaea 25, 167; 1971, Juily 26; 4 i 3 . 
Impact of U.S.A. on Indo Pak relations 
discussed part of the art ic le deals with Sino-Indian 
relat ions and brands India as "Expansionist." 
24. BDWARI^ S (Michael) 
India, Pakistan Nuclear weapons. 
Int Aff (London^ 1967, October; 167-80. 
Writer blaaes India for not taking an i n i t i a t i v e 
for settlement of issued with Pakistan. Talking of 
Ayub's desire to come to teims with India he said 
'the Inst i tut ional character of Kashmir dispute l imits 
h i s f i e ld of action inside Pakistan. He has to depend 
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on the army for support and I t I s unlikely that he 
HDUld have that support In any attempt to take new 
stance on Kashmir*** Mrs. Gandhi's position according 
to the author i s some^at similar because she too had 
to depend on Congress Party's support vhich she may not 
have got. 
V2<193, 2241 q RELIGIOUS CAUSE,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
25. GUPTA (HR) 
India Pakistan War 1966. 1967, Haryana 
Prakashan, Delhi, 2V, P676. 
The hook over 800 pages i t divided into three 
parts of almost equal s i z e , ent i t led military front, 
home front and diplomatic front. I t throws l ight on 
causes of India Pakistan conf l ict 1966. Pakistan's 
e f fort to grab Kashmir springs from hatred of India. 
The author vievs 1965 conf l ict as "conflict between 
secularisn and theocracy between democracy and autho-
ritarimstt ." 
Appendix gives facimiles of s<»ie Pakistan 
secret docxnents. 
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26. TINKER (Hugh) 
India and Pakistan: a p o l i t i c a l analysis . 
1967, Pal l Mall Press, London^ P.234. 
According to Tinker the cardinal aspect of Indo-
Pakistan relations i s rel igious fanaticism and mutual 
suspicion, Pakistan tried in 1966 to vrest Kashmir 
and fai led but th i s did not end dispute, 
27. MORA&S (Frank) 
Self rel iance, 
Rttftnar 75* 1966, November^ 34-36. 
The writer says of Indo Pak confl ict 1966. I t 
i s not India but Pakistan ii^ieh has nerer reconciled 
to the fact of part i t ion, for in attempting to partit ion 
India Pakistan Partitioned i t s e l f . This i s important 
and explains much of her present frustration, 
V2tig3, 2241W POLITICAL CAUSES,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
28. JHA (JC) 
Foreign po l i c i e s of India and Pakistan, 
gOtttft AalftB Stud 4 , 2; 1969, January; 160-70. 
Claims of India and Pakistan on Kashmir discussed; 
«J 
both are v l l l l n g to pay any price besides KaahBlr, 
other factors vhich detennlne Indo-Pak po l i c i e s are, 
h i s tor ic struggle between India and Pakistan*, Pakistan 
suspicion of Indian design I t s obsessive atagonism to 
India; i t s ideological conf l i c t , 
29. RASHESD UDDIH KHAN 
Battle of Principles . 
Samlnar 75", 1965, November; 19-25. 
Tha genesis and substance of so called Kashair 
problem i s **enme8hed not only in faulty (what turned 
out to be also mischievous) procedure proscribed for 
the lapse of paramoiuitcy, as envisaged in British 
constitutional documents, but also in the obstinacy 
of Pakistan in emphasizing the rel ig ious basis of the 
part i t ion. I t has now become basis of conf l ict between 
India and Pakistan.'* 
V2>1)33, «241 W/XVSxll) 'N71 
/ INTERN>i POLIGir,PAKlSTAN,CAUSES, 
TENSIONS, IN DO PAK RELATIONS 
30./ Risk o f / a l l out war ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
/ 
Lnr^ f^ on Times 1971, December 4 ; 13:1 
9J 
The very existence of Pakistan its at stake. 
A war that develops in these conditions iidll be much 
l e s s reponsive to international action tiian was the 
case of 1966 conf l i c t . 
V2:193, 2241 y SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSiSS,XfiNSlONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONE 
31 . MUKHERJSfi (Dil ip) 
Inevitable war. 
Far East Sco Rev 1966, September 30; 602-4. 
d e war had come, writes because It had. He 
analysis the hatred, suspicion and misun(!erstanding 
which have divided India and Pakistan. Mr. Mukherjee 
argues that Pakistan's actions have been based on 
miscalculation about Premier Shastri 's p o l i t i c a l 
strength, peace has come but there i s , according to 
the author, absolutely no c<»unon grounds between India 
and Pakistan view points. " Pakistan's main objective 
i s to compel India to discuss Kashmir i s sue . This i s 
\Aiat made her dig in her toes in Kutch," 
9i 
V2:ig6, 224121 K KASHMIR,CAUS^^^ENSIONS, 
IN DO PAK RSLATIONS 
32, GUPTA (S i s ir ) 
Issiaas and prospects in Kashmir. 
^Rdia Q}i&v\ 21 (3); 1965; 253-284. 
The author opens h i s discussion with the 
remark that '* The origin of the conf l ic t over Kashmir 
can be traced back to the days before India' s partit ion. 
Pakistan encouraged the r\iler to declare Independence 
90 long as they expected that th i s would help other 
states within India t;o take a similar stand," as part 
of discussion about the Kashmir dispute he discusses 
the reasons advanced by Pakistan in favour of i t s claim 
over the state", ( i ) Religious affinity*, ( i i ) State of 
Kadimir has longer boundary with Pakistan than with 
India, 
33 . MUKUT BEHARI LAL 
Kashmir Issiie. 
I^ ylAft QWT% 21 , 4-, 1965; 345-74. 
Traces the genesis of partit ion and how 
Kashmir issue has bec(»ne a bone of contention between 
India and Pakistan. The writer shows how after the 
9^ 
f ailiur« of direct nagotiatlon of 1953 the Security 
Couacll discussion on Kashmir got Involved with 
conf l ic t bet%f8en the great povers. He concludes with 
the remark 'f'aklstan's Intran slgence, I t s collusion 
with China and Chinese occupation of Kadimlr territory 
and aggreslve disposition haire made p l e l s i s c i t e 
impracticable proposition." 
34 . NOORANI (AG) 
Kashmir Question. 1965^ Manal^italas, 
Bombay, P126. 
The war between India and Pakistan 1965 has 
once again brought the KaAmir Issue into the lime 
l i g h t . I t has been proved that there can be no peace 
and p o l i t i c a l s tab i l i ty in the sub-continent unti l th is 
•exed problem i s solved. In this perspective A.G. 
Noorani*s book " The Kashmir Question" i s of in teres t . 
He quotes Mr. Rajagopalacharl and Jaya Prakash Narayan 
in sv^port of rethinking on Kashmir issue (Noorani was 
detained under DIR), In the words of the author Kashmir 
accession to India i s perfectly legal and val id , i t i s 
nevertheless provisional. I t s t i l l remains to be 
") 9; 
decided "by agreement of the three parties namely India 
and Pakistan and people of K«^iair (Preface). 
35 . SAWAR HUSSAIN, ed. 
Kashalr Question. 1966, Pakisttan Inst i tute 
of International Affairs, Karachi, P4fi4. 
Contains o f f i c i a l diplonatic documents 
Pakistan, concerning i t s claim over Kashmir. The author 
i s a secretary of Pakistan Inst i tute of International 
Affairs. 
36. V£H}U£S£ (BG) 
No second part i t ion. 
a^Al^ d^ Aj^a 17, s ; 1966; 332^7 . 
Deals with Pakistan's attempt to have second 
partit ion with reference to Kashmir. Xhe author points 
out Uiat " Kasiiimir i s not isolated problem and can never 
be properly discussed out side thd general framework 
of Indo-Pak relat ions. He quotes Late Liaqiat Ali as 
saying: **episode of Kashmir considered by i t s e l f would 
look l ike a sentence out of context a reference to 
U.N.O. must include much larger ground". 
9 1 
37. LAMB (Alastalr) 
Crises in Kashmir, 1947-1966, 1967, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, London. P163. 
The theme of the book i s centrally Kashmir 
dispute - claims and counter claims are discussed. 
Due to i t s brevity of treatment and absence of detailed 
docusentation, th is book wi l l be of interest to their 
general reader rather than spec ia l i s t s . 
V2I193, 224121 K, Ga 1U4 »N65 
DN1Z£D NATIONS,KASHMIR,CAUSBt,X£;NSI(^ S, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
38. India Aid Memoir to the Secretary General on the 
training of Irregulars in Pak occupied Kashmir. 
P. 294-95, 
India drew the attention of Secretary General 
U,N, to the recruitment of 14, 000 raiders fHxn North 
Vtost frontiers and then despatch to occupied Kashmir 
by the Pakistan Govt. "It voices fear t^at these would 
be inducted into Kashmir s t ea l th i ly in the guise of 
c i v i l i a n s . 
9 
39. KHAN (Rahmatullah) 
KadiBlr and United Nations. 1969, Vlkas 
Publications, Delhi. P 199. 
Deals with alleged Indian comnltment to 
U.N.O. to hold p l ebsdte in Kashmir. Besides discussing 
lavs relating to Inf i l trators and subversive inter-
vention, author has tried to eocpose acts of omission 
and coamission on the part of security council. He 
f e e l s that decisions of Council are binding only to 
the extent of preventing, suppressing or restoring an 
act of aggression. *^o decision can be imposed aa a 
State ^ i c h i s not gui l ty*. 
Includes comprehensive bibliography. 
40 . Pakistani Attacks a desperate gamble, an ed i tor ia l . 
Cflciial 156, 3877; 1965; 357-58. 
Zhe art ic le written in the midst of war. 
I t biases U.N.O, for i t s d i i l ly - sha l ly lng . •nj.N.O. has 
yet to t e l l Pakistan in the blentest possible terms 
>diere exactly the faul t l i e s as reported by i t s own 
observers. U.N.O. has seen that the original suppression 
of General Nimnio's report served no purpose, i t s only 
9 n 
increased Paklstaa's militancy jret U.N.'s more powerful 
members have shown no sign of realizing that wishy washy 
appeals wi l l not work. 
4 1 . SARWAR HUSAM 
Pakistan and United Nat ions . 1966. 
Manhattam Publ i ca t ions , New York. P 264. 
Contains two w e l l - w r i t t e n chapiters on Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan acid the unsuccessful 
attttipt of United Nations to solve the dispute. I t has 
been described as "cancerous growth". 
42 . U.N.*s fai lure in Kashmir ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Scon Wklv 17, 40*, 1965, October 2', 1506-09. 
Cr i t i c i ses U.N.O. for not doing anything 
concrete regarding Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir. "Out 
break of fighting between armies of India and Pakistan 
reminded the world of one of the signal fa i lures of 
U.N." 
9? 
V 2 : 1 9 3 , 82412J K, Ga 73 ( z J ) 
DNITED STATES,KASHMIR,CAUSE,TENSIONS, 
IN DO PAK RELATIONS 
4 3 . U.S. and the Sub-continent ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pakistan Time a 25; 23', 1971, February 27*, 
4»1 . 
A s s a i l s U.S. fore ign p o l i c y with regard to 
Kadimir i s s u e "U.S. n e u t r a l i t y gave Indian new sinews". 
V2»193, 824121 K, Ga 73 ^X) 
UNITED STATES,ECONOMIC AID,K.IISHHIR, 
CAUS£S,TSNSI0NS,IND0 PAK RELATIONS 
4 4 , SANDERS (So l ) 
Sense of Asia. 1972, Charles S c r i b e r s , 
New York. P 339. 
American j o u r n a l i s t reporting on South East 
Asia. His book i s s u b t i t l e d , *An i n s i d e view of the 
lAiole- Far East today and an appraisal of American 
inyolvement*. 
Sanders b e l i e v e s that American aid to both 
co imtr ies should be made condi t iona l on sett lement of 
Kashmir i s s u e and a mutual secur i ty pact with l i m i t a t i o n 
9j J 
of veapons. He f e e l s that Kadimlr problfim wi l l remain 
unsolved t i l l ikaerica takes vtp tougher l ine of action. 
V2:l93, 224121 Ku 
KUTCH,CAUS&iTENSIONS,INDO PAK fl&LATIONS 
45. iNAND (RP) 
Kutcsh Award, 
India Quart 24, 3', 198R, 183-205. 
Comments on Kutch award (1968). Author 
attempts to examine the basic i ssues of the dispute 
and to find out how much Justification there was in 
crit icism of the award. I t caused a great furor in 
the country. 
Provides an excel lent bibliography on the 
topic and on Indo-Pak relations in general. 
46. HIGGINS (R) 
Findings or the Rnnn Kutch, 
Wld Today 24*, 1968, April*, 104-106. 
Deals with U.N.'s finding on Rismn Kutch, 
%e award has been accepted by Pakistan. The Indian 
Prime Minister however has been tander considerable 
93 
domestic pressiire to repxidlate the findings of the 
Tribunal, The death of Shastri and Indo-Pak war 1965 
have been urged as excuses for doing so. "Ihe author 
rejects these reasons as having no legal v a l i d i t y . " 
47. KHAN (Farzana) 
Rann of Kutch dispute. 
fakjgtan Hgrigoa le; 4; 1966; 374-R4. 
Traces the history of Kutch with a view to 
advancing Pakistan claim over Kutch. "In April 1966 
this Issue brought India and Pakistan almost on the 
brink of ful l - f ledged war. Qie ruling congress party 
agreed to partit ion In 1947 with mental reservation 
that Pakistan would soon col lapse, says tlrie paper. 
Ascribes India's precipitating Rann of Kutch Issue to 
a wish to divert attention from dee pending cr i ses at 
home and to supress growing separatist trernds by 
raising bogey of extemcd aggression. 
48, Meaning of Kutch ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
East Scon 44*, 23; 1966, June; 1255-56. 
The art ic le i s in the form of a reply to 
some reader's l e t t e r . I t deals with Pakistan's 
lOJ 
aggression Kutch and takes I t as 'not an isolated 
aberration'• I t I s linked not only In a general vay 
to Pakistan h o s t i l i t y towards th is country but speci-
f i c a l l y to such recent history as Chinese occupation 
of Indian territory In 1962, the Peking Plndl friendship 
which has since been forged against our coimtry, and 
Pakistan's current attempt to reopen the Kaahnlr 
question forc ib ly , ' 
V2«193, 224122 I , Gal-1. (X6291), H 
RAPPROACHMEKT,WORLD BANK,INDUS BASIN, 
CAUSE5»TENSI0NS,IND0 PAK TENSIONS 
49. TUFAIL JAWED 
Xhe World bank and the Indus Basin dispute. 
Pakistan Horizon 19*, 2\ 1966, 133-42. 
Along with the border skirmishes and 
preliminary disputes, Indus basin dispute and subsequent 
treaty was one of the factors which contribute to the 
tension in the subcontinent. Refering to the treaty, 
the author biases big powers for creating a situation 
In which Pakistan had no choice but to agree to sign 
the treaty and lose i t s legal rights on eastern rivers. 
10 
V 2 t l 9 3 , Z24I3, Q a l - l (M7) 
BIG MILITARY POWEBS,CAU8£S,ISNSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1966 
50. MISRA (KP) 
Indo-Pakistan Confl ic t . 
African Quart 5,3*, 1966, 203-7. 
Analyses fac tors which prompted Pakistan 
to go to war witii India . Death of Jawahar Lai led 
Pakistan to think i t would lead to d i s in teg ra t ion 
Ind ia , fur ther Pakistan had been rec ip ien t of free 
arms aid from western count r ies , t h i r d l y Pakistan was 
growingly InYolved with China. Ihe author has quoted 
Bhutto saying that "in the event of war Pakistan would 
be helped by most powerful nation in Asia." 
V2tl93, Z2413, Qa73 (zS) 
ARMAM£NI,UNII£D STAT£S,CAUSES,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
5 1 . CHOUDHRI (Mohamad Ahsan) 
Pakistan and the great powers. 1970, Council 
for Pakistan S tud ies , Karachi, p 140. 
Labels India as Machiavellian. I nd i a ' s growing 
mil i tar ism poses great th rea t to peace in subcontinent. 
1U2 
A fool i sh Anerlea laviriies aid on ungrateful India 
instead of reserving i t for loyal Pakistan, says 
the writer. 
V2J193, ZZ413 (V2tll) 'NeS 
HOME POLICY,INDXA,CAUSES,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIC»IS 
52• The war between brothers. 
Econ 1966, September 11*, 970-7:3. 
India's leadersi and th i s applied perhaps 
equally to their counterparts in Pakistan, are prisoners 
of the past "attitudes on Kairtimir have become so deeply 
ingrained that neither side has any freedom of action.* 
According to the art ic le Pakistan seems to 
have relied extraordinarily vipaa a weakening of New 
Delhi's authority in the period after Nehru, as a result 
of economic inguist ic and other strains iq)on India's 
unity. 
The art ic le suggests that American aid against 
communiflB was regarded by Pakistan as edd against India. 
lOJ 
V2I198, Z3AJ3 (V3X11) 'NeS 
HOME P0LIC7,PAKISTAN,CAUB£S,TENSIONS, 
IN DO PAK RSUTI0NS,1966 
53 . SAYSSD (Khalld 6) 
1966. an epoch making year In Paldstan* 
General e lect ion and war with India. 
Aalan Sur 6,2*, 1966, February; 76-85. 
The author la a Pakistani. The general 
e lect l (»i , the art ic le t e l l s us, brought disappointment 
to Govt. I t won only 60 percent of the seats In west 
and 55 percent In east . Ayub w^ sis wellaware that h i s 
party was not well or-ganlsed. 1966 turned out to be 
characteristic <xie, for Pakistan was not only Involved 
in anted conf l ict with India but was also faced with 
threat of losing military and economic aid from U.S.A. 
Hie war has brought out considerable 
reservoir of rel igious fervour that Pakistan Govt, can 
draw i:q;K>n fox* purposes of national unity during the 
cr i ses due to war. 
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V2X193, ZXAJ3 (¥3x11) »N71 
HOME POLICYjPAKlSTAN,CAUSES,TENSIONS, 
IUDO PAK HELATI;)NS,1971 
5 4 . SULERI (ZA) 
F u l l C i r c l e . 
P a k i s t a n Times 25^ 10', 1971 , February 14; 6x3. 
The au tho r s t a t e s Ind i an b e l l i c o s i t y has a 
tiiatp p o i n t . I t i s r i v e t t e d on the sad s t a t e of 
n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , 
72X1S3, ZZ413 (73x1132) »N71 
EAST BENGAL CiaSES,CAUSES,TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
5 5 . Choice f o r I n d i a ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
P a k i s t a n Times 2 5 , 250; 1971, October*, 4 * 1 . 
Desc r ibes I n d i a ' s d ip loma t i c e f f o r t s fei^ 
j u s t s e t t l e m e n t of Eas t Bengal as a s s a u l t i n d i s g u i s e 
a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n , 
5 6 . CHOPRA (MaharaJ K) 
M i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n Bangladesh. 
n i l i ^ a r v %Y 5 2 , 5 ; 1972, May; 51 -60 . 
As p a r t of the d i s c u s s i o n of I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y 
I O J 
assistance to Baogladash analysis the factors \tilch 
were responsible for Indo-Paklstan tension and conf l i c t . 
One of the factors , according to the author, I s the 
crushing of d«Bocratlc sentlnents of Pakistani masses. 
57 . CHOPRA (Pran) 
Coll ision course* an Indian view. 
Pacific cnmmni^ ^^ v 3,1', 1971, October, 154-70. 
Indo Pakistan relations with special reference 
to Sast Bengal. Zhe poss ib i l i ty of war i s discussed. 
58. Hold back both of you. 
SS2IU 240, 6677; 1971, August 14-20; 13-14. 
Indo-Paklstan tensions and stakes Involved 
In the conf l ic t s turning into war are discussed. By 
putting Mujlbiur Rahman on t r i a l Yahya Khan has aggravated 
the chances of war, adds the paper. 
59 . LSSCAFE (Lee) 
India's Strategy of pressure. 
GjMUHsiiaa 1971, November i s ; 3*1. 
Describes the 'War fever' gripping India on 
the eve of war. Ihe art ic le attnapts to d issect the 
I O J 
•War bug* i*ilch had stung the two countidies and in 
the process enunerates ttiB factors e .g . East Bengal 
unrest, foreign intervention e t c . responsible for the 
present s tate . 
60. No vor over Bangladeidi ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Guardian 1971, October 19, 10«1. 
Rates height the chances of war between 
India and Pakistan over the issue of East Bengal's 
demand for deaocraey. 
V2»190, Z2S413 (V3J1132), Ga41 'NTl 
CHINESE ATTITUDE,EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) 
CmSES,CAUSESTENSI0NS,IND0-PAKI&TAN RELATIONS 
61. VOLSKY (Qnitry) and OSVATAV (A) 
War on the Indian subcontinent. 
New Timea 1050; 1971, December, 7-S. 
Military conf l ic t on the Indian subcontinent 
was rooted in the events of 25 March 1971 \4ien Yahya 
Khan's Govt, refused to reckon with the w i l l of the 
people. Accuses Peking leaders of opposing every move 
for international security and promising Pakistan 
Ul 
"fiitt siqpport in the event of aggression from I n d i a , " 
V2»193, Z2A12 (V3»1132), Ga58 
RUSSIAN AITITUDSfEAST BENGAL(BANGLAD&SU} 
CRISES,CAUSEsTANSlOHSjINDO PAK RELATIONS 
62. MDSTAPA (Zubeida) 
1971 Cr i s e s i n Pakistan: India , Sov ie t Union 
and China. 
P a c i f i c Community 3 , 3 ; 1972, Apri l ,498-515 . 
Genesis of the 1971 c r i s e s traced from Dec. 
e l e c t i o n s in Palcistan to Indo-Pak war. Suspects 
I n d i a ' s ac t ive involvement i n East-West PisQcistan 
c o n f l i c t . USSR and China r o l e s d i scussed . 
V2X 193, Z2413 (V394-7432) »N7 
EAST BENGAL (BANGUDESU) REFUGEES,CAUSES^  
TSNSI(»IS,IND0 PAK RELATIONS 
63. Indiat Not i f . But idien. 
Time 1971, November 2 9 , 6-7. 
Analysis the impact of refugee problon on 
I n d i a ' s economy and s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s e t ui>. Indira 
Gandhi's three veek western t r ip earned several s i zable 
donations f o r r e l i e f but India was made to bear the 
l U J 
real f inancial burden. The presence of 9.700,000 
refugees threatened social s tab i l i t y of ttxe country. 
64. On the brink of war ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Guardian 1971, November 24; 11< 1 . 
The art ic le senses war in the aJir^  refugees 
inf lux has driven India to this situation* Asks i f 
New Delhi seeks permanent steward^ip of Kast Bengal, 
I t holds Yahya Ehan*s attempt to tame democracy 
responsible for th i s tension in the sub-continent of 
Asia. 
65, Why India and Pakistan are at i t agaJLn? 
U.S.Newe Wld Rep 71,23; 1971, IXicember 6; 
21.22. 
Many observers, the art ic le claims, are 
convinced that India has decided that even major war 
i s l e s s risky than le t t ing Sast Bengal upheavals and 
refugee burden dr i f t along. China withheld i t s 
assistance because of the climate and USSH>India 
mil i tary pact. Pakistan according to the writer i s 
l e s s eager to go in for war with India. 
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V2«193, ZZ413 (Y394-7432), A21 'N? 
INT£I^m:^N.£AST BENGAL (BANQLADBSH) 
BBFUGEES TENS I dNS, IN DO PAK HEUTIONS 
66. ABOQL MAJID 
India's vestac^nterest In refugees. 
£afcLaifla.nttfta 26, 143; 1971, July 1,4:3. 
India has Tested Interest in tlie refugees 
"says the paper, because i t wuits Pakistan sp l i t" . 
67. Bluffrecoils ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
PAkistan Times 25, 174', 1971, August 7*, 4*1. 
Cr i t i c i s e s India's anti-Pakistan compaign 
with reference to East Bengal refugees in India. 
68. Indian Information and Broad-casting (Ministry of - ) 
Bangladesh and Indo Pakistan war. 
1972, Publication Division, De3iii, P123. 
A col lect ion of speedies made by India's 
external affairs minister Shri Swaran Singh and India's 
peimanent representative at U.N. Mr. S.Sen. In these 
speedies they tried to convince the world that India 
had no alternative but to get involved in Pakistan's 
Sast-lttest c r i s i s in order to solve the problem of 
IIJ 
refugees ineliix rasuiting frcxa West Pakistan military 
Junta's a troc i t i e s . 
69, LUGOYSKY (Y) 
For last ing peace on the India subcontinent, 
Int.Aff (Moscow) 1972, February 2 ; 76-79. 
I t was reprisals and persecutions of the 
refugees by Pakistar vhlch led to armed incidents along 
the border with India and this resulted In c r i s i s In 
Indo Pakistan relations % l^ch developed into open armed 
clash. The situation worsened because of external 
forces Interested In stepping up the tension even after 
West Pakistan amy had mounted I t s military operations 
In Eastern provinces, U.S.A. continued arms delivery 
to Pakistan, 
70. RAJAN (MS) 
Bangladesh and after. 
La£i£iSL.A£f 45, 2; 1972; 191-206. 
Commenting on India* s involvement In East 
Bengal c r i s i s the writer says that i t was thg C3mlcal 
and callous attitude of the vast minority of governments 
11 
of the vorld that event i ia l ly compelled India , par t ly 
In s e l f defence to solve the refugee problem by use of 
f o r c e . 
Y2»193, EZ413 (Y394-7432), GalW4, 'N7 
UNITED NATIONS ATTITUDE, EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) REFUGEES,CAUSER TENSIONS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
7 1 . Favourable cl imate ( e d i t o r i a l ) 
Pakistan Times 25 ,285; 1971, November 25*, 1 . 
U,N,»8 reso lu t ion for creat ing proper cl imate 
f o r the return of refugees from India , d i scussed . 
India accued of using undue inf luence i n ge t t ing U.N. 
pass t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . 
V2I193, ZZA23 ( © 9 4 - 7 4 3 2 ) , Ga58 •N7 
RUSSIAN ATTITUDS,EAST BENGAL(BANGLADBSH) 
REFUGEES CAUSERTENSIONS,INDO PAK RELATIONS 
72 . Sov ie t eyes on Bangladesh. 
Foreign RaT> (London), 1224, 1971, December 
16; IP. 
Ascribes motives for I n d i a ' s concern about 
the refugee on problem. According to the a r t i c l e s ince 
11^  
Hindu refugees would never return, to crea te a predo-
minantly Muslin army with Hindu army o f f i c e r s would be 
the i d e a l s o l u t i o n . Indiia has a l so USSR backing, 
V2t l93 , ZZ413 (T394-7432), Q 32 'N? 
INT£LI£CTUALS ATTITUDE, EAST BENGAL 
(BANQLAOSSH) REFUGEES, CAUSE3 TENS IONS, 
INDO PAK REUTIQHS 
7 3 . AYOOB (Mohammed) and SUBRAMAN7AN (K) 
Liberation of War. 
1972, S.Chand, New De lh i , p .292 . 
Mohd. Ayoob i s professor of Pakistan s tudies 
at School of Internat ional stttdies and K.Subramanyan 
i s the Director Inst i tute of Strategic Stiidies, Delhi. 
Vftiile talking of genocide and refugee problem, they 
write that one of the shocking aspects of the attitude 
of the Indian e l i t e in the early months was the tota l 
absence of any considerations of the p o l i t i c a l social 
economic strains the refugee influx would impose on 
India. 
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74, Peace in Peri l (edl topla l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25, 23R; 1971, October p;4xl. 
India blamed for noncooperatlon in resolving 
the Indo-Pak conf l i c t . Indian Inte l lectual accused of 
exaggerating c r i s e s . 
V2xigS, Z25, '^7 PROVOCATION,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS 
75, Looming Threat (edi tor ia l ) 
gjafelsigjELJlaflA 25, 253*, 1971, October 23*, 4»1. 
India accused of creating cr i ses and having 
ulterior motives of t err i tor ia l expansion. 
V2X193, zz5, A2961 •N71 
BLACKOUTS, PROVOCATION, IN DO PAK TiiilSIOMS 
76, Black outs and border ba t t l e s . 
Time 1971, November 22; 10-11. 
Describes the black out exercises carried 
out by both sides on the eve of war. £ach side has 
frequently violated the others airpace. The border 
skirmishes and gueri l la sabatage has escalated chances 
of war • Sudi border sklralriies may get out of hand. 
1 1 4 
Mrs. Gandhi's t r ip abroad did not win tangible support 
fron fore ign powers thoi;»gh she won much public sympathy. 
\r2»193, zz5 , Ga 5-1 'H? 
WESIEHN POWSBS VITIXUDS,PR0VCX;ATI0N , 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
77. SULERI (2A) 
Hi s tor i c confrontat ion, 
Pakistan Times 2 5 . 153; 1971,Ju;Ly l i ; 4 : 3 . 
Indian aggress iveness has esca lated in tune 
with the r i s i n g tempo of ant i Pakistan h y s t e r i a in 
the West says the w r i t e r . 
V2:19G, zz5 , Ga73 'N? 
UNITED STATES, PROVOCATION, IN DO PAK RILLATIOWS 
78. Restraint ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pftkistan Timag 25,274*, 1971,November 13; 4»1 . 
U .S .A. ' s c a l l to India and Pakistan to 
exerc i s e res tra in d i scussed . Cledjns that Pakistan has 
been exerc i s ing greates t r e s t r a i n t in the midst of 
11 
Indian provocat ions . 
V2«193, zz52 , 'N7 
THREATS, IN DO PAK RELATIONS 
79. AYOOB (Mohammed) 
General Tahya Khan*s war t h r e a t s . 
Shaktl 7 , 1-2; 197 i ; 116-119. 
Deduces reasons for Yahya Khan's threat of 
war against India . Eff icacy of Mukti fouj has led 
Yahya Khan to try to make Bangladesh an Indo-Paklstan 
I s s u e . 
V2»193, zz55 , »N7 
SUBVSBSIQN, INDO PAK RELATIONS 
80 . AFTAB HUSSAIN 
Indo Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
PaltiB^m BoriaQB 24,2; 1971; 13-17. 
India according to the author suf fers from 
m i l i t a r y defeat ism. I t I s seeking to bring harm to 
Pakistan by encouraging d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . 
11 
81. HAZEmURST (Peter) 
India lares e x i l e s for Russia, 
Pakistan Times 25, 243; 1971,October 13; 4»3. 
Charges India with encouraging £ast Pakistan 
freedcun moyement to turn into an organisation which 
wi l l align with USSR. 
82. India's spite ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25,8! 1971,May 7, 4:1 . 
Accuses India of abetting the East Bengal 
law-breakers. Flow of arms and ammunition from India 
to Sast Bengal i s suspected. 
83 . SUI£RI (ZA) 
VDio stands for peace. 
Pakistan Times 26,26i; 1971,October 3 i ; 4:3, 
India blamed for aiding East Pakistan's 
secess ionists a c t i v i t i e s and India-USSR accused of 
entertaining anti-islamic sentiment \diich according to 
the author led to their a l l iance . 
1 1 / 
V2»193, ZZ551 K 'NeB 
KASHMIR LNFILTRATORSjINDO PAK RELATIONS 
84. India Prime Minister (Shastri^Lal Bahadur) 
Broadcast to the nation. 
Foreign Aff Record 11, 4;i965,September*, 
248-52, 
Contains text of Prime Minister's broadcast 
to the nation, on Sept. 3,1966, on the situation 
arising from Pakistan's aggression against India. 
Talking of in f i l t ra tors the Prime Minister said "they 
were well-armed with modem weapons and thie ii^ole 
situation was conceived, planned and exectited by 
Pakistan. This we believe has been established beyond 
doubt in the reports submitted by the Chief Military 
Observer to U.N. Secretary General." 
85. Pakistan. Pakistan's case in Kashmir. 
Hound labl 221, 1966, December', 75-7P. 
In a controversy much depends on from where 
the argment begins. Xhe Indian i n s i s t s that things 
started moving from August 5 , when members of Pakistan 
11] 
army in the sense of Inf i l trators crossed the cease f ire 
l ine and entered Indian Kashmir. Pakistan correspondents 
c a l l t h i s "clever attempt to confuse enti:re nation *" 
accuses India of being in bel l icose mood "India preci-
pated war because i t had imperial ist ic design on Pakistan 
territory, 
86. RAM GOPAL 
Indo Pakistan war and peace . 19(37. 
Pustak Kendra, Lucknow. P 22P. 
Traces beginning of war of 1965 with i n f i l -
t r a t i o n from Pakistan i n t o Kadimir. Attaxipts to deal 
date wise with d i f f e r e n t events during Indo-Pak war. 
U.N. ro le vehemently c r i t i c i s e d for put t ing India and 
Pakistan on par . 
8 7 . SARWAN HASAN 
Real i s s u e i n the present India-Pakis tan war. 
Pakistan Horizon 18,4*, 1966; 3 3 3 - 4 3 . 
The author i s Secretary of Pakistan I n s t i t u t e 
of International Affairs. In defence of h i s country 
he puts forth the legal argment that i f India had 
/ 
ly 
thought that freedom f i g h t e r s In Kashmir were I n f i l t r a -
tors frcMn Pakistan, and that Pakistan by sending them 
In has v io la ted cease f i re l i n e , i t should have referred 
the matter to Secur i ty Council Instead of crossing 
cease f i re l i n e and invading Pakistan. 
V2X193, ZZ551K, 033 »N65 
OPI-OSITIONS PARTIES,KASHMIR INFILTRATORS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
88 . SHRIMAN NARAYAN 
A Peace with Jus t i ce . 
AICC Econ Bay 1 7 , 8 ; 1965,Septeml)er 18; 7-8 . 
Die writer i s prominent p o l i t i c a l l eader . 
He opens the d i scuss ion by saying that the armed 
c o n f l i c t a r i s e s out of events massive I n f i l t r a t i o n s 
of Pakistan s o l d i e r s in c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s ^.into Jammu 
and Kashmir. *fie c a l l s for reappraisal of our a t t i tude 
towards Pakistan and accuses Pakistan of d e l i b e r a t e l y 
d i s t o r t i n g f a c t s by c a l l i n g Pakistan i n f i l t r a t o r s 
freedom f i g h t e r s . 
12J 
8 9 . XQAPAR (Homesh) 
Home work needed on m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . 
Econ P o l i t wklv 17.46;i96B,SaptembflP 13*, 
1689-92, 
Underlines Pakis tan's attempt to push i n f i l -
t ra tors i n t o Rajasthan sector cso as to give U.N. an 
impression of i t s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . According to the 
author t h i s would create complications at the time of 
demarcation of cease f i re l i n e and w i l l cause demar-
cat ion in India . 
V2t l93 , zz56 'N? 
PROPAGANDA, INDO PAK RELATIONS 
9 0 . HATIM IQBAL MEHRUNNIS 
India and the 1971 war with Pakistan. 
Pakistan Horizon 25.1! 1972', 21-31. 
Puts India in the dock and accuses it of 
having expansion 1st plans. It was a calculated more 
to go into war. 
V2I193, zz56 (Y:l) 
CULTURAL PROP AG AN DA, INDO PAK RELATIONS 
9 1 . ABDUL MAJID 
Indian propaganda. 
12 
Pakistan Tim^s 25.205; 1971,Septemlser 2;4x3 . 
India vehomently cr i t i c i sed for i t s anti 
Pakistan compaign in foreign countries. I t s cultural 
a c t i v i t i e s abroad described as motivated to alienate 
other nations feel ings from Pakistan. 
92. Stand up and be counted (ed i tor ia l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25.265. 1971, October 25;4xl 
Accuses world opinion of shoving sympathy 
to refugees did not stopping India from provoking 
Pakistan into war. Accuses India of indulging in 
V2«193, (zM) 'Nes 
WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
93. DASTUR (Alooj) 
Some lessons of India-Pakistan Clash of arms. 
tJB4t?<3 AgAfl 17,5; 1965; 327-31. 
Provides in military terms analysis of Indo-
Pak war of 1965. The author regards US as being 
partisan and says at Pakistan, armed by U.S.A. to re s i s t 
the coomunist esqpansion, was allowed to use them against 
India. Indian army's victory showed that machines 
122 
should not be treated as master of men but t h e i r 
subjec ts . The a r t i c l e c r i t i c i s e s , I n d i a ' s policy of 
non-alignment and a s s e r t s that i n t e rna t i ona l r e l a t i ons 
are not to be conducted as a soc ia l - se rv ice league. 
V2»193, (zM) 'N? 
WAR, IK DO PAK RELATI(»IS, 1971 
94. BLINKENBEH} (Lars) 
India Pakistan^ a h i s t o r y of unsolved 
c o n f l i c t s . 1972, Dansk uden Rigs P o l i t i s k 
I n s t i t u s S k r i f l e r , Munskgaard,Denmark,? 412. 
An exce l len t survey and study of Indo-Pak 
conf l i c t s in two sec t ions , spec ia l ly in t e re s t ing 
because the views of cont inenta l and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Scandinavian scholars , are not very e a s i l y avai lable 
to English readers . 
Die f i r s t pa r t dealing with the h i s t o r i c a l 
background and causes pre-and post-1947. The scholar 
has supplemented h i s t o r i c a l mater ia l with interviews 
with p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s . He notes one of the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s conf l i c t has been the fac t tha t 
12J 
Pakis tan ' s a l l round ot t i tuda towards l ad ia and Kashmir 
dispute has ramoved a constant f a c t o r , Indian p o s i t i o n 
on tiiQ other hand has undergone change. The a n a l y t i c a l 
part attempts to give the s tr i ic tural element of t h i s 
part icu lar d i spute . 
V2t l93 , (zM), Al l 'N65 
FORMAL DECLARATION,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1965 
95. India-President (Radhakrishnan,S). 
Broadcast to the nation on Pakis tan ' s 
Aggression. 
Foreign Aff Record 11,9^ 1965,September,243-6. 
Text of a message broadcast to the nat ion by 
the pres ident on September 1 1 , 1965, He told the 
nat ion that President Ayub Khan of Pakistan has annoimced 
that Pakistan i s at war with India . Ihe Pak force has 
obviously been permitted to attack our c i t i e s and i t 
not confined s t r i c t l y to m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s . The Pakistan 
navy has a lso been brought in to act ion against our port 
at Dwarka. 
1 2 ; 
96. India . Prime Minister . (Shastr l ,La i Bahadur). 
Broadcast to the nat ion . 
AICC Econ Rev 1 7 , ? ; 1965, September 15; 7 -9 . 
In a broad cas t to the nation on Sept . 3 ,1965 , 
the Prime Minister Shri Lai Bahadur Shastr i ca l led upon 
the people to prepare for the hard days. "The nat ion", 
the prime minis ter sa id , "should get in to the mood vdiich 
i s necessary for undergoing s a c r i f i c e . This i s the 
pr ice of f roedOTJ they a l l have to pay". 
V2»193, (zM), A21 •N7 
INTERVENTION,WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
97. BAYLEY (David H) 
India:War and p o l i t i c a l a s s e r t i o n . 
Asian §\ff 12 , 2 ; 1972; 87-96 . 
As part of the d i scuss ion on India-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s traces India's involvement in the eruption 
of c i v i l war in East Bengal according to the author 
( i ) f i r s t phase las ted from beginning of refugee i n f l u x 
to s igning of s o v i e t traaty (11) Second phase from 
Aug.-Nov. I t was dominated bv d ip lanat i c a c t i v i t y and 
growing preparations for war. I t was increas ing ly c lear 
12 i 
that India-Pakistan \rere locked In trag ic c o l l i s i o n 
(111) third c l imat ic phase began with 20 Nov. when 
India sent army across eastern border to break up 
Pakistan troops* 
V2X193, (zM), A23 'NSS 
SELF DEFENCE, WAR, IN DO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
98. Breaking the rxiles ( e d i t o r i a l ) 
Econ 1966, September l i ; 959-60. 
Holds both India and Pakistan g u i l t y of 
v i o l a t i n g the ru les about e s c a l a t i o n ru le s s lowly 
worked out by Merican and Russians in the l a s t decade. 
!Die paper accepts I n d i a ' s contention that march towards 
Lahore was outcome of Pakis tan's i n i t i a l dec i s ion to 
laimch Guer i l la s i n t o Indian-held Kashmir. 
V2»193, (zM), A24 '^65 
AGGBESSI0K,II DO PAK RELATIONS, 1966 
99. Indian an India approach to Kashmir. 
Itound Tabl 2 2 i ; 1965, December*, 67-6P. 
With China poised on Indian's Northern Borders 
Pakistan could not have found be t t er time to attack 
12S 
India and grab Kashmir. I t was not an end In i t s e l f 
but was designed to lead to various consequences. 
Kashmir i s the excuse but by no means an object the 
t a c t i c s were same as before massive thrust of 
g u e r r i l l a s on August. To stop further i n f i l t r a t i o n 
the Indian army occupied the Haji Pir Pass beyond the 
cease f i r e l i n e and counter response wa? f u l l - s c a l e 
a t tack . 
V2J193, (zM), A24 'N? 
AGGRESSION, IK DO PAK RELATIONS ,1971. 
100. Can India Change? ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25,283*, 1971,November 23*, 4 :1 
India blamed for continuance of c o n f l i c t . 
*Vlhat choice i s l e f t to us", says the paper, *but to 
f i g h t i n the l i g h t of f u l l sca le attack on Bast 
Pakistan" 
101 . War in the o f f ing ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25 ,179; 1971, August 6; 4 : 1 . 
Exto ls President Yahya Khan's message f o r -
warding the nat ion against l ike l ihood of aggression by 
Ind ia . 
m 
V2:193, (zM), A24, Ga 'N? 
MIBLIM COUNTRIES ATTITUDE, AGGRESSION, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
102. QAlffiERUDDiN AHMAD 
East Pakistan c r i s i s and the '^ dddah confe-
rence on musllm countries* 
Pakistan Horizon 25 . i ; 1972, 45-47. 
The writer was one of the participants in 
the conference and this art ic le i s the address he 
delivered at the Pakistan Inst i tute of International 
Affairs, Karachi on March IP, 1971. In this address 
he i^ares h i s experience at the conference and throws 
l ight on joint communique Issued by the conference 
declaring India an aggressor. 
V2»193, (zM), A24, Ga41 •N71 
CHINESE ATTITUDE,AGGRESSION, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
103. Huang Hua Condemns Soviet Union for supporting 
Indian aggression. 
Peking asv 5Q; 1971, December lo; P-10. 
Huang Hua, Chinese representative at U.N.O. 
condemns USSR and calls it a supporter, encourager 
12j 
and protector of Indlari aggression against Pakistan. 
V2:193, (zM), A24, &a5-l 'N?! 
WiSXERN ir-OWESS ATTITUDE,AGGRESSION, IKDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971 
1 0 4 . SUBHAN RAHMAN 
Genesis of resistance. 
Nation 213T 22*, 1970, Deceml)er 27', 6R6-P9. 
!Die author Is nov economic adviser to Mujlb. 
He says "war between India and Pakistan emerged as the 
f ina l arbiter In Bangladei^'s struggle.* Pakistan 
according to Rahman boped to internationalize the war 
but needed more than border skirmishes to get security 
council involved. 
105. THAPAR (Romesh) 
Our security sclenarts . 
Seminar 150', 1972*, February*, 17-21. 
Deals with International relations in context 
to Indo-Pak war. Emergence of Bangladesh described as 
India's victory. Defence India's intervention "case 
for Indian military Intervention in Bangladesh has always 
been strong." 
123 
V2:193 , (zM), A25 'NGS 
WAR SElZlEaSS, INDO PAK HALATIONS, 1965 
106. Bat t l e of cargoes ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
East Econ 4 5 . 2 2 : 1965,November 26; 1014-16. 
Concerned with the detaining by Pakistan 
of cargoes boxmd for India, The experience of Indo 
Pakistan h o s t i l i t i e s , i t i s argued, inadenta l ly should 
provide an opportunity for review of in ternat iona l law 
regarding safety of marit ive trade. I t further po int s 
out that India Govt, ' s r e t a l i a t i o n in t h i s regard has 
been dec larat ion of only those items as contraband 
which could contribute d i r e c t l y to the bui lding up of 
Pakis tan ' s war machinery, 
107. SHARMA (SP) 
Indo Pakistan maritime c o n f l i c t , 1 9 6 5 . 1970 
Academic P r e s s , Bombay, P130. 
The author attempts to bring out into bold 
r e l i e f the l e g a l aspects of the c o n f l i c t . In chapt 11 
he l a y s bare the claims and counter claims by the p a r t i e s 
regarding observance of what may be ca l led present day 
ru l e s of warfare. The author concludes that Pakis tan's 
13J 
seizure of Indian cargoes was against the spir i t of 
international law. In t^ ie wf. appendix he c i t e s texts 
of proclamations of emergency issue by Pakistan, and 
Indian Govt.'s not i f icat ions regarding contrab and, 
to show that Pakistan claim to bel l igerent rights does 
not have legal va l id i ty , because the author argues i t 
was not in s t r i c t leg&l terms war. 
V2»193, (zM), A291 'NBS 
LOGISTICS,WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
108. THAPAR (Ronesh) 
Ayub*8 cost ly miscalculations. 
Econ Po l i t Vfklv 17,37; 1965,September l i ; 3 - 8 . 
The writer says even i f the Pakistani armour 
escapes a terrible mauling, there i s l i t t l e doubt that 
Ayub has made too cost ly miscalculations. The f i r s t 
that Kashalr iiould rise in support of h i s army In f i l -
trators and second that India would confine herself to 
defending Jammu and Kashmir. Disadvantage of an exposed 
and undependable supply route was one reason for 
Pakistan's setback in this war. 
13i 
V 2 : 1 9 3 , (zM), A293 'NOB 
DESTHUCTION,STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 
WARjINDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
109. I n i t i a t i v e with India ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
gcon and FolJ-J^ WI^IY 17 ,37; 1965, September 11 
1395. 
Provides descr ipt ion of a c t u a l war, the 
s trategy and t a c t i c s adopted by respect ive armies. 
The a r t i c l e suggests that the best way for India i s to 
emasculate Pakistan m i l i t a r i l y . The sustained attack 
on Pakis tan i s a ir bases l i k e the one at Sargodha anil 
emphasis on des truct ive of armow and equiiment in the 
o f f i c i a l reports suggests that t h i s object ive i s being 
pursued. 
V2»198, (zM), A297 •N7 
DlVEaSl(»iARY TACTICS,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATION 3,1971 
110. India Grimly presses on ( e d i t o r i a l ) 
Int Herald Trib 1971, December 3 , 6»1 , 
Pakistan got in teres ted in in ternat iona l act ion 
not to n o m a l i s e East Pakistan ( Ind ia ' s e a r l i e r aim) 
but to fend of f Indian m i l i t a r y pressure . Pakistan 
132 
could not realize that- i t s declared friend China was 
too remote and weak to help in way. i^ixon retreated 
to formal neutrality from partner^ip out of fear that 
U.N. route vould be blocked. 
V2X19S, (zM) A297, Ga73S=F »N71 
SEVENTH FLEET (UNITED STATES), DIVERSIONARY 
TACTICS,WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS. 
111. Naval Rivalry. 
Time 1972, January 17; 10. 
This short write up analyses tiie motives 
which prompted U.S. to order U.S. Seventh Fleet to sa i l 
into Indian Ocean towards Bay of Bengal appart from 
evacuation of Americans from East Bengal, another reason 
was to impress Indian and to counter any Soviet ships 
that might appear in the region. 
112. WICKER (Tom) 
Anderson Papers. 
Int Herald Trib 1972, January 5 , 4«6. 
According to Tom VJickers, Anderson papers 
have shown actual Aission of Enterprise was to divert 
133 
Indian ships and planes and tiius to weaken Indian drive 
against East Pakistan, The papers make one thing clear 
that Nixon and Kissinger set out deliberately to put 
United States into a position of supi)ort for Pakistan 
at %ihat ever cost , 
V2X193, (zM),E2 'NCB 
DEFEAT,WAR,INDO PAKISTAN,1965 
113. MOHAMMAD MUSA 
Sane aspects of the war. 
Pakistan Horizon 18,4*, 1965; 828. 
rh« above i s a reported version of the address 
of Commander in Chief at the Pakistsui Inst i tute of 
International Affairs Dec. 1965. The speaker t e l l s 
h i s audience that Insplte of Pakistan being qual i tat ive ly 
poor at managed to i n f l i c t defeat on India because 
Pakistan fought a national war. He claims that "for 
every shaheed 10 Indians f e l l " . He accuses India of 
having embarked on the path of expansion and conquest. 
m 
V2I193, (2M)i F 'FeSB 
AFTER AFFECTS OF WAR,INDO PAK 
REUXI0NS,1965 
114. EHAR (PN) 
Nov I s the time. 
Seminar 196P. November*, 26-30. 
While dealing with affects of 1965 Indo-
Pakistan war author f e e l s that Pakistan has succeeded 
in making the world at large realize that i t s supreme 
national objective i s to get Kashmir. Ihe world has 
also been given proof that to achieve this Pakistan 
i s prepared to stake everything. 
V2I193, (zM), F •N71 
AFTER AFFECTS OF WAR, INDO PAK 
RELATIONS,1971 
115. KAUL (TN) 
New situations in the subcontinent. 
Indian Horizons 2 1 , 2/3*, 1972; 14-20. 
V2hile reviewing the after e f fec t s of Indo-Pak 
war the author says that the concept of Pakistan as 
Islamic state with two terr i tor ies more than thousand 
13 
miles apart linked m&.i.nly through the bonds of religion 
proved an i l l conceived »nd i l l fated experiment. The 
emergence of Bangladeslri has sounded a death to the so 
called two nation theory. 
About Simla agreement success ha says that 
i t would not be true to believe that the agreement has 
by i t s e l f resolved a l l problems. There are many bxirdles 
the bitterness and h o s t i l i t i e s raisedby four conf l ic ts 
and 26 years of confrontation cannot be removed over-
night. I t v i l l take time and dedicated effort on both 
sides to remove these fee l ings and replace the concept 
of conf l ic t by concept of peace. 
V2il93, (zM), F31 'NTl 
TRIALS,PRISONERS OF WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971 
116. Pakistani war criminals. 
Wklv Round Tabl 1,34*, 1972,September*, 14-22. 
The above art ic le consists of discussions 
organised by the magazine. The participants being 
Amita Malik, R.P. Anand and Col. Rama Rao. According 
to Anita Malik, a p o l i t i c a l commentator "let the victims 
13J 
speak for themsalvos oa the question of war crime 
tribunals". Mr. R.P. Minnd, Department of Inter-
national Lav, School of International Studies f e e l s 
"there i s l i t t l e doubt about the personal responsi-
b i l i t y of the Pakistani soldiers for their crimes 
even i f they acted undar orders from their superiors. 
Such responsibil ity arises according to well recognised 
authority on international lav. Col. R.Hama Rao, 
Inst i tute of Defence Studies and Analysis, says that 
from Bangladesh point of viev a fa i r and public t r i a l 
of Pakistan military personnel against viiom suff ic ient 
evidence e x i s t s , would be very desirable. 
72:193, (zM), F32 'NTS 
HEPATRIATIQN,PRIS(HIERS OF WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATI(»1S, 1971 
117. India and Pakistan agreement. 
Hindustan Times 1973, August 30; 6i4 
Contains the text of tiie Indo-Pak agreement. 
The agreement was signed by Mr. P.N. Haksar the special 
representative of the prime Minister of Indian and by 
Pakistan's Defence Minister Mr. Aziz Ahmed. 
13/ 
I t contains 10 clauses regarding 
( i ) lomediate implementation of the solution of 
these hutnsiritaria problems, except in case 
of 195 P.O.W.'s . 
( i i ) RapartriaUon of a l l Pakistan P.O.W.'s and 
ciYilian internees, 
( i i i ) Simultaneous repartriation of Bangalis in 
Pakistan and a l l Pakistanies in Bangladesh, 
( iv ) Principle of simultaneity to be observed in 
repatriation. 
(•) Pakistan has agreed to accept substantial 
nusber of non-Bangalis who have opted out 
for Pakistan, 
( • i ) Bangladesh agrees ^ a t no t r i a l of 195 P.O.W.'s 
shall take place during the entire period of 
repatription and pending discussion envisaged 
in clause ( v i i ) . 
( v i i ) On completion o ' repatriation of P.O.W.'s 
and c iv i l ian internees in India, Bangalis in 
Pakistan, and Pakistanies in Bangladesh, India 
Pak and Bangladeish wi l l discuss and se t t l e 
133 
qussUon of 195 P.O.W.*s. 
( y l i l ) The schedule for t r i p a r t i t e repartr la t lon 
w i l l be worked out by India . 
V2»193, (zM), F32, zb6 'NTS 
HBCOGNITION BANGLASBSH AS OBSTACLS, 
REPATRIATION,PRISONERS OF WAR,INDO 
PAK RELATIONS, 1 9 7 2 . 
118. SATISH KDMAR 
Cie P 0 W quest ion . 
Hindustan Times 1973, March 3 ; 5 i2 
The author says tha t Bhutto d e l i b e r a t a l y 
complicated the P.O.W. problem by h i s remark that 
Bangladesh recognit ion i s condi t ional on the repatr ia -
t i o n of P.O.W.'8 Mr. s a t i s h Kunar f e e l s that Bhutto 
i s using the P.O.W.*8 repartr la t lon problem to involve 
U.N. i n the quest ion . 
V2I193, (zM), F321, 'N72 
HUMANITARIAN ASPECT,REPATRIATION,PRISONERS 
OF WAR, IN DO PAK RELATIONS, 1972 
119. Bangladesh's approach not rec iprocated. 
Pakistan delaying r e p a t r i a t i o n . 
Baneladerfi obs 1973, February 12; 4»1 . 
13J 
I t Charges Pakistan with not having responded 
to the hunanitarian gesture of India and Bangladesh 
vAien they decided in l a s t November to repatr iate the 
f a m i l i e s of a l l the P.O.W.'s. 
V2»193, (zM), F322 'N72 
I£QAL ASPECT,RSPAIRIATION ,PRIS(»«ERS OF 
WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1972 
120. GILL (peter) 
400,000 hos tages . 
DftAlY Talegrftpn 1972, October 19; 16«4 
Discusses Paki s tan ' s threat to take P.O.W.'s 
i s s u e to Secur i ty Council . The author accuses India 
and Bangladeidi of f l a g r a n t l y ignoring the provis ion 
of Geneva Convention by not repatr ia t ing a l l the 
vounded s o l d i e r s at l e a s t . I t d i smisses Indian 
Government's argxuent that there i s no cessa t ion of 
h o s t i l i t i e s and only c e a s e f i r e . 
121. HITTER (JP) 
lAgal aspects of the P.O.W. i s s u e . 
Hindustan Stand 1972, November B, 4 a . 
The author po int s out that s ince the Pakistan 
14J 
army surrendered to the jo in t conunand of Indian army 
and Muktl Bahinl f o r c e s , India cannot u n i l a t e r a l l y 
re l ease the P.O.W.'s. 
122. ZAHID SAID 
Indo Pakistan c o n f l i c t 1971 - l e g a l a spec t s . 
Pakistan Horizon 2 5 , 1*, 1972; 7P-91. 
Repartrlatlon of refugees of East Pakistan 
and of Prisoner of war i s considered as ob l iga tory 
on India . Lagal-Implication of t r i a l s of P.O.W.'s and 
repatr ia t ion to Bangladesh area c r i t i c a l l y dea l t wi th . 
I t considers India a v i o l a t o r of in ternat iona l l a v s . 
V2»193, (zM) F323 »N72 
POUTICAL ASPECT,REPATRIATION,PRISONERS 
OF WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1972 
123. HARI HARAN (A) 
Dacca's hand in the P.O.W. i s s u e . 
Fur Rast Scon Rev 75 ,7', 1972,February 12; 4 - 7 . 
Suggests that due to Bhutto's attempts to 
replenish the Pakistani arsenal wltii weapons from U.S. 
and China, the P.O.W.*s detent ion from Indian point 
of view becomes necessary. I t i s rea l i sed that as long 
14i 
as the 93,000 West Pakis tanis are held pr isoners In 
India there would be no threat of war. But once 
immediate I s sues are s e t t l e d i t i s considered p o s s i b l e 
Pakis tan, with the aid of the Chinese would try to 
create trouble in Kashmir. 
V2119Q, (zM), F5 'N71 
DISMiiMBERMSNTjAFlER AFFECTS OF WAR, 
INDO PAK RliLATICMiS, 1971 
124. FAROOQUI (MM) 
Pakistani p o l i c i e s that led to break \xp, 
1972, New Age Print ing P r e s s , New Delhi .P106. 
Traces Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s from 1947 t i l l 
date . Written from canmunist's point of view. Blames 
m i l i t a r y o l igarchy of P a ^ s t a n f o r ttiis c o n f l i c t , 
Snergence of Bangladesh and part plajred by Mujlb i s 
discussed from Marxian point of view. 
125. MANEKAR (DR) 
Pakistan cut to s i z e . 
1972, Indian Book Co. , New Delhl^ P175. 
Story of tJie 14 days Indo-Pakistan war. 
The writer a s s e r t s that i f Pakistan i s cut to s i z e 
14J 
i t i s ent ire ly Tahya Khan's handlvork. India has 
nothing to do with i t . Yahya Khan struck an axe on 
the body of Pakistan on Mardi 25,1971, for India th i s 
was war to end weurs by Pakistan. 
126. Stricken subcontinent ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Int . Herald Trib 1971, December 13", 6s 1 . 
Ihe most c r i t i c a l result of th i s tragic 
confrontation would be emergence of Bangladesh as 
third major nation on Indian subcontinent. According 
to the art ic le the example of Bangladesh cotild set off 
chain reaction in both Pakistan and India that would 
reduce the subcontinent to a Balkanized hodge podge 
of quarrelling s ta tes . 
V2I193, (zM), F6 (x»57) 'NSB 
FOBBIGN EXCHANGEl,ECONOMIC CRISES, 
AFIEH AFFECTS OF WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATI(»fS, 1 9 6 5 
127. MUKHERJSE (Dll lp) 
Ploiigh Shares into Swords. 
Far East Econ 50,4*, 1965,October 28*, 160-62. 
One of the f i r s t developments the author. 
14J 
foresees after 1965 In India and Pakistan Is that the 
High Coninands In both countries v l l l demand renewed 
arms supplies to replace those destroyed during the 
shooting. Ihe drain on foreign exchange vhlch this 
Implies tHat combine with other economic factors such 
as dlsri:qptlon of aid programmes, to sdt^ imulate Inflation 
and affect long term planning. 
12R. NAIH (SK) 
Aftermaths. 
scon wklv 17,40; 1965, October 2o; 1509-10, 
Die author f e e l s that worst affect of Indo-
Pak war 1965 was on our economy. The serious e f fect 
w i l l take the form of Increased diversion of foreign 
exchange and other re purees from c i v i l to military 
purposes. 
129* On the eve of ceasefire on the economic front 
(edi tor ia l ) 
East Boon 45^15; 1965,September 17*, 6P7-90. 
Indo Pakistan war had adversely affected 
Indian economy. Ihere was much concern In the nation 
that our foreign exchange resources had become so 
Hi 
meagre and uncertain at a time \itien the need for 
c r i t i c a l imports had abruptly risen in the defence 
context. 
Ihe art ic le also deals with role of 
controls in defence oriented economy. 
Y2»193, CzM), F7 'NSB 
POLITICAL STABILITY,AFTER AFFECTS OF WAR, 
INDO PAK. RELATIONS, 1965 
130. KRISHNA MEN ON (VK) 
Foreign policy continuian. 
Seminar 75^ 1965, November; 41-50. 
The writer, a fonaer Union Minister for 
defence, %diile talking of the affects of Indo Pakistan 
war 1965, says "the cr i ses has indicated more than 
ever before, both the inherent quality and appropria> 
teness of nonalignment as a posture and pol icy. The 
vmr has aroused the nation and forged unity. 
V2I193, (zM), F7 'HVl 
POLITICAL STABILITY,AFTER AFFECTS CF WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
131. Ali Bhutto begins to pick \2p the pieces . 
Time 1972, January 3*, 22-23. 
14 
According to the art ic le one of the after 
maths of the defeat of Pakistan was surrender of powers 
by Tahya Khan to Ziilflkar All Khan Bhutto. There was 
tuimoll In the country - the seven generals including 
Yahya Khan offered to retire and their resignations 
were accepted. Some navy men also resigned. 
Y2:193, (asM), F8173 'N?! 
UNITED STATES GAIN, AFTER AFFECTS OF WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
132. War In Aslat V y^ India spumed US peace ef forts 
(edi tor ia l ) 
U.S.News Wld Rep 71,25; 1971,December 2o;10-12. 
Views U.S. as big loser In attempting to 
lead off tiie war I t did not receive any encouragonent 
from India despite mil l ions of dollars aid over the 
years. Calls Russia a "big winner - a chief supporter 
of wars apparent victor". Deals with U.S. dlsanhance-
ment %irlth I t s 25 years old policy of trying to buy 
p o l i t i c a l Influence with foreign aid. 
I d J 
V2«198, (zM), FR173-F82V 'N?! 
UNI1SD STATES DIPLOMATIC GAIN,AFTER 
AFFECTS OF WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS ,1971 
133• N«w Worries f o r U.S. in Asia* a f t er maths of 
Indian Pakistan war. 
U.S.Neva Wld Rep 7 2 , i ; 1972,January 3 ; 14-16. 
I t i s not only India but Russia as we l l 
that emerges as big v i c t o r i n As ia ' s l a t e s t shooting 
war f o r U.S. the f u l l meaning i s Just s tar t ing to 
unfold . Fee l s that U.S. mistake of backing Pakistan 
has lowered M e r i c a ' s pres t ige and in f luence . 
134. The p e r i l of picking a l o s e r . 
News week 78 ,26; 1971,December 27*, 6-7. 
The paper thinks that i f the U.S. suffered 
psychologica l i f not substant ia l damage, Peking paid 
for i t s a l l i a n c e with Pakistan in much more d i r e c t way. 
Despite Mrs. Indira Gandhi* s annoyance Iritti U.S. the 
White House was confident that India* s continuing need 
f o r f i n a n c i a l aid voiild soon spur New Delhi to make 
c o n c i l i a t o r y overtures to Washington, but the e a r l i e r 
en terpr i se was taken by Indians as a brazen attempt to 
pressure India i n t o backing down. 
14/ 
135. SAFRAN (Nadar) 
Iftilted States: how firm an alloy In war. 
New Mlddl« East 4o:i972. Janiiary; lP-19. 
Looks at the Implications of the Indo-
Pakistan war for countries dependent on U.S., and 
v^ich may now conclude that America i s a f ickle al loy. 
The writer disputes the charge tiiat Pakistan has been 
abondoned in i t s hour of dire need. Further, i t denies 
that U.S.A. was formal a l ly of Pakistan in conf l ic t 
with India. Agggrtlnig 
V2tl93, (zM), F8173, Zia *nes 
CESSAIION OF HOSTILITIES U^NITED STATiiS 
GAIN, WAR, IN DO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
136. Ihe war that hasn't quite. 
Econ 1965, September 18", 1076-77. 
By accident or design probably by accident 
the India Pakistan war seems to have f izzled out before 
i t real ly started and result i s tiiat nobody gained 
except may be U.S.A. 
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137. GHOSH (S) 
!Ihe essence of i t . 
seminar 75*, 1965, November; 10-IP. 
While d i scuss ing Indo-Pakistan war 1965 
U«s« p o l i c y of appeasement to Pakistan and n.K. '8 b ias 
for Pakistan in quest ions concerning Indo-Pakistan 
opines these are l o g i c a l l y responsible for the present 
war. I t i s they %dio have a l l along equated the aggressor 
with the Yict lB of aggression and have thus emboldend 
Pakistan. 
Muslim leaguers could not accept democracy 
in undivided India , not can they now reconci le them-
s e l v e s to the s ta tus of a smaller s ta te in r e l a t i o n to 
India . 
V2X193, (zM), Gal -1 , •N65 
WORLD POWERS ATTITUDE, WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1 9 6 5 
138. ZUBEIDA HASAN 
Indla-Pakistans a siamary account. 
Pakistan Horizon 18,4', 1966; 344-56 . 
Research o f f i c e r at Pakistan I n s t i t u t e of 
Internat ional Af fa irs in t h i s a r t i c l e she descr ibes the 
14J 
Situation during the war-covering both military and 
foreign aspects. Die reaction of of different countries 
and support received by Pakistan from various sides i s 
discussed country wise. I t provides an Interesting 
commentary from Pakistani point of view of the reaction 
of various nations to Indo-Pak war of 1965. 
V2X193, (zM), Gal (97) 'NSB 
MUSLIM COUNTRISS ATTITUDE,WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1966 
139. AGWAKI (MS) 
India, Pakistan and West Asia. 
Int Stud R, l -2; 1966,July-October; 158-66. 
Ihe out break of large scale h o s t i l i t i e s 
between India and Pakistan in the Summer of 1965 
introduced new idiades of emphasis in the attitude of 
WBst Asian countries. Turkey and Iran, the writer 
t e l l s us, offered moral and material support to 
Pakistan t^ich was an act of h o s t i l i t y towards India. 
Jordan backed Pakistan too, in the Security Council 
delibrations alongwlth Saudi Arbbla at Arab* s Head 
Ck>nference i t tried to demand collective.disapproval 
of Indian stand. 
140. THAPAR (Romesh) 
Ihe Danger ahead. 
fi99R fQU% Wk3,Y 17,4;i965,October 9;i544. 
While ta lk ing about cease f i r e , the author 
poin ts out that through Iran and Turkey's help Pakistan 
I s busy In rebuilding I t s m i l i t a r y s t rength . These are 
the wr i te r says , omnlnous polnters-and dlplomatlcEdly, 
through ceasefire and other assurances we do not seem 
to be able to prevent aid from reaching Rawalpindi a t 
t h i s c r i t i c a l moment in the h i s t o r y of the subcontinent, 
V2»193, (zM), GalJN4 »N71 
UNITED NATIONS ATTITUDE,WAR, 
IWDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
141. FARUKI (Kemal K) 
Indo-Pakistan war, 1971 and United S t a t e s . 
Pakistan Horizon 2 5 . i : 1972*, 10-20. 
The react ions of d i f fe ren t countr ies a t 
United Nat ion 's secur i ty council meeting described, 
U.S.A. and China describe as t h i s of Pakistan. 
15i 
V2»193, (z i l ) , GalN4-H3 'Nee 
MEDIATION, UNI TED NATION'S role,WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
142, NOSSEL (Frederick) 
United Nations: U Thant's r o l e . 
Far East Econ 50,6*, 1969,November l i ; 16-21 . 
While commenting on U Thant's v i s i t to Delhi 
and Rawalpindi during 1965 c o n f l i c t the author says 
that as U.N. secretary General, U Thant in Indo-Pak 
dispute was as much as messenger sent by vrashington 
and Moscow as a mediator. 
V2J193, (zM), GalN4-H3 'N71 
HBDIATIOK,UNITED NATION'S role,WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
143. '4io wants war ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25 .258! 1971.October 2 F ; 4 « 1 . 
Contains reply of President Yahya Jjian to 
U Thant's l e t t e r in %diich U lliant requested the 
reso lv ing of the c o n f l i c t , withdrawal of forces from 
border was asked by Yahya Y^sn, 
152 
V2:193 (zM),GaIlf4-H3,Za2 
CEASEFI RE, MEDIATION, ON ITED NATION'S ROLE, 
WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965. 
144. In the arms against aggression ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
East Econ 45.12! 1965.September 17; 531. 
" U«N. Secretary has not succeeded in His 
e f fo r t s to secure immediate cease f i r e . "Oils i s because 
Govt, of Pak i s t an ' s i s only not in te res ted in the 
res to ra t ion of peace but i s keen on exploi t ing the 
present s i tua t ion in such a way tha t i n t e rna t iona l 
pressure i s brought to bear on t h i s country to agree 
to discuss the s ta tus and future of Kashmir." 
145. India , prime Minister (Shas t r i ,La l Bahadur) 
Statement. 
Foreign Aff Record ll,9;i965,september;252-55. 
The statement was made by Prime Minister on 
the ceasefire in the Parliament on sept. 22,1965. He 
told the House that in deference to the resolution of 
Security Council the Govt, of India has ordered ceasefire 
on mutual basis. 
15J 
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CSASSFIRE,MEDIATION,UNITED NATION'S ROLE, 
WAR INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
146. ASTRACHAN (Anthony) 
U«N, de lays Note on U.s* cease f i re motion. 
In t Herald Trlb 1971. December 14*, 1»5. 
Describes Security Council meeting on 12 Dec, 
1971. white House representat ive c r i t i c i s e d India for 
not accepting U,N, reso lut ion for cease f i re while 
Pakistan d id . According to the author India did not 
accept cease f i re because i t wanted Bangladesh to be 
made a party to the c e a s e f i r e . 
147. United Nations Securi ty Council 
Resolution 3o3 (1971) . 
Pakistan Horizon 2 5 . 1 ! 1972; 161. 
Text of reso lut ion sponsored by Argentina, 
Burundi, Japan, Nicaragna, S ierra Leone, and Somalia, 
adopted by a vote of 11 in favoxir and with 4 absentees 
(France, Poland, USSR and UK) t h i s was on December 5 , 
1971. 
V2«193 ( z l j , Ga41 'NSB 
CHINESE ATTITUDE,WAR,INDO PAK REUTIONS .1965 
148. DUTT (Vidya Prakash) 
1 5 ; 
India, caiina and Pakistan. 
YQlana. 9,20;i965,October lO; 37. 
We have to face two countries vhlch profes 
opposing Ideologies but are In C3nilcal co l l i s ion after 
Pakistan's mass the armed attack on Kashmir, Peking's 
advocacy of Pakistan's case has become more strident, 
say the author* 
149. PBING SHSIM (Klaus I"^ 
China's role In Indo-Paklstan conf l i c t . 
China Quart 24; 1965,October-December;170-5, 
According to the author from 1965 Indo-Pak 
war was turning point In Slno-Pakistani re lat ions . 
India's htMlliatlon at China's hands encouraged Pakistan 
to resort to arms In order to gain Pakistan's objectives 
In Kashmir. Talking of China's role In 1965 conf l i c t , 
the author suggests that v^lle Chlnesei Govt, statement 
did not come right out and say that China woxild enter 
the war on Pakistan's s ide, I t came very close to I t . 
When the I n i t i a l f ighting proved inconclusive, China 
took anotiier step to bolster Pakistani posit ion. On 
Sept. 19,1965, she sent an ultlmation to India alleging 
15J 
aggression In the border area* 
V2I19Q, (zM), Ga41 'N?! 
CHINESE ATTITUI£,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATI(»iS,1971 
150. BLOOD WOBIH (Demls) 
China's Wary game. 
Jerusalem Post 1971, December 6, 3 : 1 . 
While talking of Indo-Paklstan war, the 
author says that Peking's attitude has become a key 
Issue. He holds Chou-Snlal rather than Mao's groMp 
responsible for the Chinese smile for Yahya Khan. 
Cr i t i c i s e s Peking for backing military Govt, of West 
Pakistan against l e f t wing l iberation movement of the 
oppressed people of East Bengal. 
151. MEURUNNISA AU 
China's diplomacy during the Indo-Paklstan 
war,1971, 
PflKla^fln HnrUion 2 5 , 1 , 1972, 53 . 
Calls China's restraint and attitude towards 
Bangladesh as correct and sympathetic. China supported 
Pakistan as much as was possible , says the author. 
15 r* 
152, VOLSKY (Dmitry) 
Peking mischief makers. 
New Times 2\ 1972, January*, 10-11 . 
Ihe author accuses Chinesa leaders of sowing 
d i s t r u s t and i n c i t i n g enimlty Isetween Bangladesh and 
India and a l so of encouraging revenge minded Pakistani 
elements against India . 
153, YAKUBOT (A) 
Conf l ic t in Hindustan and tii« provocative 
ro le of Mao's group. 
S o v i e t Bev 9 , i ; 1972, January 4 ; 3 8 - 4 2 . 
Reveals Peking' s de l iberate provocation and 
fanning India-Pakistan c o n f l i c t to t h e i r ( i . e . Chinese) 
advantage. Holds that Nixon i s par t ly responsible for 
making pro-Pakistani ge s tures . 
V2X193, (zM), Ga41 (zS) 'N65 
ARMAMSNT,CHINESE ATTITUDE,WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
154, SETHI (SP) 
Chinn as a fac tor in Indo-Paklstan c o n f l i c t . 
Wld Today 25^i ; 1965, January*, 36 -46 . 
15? 
The p o l i t i c s on the Indian subcontinent are 
a continuation of the old animosities bui l t up during 
the Independence struggle, fought at cross purposes by 
the Indian National Congress and Muslim league In 
United India. 
According to the author, through I t s friend-
ship with China Pakistan hoped both to overawe, India 
and also to threaten her a l l i e s with defection unless 
they put pressure on India to se t t l e Kashmir i s sue . 
V2J193, (zM), Ga41 (zS) 'NVl 
ARMAMENT,CUIN£Sfi ATTITUDE,WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIOIJS, 1971 
155. MALINKIN (Y) 
Peking and the conf l ict on the subcontinent, 
Soviet Rev 9,3(supplement),1972,January IP; 
11-18. 
Accuses Peking of rendering military aid to 
Pakistan China i s Pakistan's main supplier of machine 
guns, automatic r i f l e s , martars e t c . , according to tiie 
writer. 
153 
V2:193, (zM), Ga41, Za *He5 
CESSATION OF HOSTIUTIES,CHINESE r o l e , 
WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1966. 
156, 13ianks for muffing i t ( e d i t o r i a l ) 
EcoQ 1965, September 25 ; 16-IP. 
China by intervening in the war between India 
and Pakistan did a nimber of things i t cannot have 
meant to do* I t hastened a wrong sor t of end to war. 
I t v i r t u a l l y raised tiie vdiole world against i t s e l f . 
Yet, the paper says, China acted in the hope of prolon-
ging Pak i s t an ' s war e f fo r t s i s beyond doubt. 
V2»193,(zM), Ga5-1 '1165 
VIES TERnP OWE BS ATTITUDE, WAR, IN DO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1965 
157. Under-estimated p e r i l s . 
Far East Econ 50^3^ 1965,October 2 i ; i 22 -29 . 
CorrSspondent repor t s t h a t Big Western Powers 
have fa i led to grasp the r ea l p o l i t i c a l dangers of the 
s i t u a t i o n , often forge t t ing t h a t vAiat i s a t stake i s 
not the fr iendship of West with India or Pakis tan , but 
peace in Asia. According to the repor ter the view tha t 
Kashmir conf l i c t i s primari ly a re l ig iousone, i s 
15d 
misleading and dangerous. 
V2t l93 , (zM), Ga5-1 'N?! 
WESOEHN POWERS' ATTITUIffi,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971. 
158. Reconstruction of the subcontinent ( e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Romd Tabl 247^ 1972, July", 275-81 . 
Revievs tlie future of western p o l i c y in the 
subcontinent e s p e c i a l l y with reference Indo-Pakistan 
c o n f l i c t . 
159. PALMER (D) 
New Order in Sout^ Asia, 
Qribis 15 , 6; 1972*, 1109-21. 
With the emergence of Bangladesh t h i s U.S.A, 
paper f e e l s that India has emerged as dominant power 
in South i^ast Asia . Discusses various countr ies ro le 
witii reference to tiie 1971 Indo-Pak c o n f l i c t . 
160. SEMIC (Dusan) 
%ird war on the Indian subcontinent. 
Rev Int Aff 22^52; 1971,December 20; 4 - 5 . 
In 1965 American and S o v i e t pressure on the 
b e l l i g e r e n t s resulted fr<ra the common assessment that 
16J 
the c o n f l i c t was not in the i n t e r e s t of e i t h e r of the 
super povers . But in 1971 there was no such agreement 
U.S*A. seen to be making e f f o r t s to come out of new 
c o n f l i c t with a few dents to i t s pres t ige as p o s s i b l e -
S o v i e t Ifeion has become an a l l y by t rea ty of one side« 
According to the author Yogoslavia f e l t t h a t m i l i t a r y 
act ion was unacceptable so lut ion to the problem of 
even refugee i n f l u x . 
721198, (zM), Ga56 'NTl 
GRSAT BRITAIN ATTITUDE,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971 
161. qURBSHI (Khalida) 
Br i ta in and Xndo-Pakistan c o n f l i c t over 
£ a s t Pakistan. 
Pakistan Horizon 2 5 . 1 ! 1972, 32 -44 . 
Accuses Br i ta in of p a r t i a l l y towards India 
and j u s t i f i e s Pak e x i s t from common wealth. 
V2: l93 , (zM), Ga58 •N71 
RUSSIAN ATTITUDE,WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS ,1971 
162. BUBON (Yair) 
War on Indian subcontinent Moscow moves closer 
161 
to Delhi, What I t w i l l mean for Egypt. 
New Middle East 40; 1972, January; 15-17. 
According to the author, Russians were 
probably not too enthusiastic about a situation >^lch 
might have so eas i ly lead to direct confrontation 
betvreen USSR and China. Once the war started Russians 
adopted a strong deterrent posture v i s - a - v i s China and 
succeeded in preventing the Chinese from becoming 
direct ly involved in the war. 
163. MUSTAFA (Zubeida) 
USSR and Indo Pak war 1971. 
Pakistan Horizon 2S,i: 1972; 45-52. 
USSR has been made primarily responsible for 
imparting to the conflict international dimension by 
drawing the subcontinent the vortex of big power 
rivalries. 
164. RSSTON (Janes) 
Winner in India Pakistan War. 
Int Herald Trib 1971, December lP-19; 4 :3 . 
In th i s Indo-Pakistan conf l ic t Russians saw 
chances to weaken Washington's long association with 
162 
India and Ind ia ' s democratic experiment In i^sla. "They 
aimed a t creat ing new a l l i ance with Indian and weaklng 
China. India Pakistan c o n f l i c t was a chal lence to 
Moscow's power p lay , 
166. ZUBKIDA HASAN 
Pakis tan ' s re la t ion with USSR In 1960 ' s . 
Wld Today 2 5 , i ; 1969, January*, 26-35 . 
Accuses USSR of abondoning n e u t r a l i t y during 
Sept , 1965 war. She further charges USSR with supplying 
of arms to India , according that , In respect of arms 
a i d , India , the only power In South Asia to receive 
S o v i e t m i l i t a r y nardware, continued to enjoy a s p e c i a l 
re la t ionsh ip with the USSR t i l l 1968, when Sov ie t 
conducted arms deal with Pakistan, 
V2«193, (ZM), Ga73, 'N71 
llNIIfiD STATES AriIT'JDE,WAR,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971 
166. FRANKEL (Max) 
Papers show s ides pushed by e v e n t s , 
In t Herald Trlb 1972, June ?; 5 U . 
Referring to the ta lk between Nixon and h i s 
a ids "The tone of the meeting now divulged suggests 
183 
that Mr. Kissinger may simply have been enunciating 
policy as privately determined by President. No back 
talk was wanted or offered. 
167. I am getting h e l l ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Int Herald Trib 1972, January 6; 1:6. 
Consists of type script of the text of one 
of the three secret docments published in Washington 
Post,describing meeting of security council. Kissinger 
i s quoted as saying "I am getting h e l l every half an 
hour from President that we are not being tought enough 
on India. 
168. KHUHSHID HYDER 
United States and Indo Pak war 1971. 
Fakiatim Horizon 25, i ; 1972', 63-74. 
Discusses limitation of Anerican influence 
in South Asia with reference to Pakistan versus India. 
On Bengal Pakistan earned U.S.A.'s sympathy. 
169. KUDRYAVTSOV (V) 
Hypocrisy. 
Soviet Rev 9,3*, 1972, January IP; 73-75. 
Die writer i s Izvest ia correspondent and fee l s 
162 
that USA played the role of hones broker In the Indian 
subcontinent. Bie hypocrisy of USA ruling c i c l e s in 
the long run would deceive no one. Talking of Indian 
peoples reaction, he adds that people have been able to 
discern their friends and their enemies. 
170. ROMESH BABU (B) 
Disinterest to gun boats and after Nixon's 
low profi le in South Asia. 
ChiaaJS§E. S, 1-2; 1972,March-April; 30^35. 
According to the author USA's preoccupation 
with Vietnam e tc , made i t push Indo-Pak tension to a 
low priority and Indo-Pak war intruded witti an apparent 
suddeness. He views Nixon-Kissinger strategy as one 
of aggressiveness towards India. 
171. Ti l t (edi tor ia l ) 
ta^ ^9raI{i W \ ) 1972, January 7', 4»1. 
Discusses Anderson papers on Indo-^akistan 
cr i s e s . According to the edi tor ia l these papers confim 
the starkly anti-Indian aspect of Merican policy and 
i l luninates i t s seeming cyniclism as wel l . Kissinger 
i s believed to have said. 'He (Nixon) does not believe 
we are carrying out h i s wishes. He wants a t i l t dor 
i s not to be treated a t too high a l e v e l . The Anderson 
papers , according to the e d i t o r , are not incons is ten t 
with pol icy pursued by Nixon," 
V2I193, (zM), Ga31-Ga56 •N65 
BRITISH J0U3NAUSTS ATTITUDE WAR, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS,iges 
172. JONES (Stephen Hugh) 
Br i t i sh a t t i t ude to Indo Pakistan War, 
Econ Wklv 17,42;i965, October 16;i589-90. 
Most Br i t i sh papers, according to the author, 
have ccxne around to accepting the Indian claim tha t 
Kashmir f ight ing began because Pakistan sent i n f i l -
t r a t o r s across ceasef i re l i n e . But the same papers also 
blamed, Indians for creat ing condit ions tha t caused 
Pakistan to take t h i s s t ep , B r i t i sh leaders think tha t 
the ra i s genuine dispute about Kashmir. They think t h a t 
Kashmir i s the key to a l l Indo Pakistan c o n f l i c t . 
163 
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BRITISH JOOBNALISTS ATTITUDB,WAH,INDO PAK 
RELATIONS, 1971 
173. ABDUL MAJID 
Times man to Indira's rescue. 
Pakistan Times 25.122:1971. June l o ; 4 i l . 
Itovievs Hazethursts support of Indira Gandhi 
c a l l s i t an "eloborate t issue of circ\mstantial f a l s e -
hoods". 
174. CHOUDHARI (Nirad ^) 
India(\Govt. and British correspondents. 
Pakistan Times 25.126: 1971, June 14; 4 : 3 . 
An interesting conment on Indian Government's 
attitude towards British correspondents with regard to 
reporting about Bast Bengal happening during 1971. 
surprise expressed at Indian Government's sudden l i f t i n g 
of restr ict ions imposed on Brit ish correspondents. 
175. How to help Mrs. Gandhi ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Guardian 1971, October 28", 12:1. 
Advises Brit ish Government to forego posturing 
16/ 
and take up f u l l y committed posi t ion, a stand of ^ o l e 
hearted support for Indian because I t Is a case of 
democracy In danger. 
V2»193, (zM), G31 - Ga58 'NVl 
RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS, WAR, IN DO PAK 
RELATIONS,1971 
176. MASLENNIKOV (A) 
India during and after war. 
Soviet Rev 9,3',1972,January IB*, 16-17. 
Pravada's special correspondent, the author 
says that the main cause \^ id i led to these tragic 
events on the Indian subcontinent was the armed suppre-
ssion of the democratic rights of the people of East 
Bengal as e:q)ressed in 1970 e l ec t ions . He describes 
the despatch USA 7th Fleet Ship to Bay cf Bengal \dhich 
aroused general indignation in India. Speaking about 
the post-war situation he says that the ceasefire i s 
just a starting point on the way towards Just and last ing 
peace. Delhi rea l i ses that although the guns are s i l e n t , 
the conf l ic t ^ i c h reged on Indian subcontinent i s s t i l l 
a smoulder. 
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V2I193 , (zM), G33-Ga54 *H65 
INDIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES ATTITUDE, 
WAR INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 . 
177. PILLAI (Raman K) 
India fore ign pol icy) bas ic i s s u e s and 
p o l i t i c a l a t t i tudes« 1969, Minakshi Prakashan, 
Meerut. Chap 13. 
In t h i s study Dr. P i l l a i enqtiires into l^e 
a t t i t u d e s of opposi t ion p a r t i e s v i z - a - y i z fore ign 
p o l i c y witti the objec t of answering the question ^liov 
did the oppos i t ion inf luence p o l i c y dec i s ions?" In 
chapt 13 while d i scuss ing Indo Pakistan war of 1966, 
he considers major probl«n8 of c o n f l i c t to be refugees 
evacuee property, m i n o r i t i e s , canal water d i spute . 
Among a l l these Kashmir i s considered the most s e n s i t i v e 
p o i n t . 
V2I193, (zM), G33-Ga73 •N71 
UNITED STATES OPPOSITION PARTIES ATTITUDE, 
WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
178. war i n Asiat f a i l u r e of U.S. diplomacy. 
U.S. News and Wld Rep 71,25*, 1971,December 10*, 
16-19. 
16 "i 
Kennedy charged Nixon Govt, with failure to 
express sympathy with Sast Bengal and for unnecessarily 
blaming India. He says our Govt, and U.N. must come to 
understand that actions of Pakistan army unleashed the 
forces in South Asia that led to war. Nixon adminis-
tration has defended Government's attitude on grounds 
that Pakistan listened to U.S.A. advice with regard to 
aid and amnesty to refugees and the administration blames 
Indian Government for military action. 
V2»193, (zM), H, Zb2 'NTa 
INIEBNAL OPPOSITIQN,OBSTACI£,RAPPROACHM£NT 
WAR, INDO PAK RBLATIONS, 1972 
179. Muree Vforries (edi tor ia l ) 
Econ Po l i t Wklv 7,9; i972, May 6; 16-18. 
Analyses the obstacles and problems in the 
way of India-Pakistan settlement e .g . P.O.W.'s t r i a l s , 
border alignments e t c . Bhutto, the paper f e e l s , i s 
contronted with domestic results of an understanding 
%rith India. The hawks in Pakistan do not want peace, 
concludes the paper. 
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SOCIO-CULTURAL OBSTACIfi,RAPPROACHMENT, 
WAR.INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
180. BHATTACHARYA (Asit) 
India Pakistan ritfapproachment: Hhe obstacles . 
ECon Wklv 16,24; 1965,January 13; 981-B4. 
According to the author a secular state In 
Pakistan i s the precondition for the growth of any real 
understffiiding and friendship between the two countries 
without i t a l l meetings and conferences of the two 
countries cannot be but be f r u i t l e s s . 
181. KNOW (Rawle) 
Pakistan loses her fear of India, 
Daily Telegraph 1965, May 5\ 1B»3 . 
Rawle know wrote \mt i l the generation of Hindu 
and sildi Punjabis who hanker after their los t Lahore has 
gone, unt i l there are pol i t i c ians in power in Delhi vdio 
were never moddened by trying to deal with Jinnah and 
h i s muslim league there never would be peace on these 
front iers . 
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V2J193, («M), H, Zb6 »N71 
RECOGNITION 6ANGUDBSH,06STACLB,RAPPR0ACHMENT, 
WAR, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971. 
182. GUPTA (Siser) 
Pakistan's dilemma, 
seminar 150^1972, February', 12-16, 
surveys the problem botti-domestlc and foreign 
with vhlch Bhutto Is l ike ly to be confronted. The 
Immediate problem Is to make the people of Pakistan 
accept Bangladesh as rea l i ty . Another problem Is one 
of securing honourable peace with India. 
183. I t s Bhutto's move. 
Econ 243.6712. 1972, April 1 5 - 2 i ; 16-18. 
ThB theme of the a r t i c l e I s that Pakistan 
must recognise Bangladesh without more delay If South 
Asian sett lement I s to be approached. The onus for 
sett lement would be on Indian then. 
V2I193, («M), H, Zb7 •N71 
PRISONERS OF WAR,OBSTACLE,RAPPROACHMENT, 
WAR,INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1971 
184. Time for Forgiveness. 
Time 1973, July 23 , 18-21. 
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Version of tht Intanriev Tlmt Editor's lnt«r» 
•i«v pr«tid«at Bhutto regarding the recognition of 
Bangladesh after he was authorised by the National 
assembly of Pakistan to accord recognition, Bhutto told 
'Time' that Dacca's intention to try 195 p.O.W.'s %ras 
s t i l l the main hurdle to successful negotiation for 
rapproachment. All the three are anxious to have 
negotiation^ Pakistan for repatriation of i t s 90,0000 
P.O.W.'s; Bangladesh to dispose off 1,50,000 Beharis 
vho vant to go back to Pakistan and India i s almost 
as anxious to get rid of P.O.W.'s. 
Bhutto said *ve have been broken in half" 
and have, apart from economic problems of under 
developed co tan try, problem of Bengalees in the west 
they have been interned *I never waited to do i t but 
Mujibur Rahman's chanvinistic policies drove me to 
this . About rapproachment he said as our i s thousand 
years old conflict between Hindus and Muslims, now 
personified in the states of India and Pakistan finding 
of a modus Vivendi would be the greatest achievement.* 
17 •1 
V2tl93, (zM), H51211 M 
MURSB TALKS, INDO PAK RELATIONS 
185• Musings before Muree, 
Bcon Pol i t Wkly 7,8*, 1972, April 29', 871-73. 
Discusses the f u t i l i t y of having dialogue 
with Bhutto for settlement of various Issues. 
V2I193, (zM), H61211M, Zb 
OBSTACLES TO MUREE TALKS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
1 8 6 . GILL ( P e t e r ) 
KashMlr still sltunbllng block. 
in 
Dally Tela graph 36374; 1972, April 25 ; 13»1. 
wri t ten on the eve of Muree t a l k s , the author 
forecases tha t a t the meeting Kashmir issue would prove 
most tenacious . 
V2»193, (ZM), H51211M, 2b3 
SOCIO CULTURAL OBSTACIJSS to MUR£& Ti\LKS, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS 
187. SALAMAX ALI 
Muree t a l k s . 
Far Sftgt ficpR gey 76 ,6 ; 1972,May 6; 14. 
Talking about the Muree t a lk s the author 
poin ts out "there was no mention in the statement of 
a single item on the agenda which has been worked out 
fo r New Delhi conference. About the anticipated sunmit 
the author says t ha t New Delhi wi l l have to cope with 
the accunulated stock of a quar ter century of h o s t i l i t y 
and s t r i f e . He repor t s tha t the fee l ing here i s t ha t 
more than one Bhutto-Gandhi meeting wi l l be required 
to produce step by step progress towards the goal of 
a sa t i s fac to ry subcontinental agreement. 
in 
V2I193, (zM), H7zlS 'NTa 
SIMLA iiGHBSMSNT 
188. CHOWDHARY (Sanjoy Itoy) 
India as a land of three nations. 
Dally Telegraph 36370: 1972, April 2o; 1 6 J 3 . 
fi^resses views on Simla sunmlt. talk of a 
suounlt meeting between India and Pakistan Is a good omen 
for gentilne p o l i t i c a l s tab i l i ty on the subcontinent. 
Cr i t i c i ses Bhutto for appointing Tlkka Khan as army 
chief, thereby Increasing hatred with Banglade^. He 
( i . e . Bhutto) has to be either hawk or dove, writes the 
paper. Calls Mrs* Indira Gandhi, the most assured leader 
and puts the onus on Bhutto for the settlement of 
various i s sues . 
189. Cooling down in Simla ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
OaatiLaa 1972, June 27; 10:1. 
The l i k e l i e s t result of Simla was anticipated 
to be resumption of diplomatic relations and trade plus 
dates for further meetings. India by attempting to use 
P«0*W.'8 as bargaining counter over such a long periods 
has l o s t much of world's esteem, says the paper. 
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190. HAZSLHURT (Peter) 
India and Pakistan In mid night agreement 
at Simla siaimlt, 
London Times 1972, July 3 ; 1*4 . 
When strained relations between India and 
Pakistan are taken into consideration, Simla agreement 
i s Indeed a h is tor ic turn in attitude on the sub-
continent. 
191. HAZBIflURT (Peter) 
Mrs. Gandhi gamble at Simla pays off. 
London Times 1972, July 6\ 6:7. 
Gamble has paid off and communists, supporters 
of l e f t wing, of swatantra have a l l welcomed the peace 
agreement, except Jan Sangh which has attacked the 
agreement. The contributor f e e l s that next few months 
would be crucial . Mrs. Gandhi %rould have to decide 
Aether she would risk her relationship with her eastern 
neighbours for a distant hope of peace with Pakistan. 
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192. Indo Pakistan relations after Slala . 
Wklv Bound Tabl 1,40',1972,November 5*, 2-4 . 
Contents; appeasement never pays by Bhai 
Mahavir; t r imps for Mrs. Gandhi by Badriaddin Tyalbji", 
missed opportiinity By G.S.Bhargava; Negotiating mage 
K.subramayan; Good wi l l being evoded by Mohd. Yunis 
China's obstruction by V.p.Dutta^ presianptions and 
r e a l i t i e s by Mirdula Saraldiai. 
193. NAKARYAKOV (V) 
Soviet people welcome Simla accord. 
Soviet Hev 9,35; 1972,July 25; 23-25. 
Two nations on whose borders armed confl ict 
broke out several times have reached the only correct 
conclusion. Ihe results of talks can be regarded as a 
big success and major step towards peaceful cooperation. 
194. SINHA (Kamaleshwar) 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-six steps to smmit. 
1972, Indian School Supply Depot,Delhi. P27o. 
I t i s a biographical account of Bhutto, bfit 
Simla s\»mit's background and after affects occupy sizable 
17S 
portion of the book. Under the heading "facts and 
background", author attempts to provide exhaustive 
h i s tor ica l backgroisid and as part of discussion 
Includes text of seato treaty 1954, Pacific charter, 
Tashkent declaration and six-point programne of Awaml 
League. 
V2I193, («M), H7zlS, Zb •N72 
OBSTACLSS to SIMLA AGRBEMSNI,INDO PAK 
RELAnONS,1972 
195. HARIHARAN (A) 
Western Pullout. 
g y JBag^  gcpQ ^Y 76,6; 1972,May 6; 15 
With reference to suamit talks the author 
says that i f Bhutto accepts proposal to abjure use of 
force there need not be major hurdles in resolving other 
i s sues . 
196. HAZBLBURT (peter) 
Shadows over the sunmit at Simla. 
London Times 1972, June 28', 14t3 . 
Under the prevailing conditions of Mr. Bhutto's 
driving obsession for power i t I s extremely unlikely that 
173 
Pakistan President wi l l make any major concession or 
agree to rect i fy a pemanent agreement on Kadimir, says 
the writer, Indians according to the author could not 
be expected to accept wishy-washy solution. He views 
the outcome of Simla siumit with ressimism* 
V2tl93, (zM), H7zlS, Zbl 'NTa 
TERRtlORIAL DISPUTE, OBSTACLE, SIM LA AGREEMENT, 
IMDO PAK RELATIONS, 1972 
197. HAZELHURT (Peter) 
Concessions at Simla sxanmit bring hope for 
deal on Kashmir. 
London Times 1972, July 4 ; 4»1. 
Mrs. Gandhi appears to have climbed down from 
her position of advocating a package deal peace treaty 
and to have accepted Mr. Bhutto's step by step formula 
for the normalization of re lat ions . 
V2I193, (zM), H7z IS , Zb2 •N72 
INTERNAL OPPOSITION,OBSTACLE^  SIMLA AGREEMENT, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1972 
198. BHAHGAVA (GS) 
success or surrender? Simla suomit. 
1972, Sterling Publications, New Delhi.P160. 
i 8 j 
According to the author, Pakistan I s s t i l l 
facing a cr i ses of ident i ty . 'Qie state of dlgust and 
frustrations s t i l l continue to dcxninate and Mr. Bhutto's 
•arious aoves to set the pace of things do not seem to 
have gonevery far . Sinla agreonent i s viewed as fai lure 
and said to meat the same fate as Tashkent declaration. 
A controversial book. I t considers Simla 
agre«nent as not l ike ly to bear f r u i t s . 
V2J193, (zM), iI7z i s , 2.b6 »N72 
RECOGNITION BANGLADESH OBSTACLE,SIMLA 
AGIffi£MSNT,INDO PAK RBLAII0NS,1972 
199. lANDON (Bala Ram) 
India seeks a peace package. 
Daily Telegraph 36411! 1972, June 7\ 16i2. 
Reports from Delhi on the preparation fior 
Indo pak suBBait. Mrs. Gandhi's desire for overall 
settlement has been interprested in India and Pakistan 
to mean that she seeks a package deal %iiich w^uld imply 
an exchange of prisoners of war and territory in return 
of Pakistan's recognition of Kashmir's accession to India 
and of Bangladesh as sovereign ent i ty . 
18i 
V 2 i l 9 3 , (aM), H7a lS , 2b7 •H72 
PRISQNSRS OF WAR,QBSTACLSS,SIMLA AGRB&MENT, 
IN DO PAK RE1LATI0NS,1972 
200. JEVRBMOVIC (Parl«) 
Dialogue betw««n Indira Gandhi and Bhutto. 
RflV Int Aff 231, 53 i ; 1972, May 20; 24-25. 
Author faa l s that at -d. tha maetlng betvaen 
India and Pakistan leaders the main point for achieving 
satisfactory peace I s Pakistanis recognition of 
Bangladesh vhlch vould have practical significance for 
90,000 P,0,W. India does not want the p,0«W,'s repa-
tr iat ion to provide soldiers for four new divisions on 
her front iers . 
V2I19S, (aM), H7alT 'Nes 
TASHKENT AGR&BMENT,IND0 PAK RBLATIDNS, 1966 
201. SDWARD£S (H) 
Tashkent and after, 
Int Aff (London) 42,3;i966,July; 381-9. 
me death of prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 
seems to terminate reconcil iation betveen India and 
Paklsttti. Tet h i s mission has been fulfilled-disengagement 
m 
of the two armies was agreed upon without apparently 
damaging the honour of either side. Ihe war had put 
severe strain on economics of both countries and ODnse> 
quently their efforts were directed at resumption of 
foreign aid. 
202. DRAMB7ANB (C) 
In the sp ir i t of Tashkent. 
New Times 39*, 1966, September 28; 17. 
While talking of Tashkent agreement the author 
e g r e s s e s regret that except for the withdrawal of forces 
and resusptlon of diplomatic re lat ions , no real steps 
were taken to implement the other clauses of the decla-
ration. He writes, that what i s more, there now appeared 
some alarming symptoms in Indo-Pakistan re lat ions , 
occasioned by reciprocal accusation, mutual suspicion 
and alienation. 
203. KBWAL SINGH 
lb strenghten the sp ir i t of Tashkent, 
soviet Rev 4 , 2 ; 1967, January; 21-24. 
The author was India's ambassador to USSR. 
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Vliila gpaaklng on the occasion of anniyersary of 
Taihlcent, he expresses regret that not a l l the provides 
held out by the declaration have been f u l f i l l e d . Among 
the things ihlch have been laplemented are diploaatle 
relations restoration and P*0*W«*s exchange, forces 
withdrawal. 
204. NIKOYAN (S) 
ladikent Conference. 
cent ilslan Rev 14,3;i966; 274-78. 
Views Tashkent agreement as an Important 
stage In the development of Indo-Paklstan relat ions . 
Reviews Vn% d i f f i c u l t i e s eonfiontlng the concerned 
part ies . Ihe Chief of then Is the red he at of passion 
over Kashmir and the Imprecedented stimulflfcion of 
c<HUiunal sentiment. 
2 0 5 . MUKHTAR 2AMAN 
llhoughts on Indo-Paklstan relations In the 
Ta^kent era. 
Pakistan Horizon 22 .1 ! 1969*, 127-34. 
Talking of tiie conf l ic t between India and 
Pakistan the auttior views i t was a hangover of the 
ISi 
dlffer«nca between the Indian national congress and 
Muslim league. About tbe effect of Tashkent agreement, 
the author says anti-Tashkent sentiment in Pakistan was 
in evidence STen before tiie ink was dry on the docimients* 
206, Pakistani dissatisfaction vitii Ta^kent. 
Round Tabl 223; 1966, July, 309-12, 
In Pakistan the declaration was on side 
welcomed as Magna Carta in the history of the subconti-
nent and on the other hand condemned as betrayal of the 
blood of martjrrs. The variations vrere in the identi-
fication of the countries which couJdbe held responsible 
"with a l l these divergencies of approachment there was 
general agreement that the declaration constituted 
diplomatic victory for Russia', 
207, PBTKOVICK (R) 
success in Tashkent. 
y v Int Stud 17,378',1966, January 5; 6-7. 
l ^ l e talking of advantages at Tashkent 
agreoient the autiior points out i t represents a broad 
platfom for the normalization of India-Pakistan 
18J 
relat ions . Xhe key points of success are that both 
parties have renounced use of force and agreed to 
evolve procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes* 
I t represents a great and concrete contribution 
to vorld peace* 
2o8, Xashkent Agreement 
Asian sur 37,1*.1966. January; 73-74* 
Describes the points of agreement e«g. with-
drawal of forces by 25th Feb., exchange of P*0*W.'s 
and setting up India Pakistan observation mission. 
Execution of the agreement according to the art ic le 
proceeded smoothly and %rithin schedule time the 
withdrawal of forces etc* was completed* 
209* Tashkent seen as an empty monument to Shastry. 
Times 56637*. 1967, January 12; 8 i6 . 
Commenting on India's reaction on the f i r s t 
anniversary of Tashkent agreement the paper says 
that the f i r s t death anniversary of Shastrl i s also 
the f i r s t anniversary of Tashkent declaration which 
he signed. Bie reconsideration of India and Pakistan 
183 
relat ions in the past 12 months had shovn that agreement 
vas barren. The relations between the two coiintrles 
are back again at their fai lure condition of dead lock. 
In the art ic le Kashalr has been taken as barrier to 
progress In Indo-Pak amity, 
V2:ig8, (zM), H721T, Zbl 'NOB 
TBRRITORIAL DlSPUTE,OBSTACI£,TASHKENT 
AORBSMENT.INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1966 
210. ALTAF GAUHAR 
Taidikent Declaration. 
Pakistan Horizon 19, 1', 1966; 13-25. 
Talks of obstacles to Tashkent Declaration. 
According to the speaker the Indo-Pakistan confl ict 1966 
did not start with so called events of 5 August 1966, 
but much ear l i er , vhen Indian forces crossed ceasefire 
l ine in Kashmir in the Kargll area and forcibly occupied 
three posts on Pakistan side ''Denies India's occusation 
against Pakistan of sending infiltrators*, i t c a l l s i t 
the people of Kashmir's armed revolt . to suppress tHe 
people of Kashmir, India alleged there vas no revolt but 
18/ 
only sabotage by lAiat I t called Infiltrators**. 
211. APPADORAI (A) 
After Tashkent. 
Sast Econ 53.18:1969. August 22; 339-40. 
Discusses the implications of Tashkent 
agreement under the headings* slow progress*, i n i t i a t i v e 
and conditional acceptance. According to Dr. Appadorai 
one of the important aspects of the situation which 
demands careful consideration i s the extent to which 
India i s prepared to please Pakistan on Kashmir issue* 
India's position i s that Kashmir i s not negotiable. 
Under these circxastances the author f e e l s that 
Tashkent agreement i s not l ike ly to f u l f i l the hopes 
i t raised. 
V2:193, (XM), Zal 'NTl 
8URBSNDBR,VAR,IND0 PAK RSLATI(»}8,1971 
212. Bangladeshi out of var^ a nation i s bom. 
Time 1971, December 20*, 9-14. 
Provides description of the war and i t s 
resu l t s . One of the after-maths of war was the 
18o 
emerg«nc« of Bangladesh after war I t was recognised by 
India and Bhutan, Both c iv i l ian and army casual i t ies 
in Eastern Wing were l i ght . Quotes Gen. Manekshaw's 
advice to Pakistan army to surrender or to face death^ 
to Insure that Muktl Bahnl would also adhere to Geneva 
convention i t was put under India amy's command, 
according to the art ic le in the Chamb area the casua-
l i t i e s were heavy because Pakistani arms had put up a 
detemined attack. I t praised the India army for being 
"precise, old fashioned and safe*. 
V2I193, (zM), Za2 'Nes 
CEASEFIRE, INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
213• In the si lence of the guns (ed i tor ia l ) . 
East Econ 45.13^ 1966, September 24', 583-84, 
I t appreciates the government's unconditional 
acceptance of ceasefire after military objective of 
frustrating Pakistan's attempts to grab Kashmir has been 
achieved. Put, the author continues, we certainly do 
not seem to have succeeded in convincing Pakistan that 
resort to force wi l l not pay. I t blames China for 
183 
exploiting the Indo-Paklstan conf l ict for I t s ovn purpoM. 
214. PANT (KG) 
"She f ight has strengthened us. 
Yoiana 9,20*, 1965, October l o ; 21-22. 
Ihe author Is at present the Home Minister In 
Indian Govt. Talking of ceasefire and further negotia-
tions he says that as far as Pakistan i s concerned we 
must make i t clear in the coming negotiations regarding 
withdrawal of armed forces that we wi l l not revert to a 
position that exposes us to another attack. 
721193,(zM),Za2, Zb2 
INTEBNAL OPPOSITION,OBSTACI£,CEASBFIRB, 
INDO PAK RELATIONS, 1965 
215. Debris of war. 
Econ 1965, September 25^ 1189-90. 
Attributes Ayub^s delay in accepting the 
ceasefire t i l l the l a s t minute to the problem of curbing 
the 'hawks' in h i s own country. 
216. ^ y Ayub did i t ? 
Econ 1965, September 26', 1010-13. 
19J 
According to this a r t i c l e , Ayub accepted 
ceasefire as a result of internal in s tab i l i t y in 
Pakistan. Ayub wondered uneasily how long the 
patriot ic forces could be kept under control and 
vhich way they would tend i f they were not controlled, 
V2I1968, H7z 3 
INDO SOVIET TREATY 
217, ABDUL MAJIO 
Indo-Soviet treaty. 
Pakistan Times 25,189*, 1971,August 26; 4 i 3 . 
Indo Soviet security pact i s described as 
reminiscent of If§zi-Soviet treaty on the eve of Hi t l er ' s 
invasion. 
218. Clarification (ed i tor ia l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25.26o:i971. October 30*, 4 a . 
Indo-Soviet treaty viewed as directed towards 
Pakistux. Clarification has been sought from USSR by 
Pedcistan Govt, but the paper takes i t as superflous 
to seek any c lar i f icat ion from USSR. 
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219. Conspiracy of Silence (an ed i tor ia l ) . 
fftk^ytpyj]! Ti|yflg 25,192; 1971 August 20; 4 t l . 
V^rld's indifference towards Indo-soviet 
treaty and threat to Pakistan Security i s discussed. 
220. GORWALA (AD) 
Indo-soviet Treaty, 
Imprint 7,6; 1971; 9-12. 
According to author i t gives pro-communist 
impetus to a l l authority within the country and i t s 
inef fect to provide safeguard against China and 
Pakistan war threats. 
221. MBNON (KPS) 
Indo-Soviet treaty: sett ing and meaning. 
1971, Vlkas publications, Delhi, P83. 
Mr. K.P.S. Menon was India's smbassador to 
USSR. Besides dealing with Indo Soviet treaty in 
Chap I , the author has dealt witli Bast Bengal Massacre, 
He tried to provide answer to the question-\^at i s the 
reason for this strang<i^d criminal apathy of world 
govts, towards a situation in \^ich t^e elementary 
192 
principles htaanity, l e t alone democracy, are being 
thrown to the winds. The world has shown i t has no 
conscience. 
222. NAIK (JA) 
Bear and the biillock. 
Far East Scon Rev 1971,October 16*, 14. 
Indo-soTiet treaty may dent Indians non-
alignment but i t need not necessarily be hindrance 
to badly needed Sino-Indian reapproachment, 
223. No room for complacency (an e d i t o r i a l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25.190'. 1971,August 18', 4 t l . 
Indo-soviet treaty's repercusion's on 
Pakistan's security discussed and USSR cr i t i c i sed 
for i t s pro-Indian att i tude. 
224. Not 80 partisan (ed i tor ia l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25,23i;i971,September 30; 4*1, 
USSR branded as partisan towards India. 
Doubles the propriety of Indo-Soviet treaty. 
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225. RSMIN RIB 
Most absurd log ic , flagrant agression. 
Peking Hev 50', 1971,December l o ; 6-7. 
Labels India an aggressor and accuses USSR 
of aiding India* Social Imperialists signed a treaty 
with India - I t I s a treaty of military a l l iance , 
According to the author this treaty emboldened India 
to carry out I t s expansionist alms. 
226. Russian Interest ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
London Times 1971, December 8; 15»1. 
The treaty vhlch Russians signed with Delhi 
was Intended both as warning to China not to Intervene 
If war breaks out with Pakistan and e warning to 
Pakistan not to ^egia the f ight ing. I t was a well 
designed stroke ^ i c h unfortunately fai led In I t s 
objective of preventing the war, 
V2I1973 INDO-UNIISD STATES RELATION 
227. SDBRAHMANYAN (K) 
US policy towards India, 
Caiina Rep 7,1-2; 1972; 36-53. 
Author was Director Institute for Defence 
studies and JnalysiSyNev Delhi. In th i s art ic le he 
explores the motivations and considerations under-
lying USA Govemaent* s consistent unsympathetic 
attitude towards India* He quotes Nixon's saying in 
connection with US foreign policy "It makes no sense 
to assume that country's clenocratic p o l i t i c a l system 
or i t s size requires our automatic agreement with 
every aspect of i t s foreign pol icy . 
V3»y7 'N BHUTTO (Zulfi Kar Al i ) BIOGRAPHY 
228. MODY (Piloo) 
zul f i my friend. 
1973, Thomason Press, Delhi, P183. 
While attempting to present unbaised portrait 
of Bhutto the man, Mody analyses Bhutto's p o l i t i c a l 
ideas and po l i c i e s as part of the discussion; in 
chapter eleven, touches upon h i s grievances against 
India. In chapter twelve deals with the foreign 
po l i c i e s , (adapter fourteen devoted ent irely to 1966 
war. 
Vftiile talking of e f fects of 1965 war author 
says i t was also the beginning of a parting of ways 
19 
between Bhutto and Ayub. 
229. MUKH£RJB£ (Dll lp) 
Zulflkar All Bhutto. 
1972, Vikas Pub. House, Delhi. P240. 
Presents portrait of Bhutto from the time 
he embarked on the road to power In 1952, to Pakistan's 
defeat ^ I c h forced Yahya Khan out and brought Bhutto 
to power. Part of discussion touches i:qpon Internal 
cr i ses of Pakistan prior to Indo-Pak war. Talking of 
e lec t ions , the writer says, Mr. Bhutto faces the 
greatest challenge in the hour of h i s trimph^ he must 
eltiier compromise with Mujib and thus risk h i s popu-
lar i ty in the western wing or confront him and thereby 
pave the way for an eventual part i t ion. 
V3 PAKISTAN HISTORY 
230. SISPHKNS (laan) 
Pakistan. 
1968, Ernest Benn, London^ P800. 
More than half of the book i s f i l l e d with a 
h i s tor i ca l narrative 1857-1947, The events of 1945-47 
19 T 
enables the reader to have proper understanding as to 
vhy Paldstan was created• I t provides a perpspectlve 
to study post partit ion events, particularly the 
tension between India and Pakistan. 
231. TAYYSB (A) 
paklstant a polet lca l geography. 
1966, orford Dnlv, Press, London, B|^ 194R. 
Contains detailed Information on the 
boundaries, economy and domestic and foreign p o l i t i c a l 
relations of Pakistan, The various problems with which 
the country Is faced are discussed. 
232. WBEKBS (Richard V) 
Pakistan, blrtii and growth of a musllm nation. 
1964, Van Nostrend. New York. P30^ 
Ihls book I s designed for the persons 
beginning a study Pakistan and I t s people e t c . The 
reader wi l l be rewarded by a reasonably good Idea of 
the nature of the people and the country. 
19/ 
233. WILCOX (Wayne Ayres) 
Pakistan*, Ihe consolidation of nation. 
1963, Colunbia Univ. Press. P642. 
Shows the e f fec t s of p o l i t i c a l modernization 
tq)on Pakistan and makes a p o l i t i c a l study of the 
factors ^ i c h brought about the founding of Pakistan. 
234. WILUAMS (UF^jmshbroak) 
State of Pakistan. 
1961, Faber and Faber, London. P204. 
Provides a general history of Pakistan. 
Ihis voliae i s primarily designed for those who voulA 
l ike to know the basic facts about this new country 
and without requiring to specialize in her constitu-
t ional! p o l i t i c a l and economic problems. 
V3 'N71 < N47 PAKISTAN HISTORY, 1947-71 
235. MORAES (Frank) 
India and Pakistan. 
ffliglfii* Cammuni^tv 3 ^ i ; 1971 .October ; 1 4 3 - 5 3 . 
Traces the history of Pakistan from partition 
to the East Bengal conf l i c t . 
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V3 'N71 < N65 PAKISTAN HIS TORY, 1965-71 
236. NIHAL SINGH 
Fron J9hl\M to Volga. 
1972, Nachiksta Pub,, Delhi. P336. 
Although a partrayal of general l i f e , has 
occasional digs at Pakistan n i l i t a r y junta's attempt 
to cover disillusionment of the masses by hate India 
compelgn. Ihe attitude of Arab countries towards 
India vis-a-Tis Pakistan and the inevitable Kashmir 
question are discussed. 
237. YORYS (Karl Von) 
Po l i t i ca l develoixnent in Pakistan. 
1965, Princeton Oniv, Press, Princeton. P113. 
Surveys the environment within which the 
p o l i t i c s of Pakistan must develop, the impact \^ich 
Indo-Pak relations have on country's p o l i t i c s has also 
been touched upon. 
VSjg^Y •N71 < N47 
SOCIAL CHANG£ INFLDENCY PAKISTAN'S 
HISTORY,1947-71 
2 3 8 . HUB TAIL AHMAD 
P o l i t i c s without social change. 
193 
1972, Karachi. P460. 
Tracts tha history of Pakistan from socio-
log ica l point of view from 1947 right iipto 1971 
c r i s e s . The author occuses Mujibur Rahman of d i s -
loya l i ty and defends military junta's repression. 
V3»ll •N69 < N62 
HOME POUCY, PAKISTAN 1962-69 
239. FELDMAN (Herbart) 
From cr ises to cr ises 1962-69. 
Oxford Univ. Press, London. P340. 
This i s an extremely readable account of 
Pak p o l i t i c a l set up during Ayub regine. The p o l i t i c a l 
situation of Pakistan i s discussed and a l l the facts 
of the situation are dealt with. The factors which 
led to out break of h o s t i l i t i e s between India and 
Pakistan,1965 are also analysed. 
The author also points to some of the dismal 
fa i lures of Ayub Khan's regine which w i l l Izx leave 
h is tor ic imprint on the destiny of Pakistan one fai lure 
pertained to h i s proclaimed effort to bridge the 
economic gap between Bast and west Pakistan. These 
20J 
ef forts led to disintegration. While Ayub Khan was 
right In assessing that Pak army could make quick 
breach through In Kashmir, he was wrong to assmlng 
that Kadimlr would rise In revolt . 
V3»ll 'NTl HOME POUCY, PAKISTAN 1971 
240. LOSHAK (David) 
Pakistan Crises, 
1972, Helneman, London. P134. 
Deals with Pakistan's p o l i t i c a l set up and 
the cr i s e s through %ihlch Pakistan Is passing. According 
to the author Pakistan K had an Interest In embroiling 
India.to shif t the onus of blame for the situation on 
India. Pakistan soiight to raise the tension to inter-
national plane and distort the entire focus so as to 
take attention away from vhat Is going on enslde East 
Bengal, to vhat was going on along and across the 
Indian border. 
241. MOHSIN ALI 
Pakistan's f i r s t e lect ion surprises. 
Pacific Community 2 .3 ! 1971; 523-36. 
Gives Illuminating account of p o l i t i c a l 
20i 
conditions in Pakistan in 1971. 
V3»1132, A., D 
CAUSES,STRAINED REUTIQNS, SAST-BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
2 4 2 , BANSRJEE (DN) 
East Pakistan a case study in Muslim politics* 
1969, Vikas Pub., Delhi. P204. 
The author seeks to analyze the basic causes 
of maladjustment between the tvo wings of Pakistan. 
It is on interesting study aquainting one with the 
background to 1971 crisis. 
V3:1132,A,D (y«l) 
SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSES,STRAINED RBUTIQNS, 
EAST B£NGAL(BANQLAOESH) AND WEST 
PAKISTAN 
2 4 3 . MICHENER (JA) 
A lamer t f o r P a k i s t a n . 
New York Times Mae 11,11*, 1972,October*, 19-30. 
Re l ig ion i s the p o o r e s t base f o r e r e c t i n g a 
n a t i o n and the l e a s t wise to depend upon, almost any 
o t h e r Y i t a l fo rce seems s t r o n g e r . Ihe d i v i s i o n of 
Bengal was a crime against geography. I t was a l s o a 
2U2 
crima against culture. 
V3I1132, A,D3 
ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION ,CAUSSS ,STRAINSD 
BBLATIONS ,EAST BENaAL(BANGLADESH) AND 
WEST PAKISTAN 
244. GASIUL HUQ 
Bangladesh unchained. 
1972, Indian Associated Press,Delhi. P17P. 
Talking of exploitation of East Bangalees 
the author says that t e x t i l e s were one of the most 
flourishing industries in Bangladesh before part i t ion. 
There was hardly any t e x t i l e industry in west Pakistan. 
Yet in course of tventy years since independence the 
Pakistan industrial policyhad been manipulated in such 
a manner that Bangladesh now produces only l e s s than 
25 percent of the tota l t e x t i l e products of Pakistan. 
245. TARIQ ALI 
Pakistan^ military rule or people's pover. 
1970, Vikas Pub., Delhi. P270. 
Pakistan student leader member of Trotskiite 
IVth International Executive Committee. He describes 
203 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic situation in Palcistan) 
to put insurgence in i t s proper perspective. Names 
20 Pakistan's rich famil ies , deals with labour and 
agrarian unrest. Forecasts disutegration of 
Pakistan due to the socio-eeonoaic conditions. 
V3ill32,Jl,D6 
HIUTARY OUGARCHY,CAUSES,STHAINSD 
RSLAllQNSySAST B£NGAL(BANGLADSSH} 
AND WBSX PAKISTAN 
246. F£LDMAN (Herbert) 
Revolution in Pakistan. 
1967, Oxford Univ. Press,Oxford. P250. 
According to the author, martial lav 
administration 1958-62 was taie responsible for Indo-
Pakistan confl ict and dissat is fact ion among Sast 
Pakistanis. 
247. VARMA (SP) 
Pakistan p o l i t i c a l system in cr i se s . 
1972, South Asian Studies Centre,Jaipur.P252, 
A group of well-known p o l i t i c a l s c i ent i s t s 
and commentators have attMipted to provide po l i t i ca l 
20 i 
reasons idilch l«d to the break up of Pakistan. In 
Chap II Prof. Ayoob dea l s with the m i l i t a r y ' s role 
i n Pakis tan's development. In Chapt 3 W.A.Welcox 
d i s c u s s e s p o l i t i c a l role of army in Pakistan. 
V3»1132,A,D8 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCENSUS,CAUSES,STRAINED 
RELATIONS,EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND 
WEST PAKISTAN 
248, MISRA (KP) 
P a k i s t a n i ' s search for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
consensus. 
1967, Impex, New De lh i . P269. 
The book g ives some information about Avami 
League's c r i t i c i s a of Ayub Khan. %e t a c t i c s employed 
by Ayub against Mujib are a l s o d i scussed . 
249. WHEELER (Richards) 
P o l i t i c s of Pakistan a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l quest . 
1970, Cornell Univ. P r e s s , London, P346. 
Authoritat ive study of Pakistan before 
d i s s o l u t i o n focuses on Islamic s ta te i s s u e . Provides 
a d i scuss ion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debates centering 
on the ro le of ISISUB, and of the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
among people. 
20 
V3«1132,A,D91 (W94) 
NATIONALISM,CAUSES,STRAINED RliiLATIONS, 
£AST BENGAL (BANG LAD&SH) AND USST PAKISTAN 
250. kLlZ AHMAD 
Pakistan faces democracy. 
^Q\md labl 242; 1971, 227-38. 
Author opines that Ayub's Ini'luence on 
Pakistani public started to decline after 1966 war, 
and subsequent Tashkent Declaration. According to 
Aziz Ahaad I t was not nationalism but fear of India 
and rel igious a f f i l i a t ion \^lch have kept East and 
West Pakistan under one reglne. 
251. QUBHSSHI (saleem MM) 
Pakistan Nationalism reconsidered. 
PftgAHg ATf 45,4; i972; 556-57. 
According to the author that I t was the 
theoretical foundation of nationalism accepted by 
large nuoiber of Indian Muslims, \Ailch created a state-
truncated and bifurcated into two parts separated by 
a thousand miles of Indian territory. Ihe uniqueness 
of this nationalism was that i t s bases were not 
' J fk ^' Z\i 
t err i tor ia l they were in fact community separatism 
and religion-derived national i ty . Because of this 
theocratic foundation within l e s s than quarter 
century Pakistan was torn as under with the majority 
province seceding from the minority province. 
Pakistan thus i s unique in i t s dismenberment. 
According to the a r t i c l e , the energence 
of new Bengalee nationalism - rejecting both muslim 
separalism and rellgion>derued nationalism, and the 
establishment of an undependent Bangladesh in 1971, 
make the reconsideration of Pakistan nationalism 
pertinent. He described Pakistan nationalism as only 
unldlmenslonal nationalian based on rel igion alone, 
VSt 1132, Al l , m 
DENIAL OF POLITICAL RIGHTS,CAUS£S, 
MOVSMENT AGAINST WEST PAKISTAN 
252. Unity at Gun point. 
Scon 239, 665P; 1971,April 3*, 15-16. 
The suppression of the popular movement in 
East Bengal i s c r i t i c i s e d . There i s also being comment 
on India's Involvement in this c r i s e s . 
2 0 / 
V3ill32,Al3 (P168) 
LANGUAGE MOVEMSNT AGAINST URDU, ST RAINED 
RSLATIONS,EAST 6SNG AL (BANG LA DESK ) AND 
WEST PAKISTAN 
253 . BHATTACHARJEE (RK) 
P r o f i l e of Bangladesh Youth. 
Wft^ Ba^ MfllB 1 0 , 4 ; 1971/72; 15-21 . 
There was conmon consensus that the genes i s 
of tiie movement could be traced back to as e a r l y as 
1948, ^ e n Mujibur Rahman protested against Jjnnah*s 
dec larat ion of March 1966 at Urdu s h a l l be the only 
s ta te language of Pakistan, The people of East Bengal 
could r e a l i s e that l abe l of Islam was being used to 
serye the colonial i sm of the west wing. 
V3«1132,A14 
PROVISIONAL AUTONOMY M0VEMBNT,STRAINED 
RELATIONS,EAST BENGAL(BANGLADESH) AND 
WEST PAKISTAN 
254. SIDDIQUI (Kalim) 
Conflict , cr i ses end war in Pakistan. 
1972, Macmillan, London. P217. 
Die auttior national of Pakistan, i s at present 
20J 
on the e d i t o r i a l s ta f f of Guardian. He I s a keen 
c r i t i c of Ayub as wel l as of Yahya Khan. 
Talking of autonomy demanded by Mujlb he 
says that Mujlbur Rahman's c a l l for autonomy for East 
Pakistan was of the same geure as the congress demand 
for dcMnlnlon s ta tus within the B r i t i s h empire had 
been. I t stopped short of treason but vent for 
enough towards eventual independence. 
V3ai32,A14,D2 
ASCENDENCY OF U8ST PAKISTAN,CAUSES, 
PBOVISIONAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, 
STRAINED RELATIONS,EAST B£NGAL(BANGLADESH) 
AND WEST PAKISTAN 
255 . SO^AN REHMAN 
East Pakistan' s r e v o l t against Ayub* Old 
resentment and new needs. 
Round Tabl 235 ,1969,July; 301-7 . 
Attempts an ana lys i s of reasons leading to 
Ayub's downfall . Amongst them, one Important reason 
was East Pakistan's dissat is fact ion with the encroach-
ment of the executive into decision making process the 
ascendency of the bureaucracy was synonymous with 
203 
ascendancy of West Pakistan. According to the author, 
vhen Mujib demanded complete autonomy for East 
Pakistan, at the round table conference of leaders 
called by Ayub he was only articulating rea l i ty . 
V3«1132,A14,F1P=P 'N? 
PEOPLE'S PARTY ATTIXUDB,PROVISl(»lAL 
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT,STRAINED RELATIONS, 
EAST BENGAL(BMGLADSSH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
256. ALBERUNI 
Importance of being Bhutto. 
Mainstream 10,27;if71/72; 10-12, 
Discusses Bhutto's unsympathetic attitude 
towards East Bengal problem after the e lec t ion . 
Ascribes to Bhutto moves for not allowing national 
assembly to meet. Since Bhutto knew that Mujib's 
victory was on the passes of a maidate for s ix points , 
and that he would not begin h i s career to power with 
compromise on principles , Bhutto demanded that the 
Awami Leagues resulting from s ix points should be a 
precondition for cal l ing the national assembly. 
21j 
V3ill32,A15 'N?! 
SECESSIONISM,STRAINED RELATION^ , 
EAST BENGAKBANGLAOESH) AND 
WEST PAKISTAN 
257. SUBODH ROY 
Tahya wi l l have to bow before people. 
N»v Age 19,13; 1971,March 28', 186, 
Discusses from Marxist point of view, 
peoples response to the Awami League's e lect ion 
manifesto and to the 35 direct ives of Mujib throiigh 
when he took over the c iv i l ian govt, of Bangladesh. 
258. SULQBI (AA) 
Anatomy of secessionism. 
Pakistan Times 25^275; 1971 ^ November 14*, 4«3. 
Vftiile discussing the secessionism in East 
Pakistan denounces India for i t s encouraging secessio-
n i s t s . He al leges econcmic aid to these rebels from 
India. 
V3»1132,A15,E1-1 
WORLD POWERS ATTITUDE,SECESSIONISM, 
STRAINED RELATIONS ,EAST.BBNGAL(BANGLADBSH ) 
AND WEST PAKISTAN 
259. ABDDL MAJID 
21i 
B r i t a i n ' s f a c t f ind ing . 
PfKlfftm V^mfi 25 ,164; 1971,July 22; 4»3 . 
Claims Pakistan i s baing subjected to 
concarteft fore ign b u l l y i n g , and in passing touches 
upon d«nand for Bangladesh, describing i t as a fore ign 
i n s t i g a t e d movement. 
V3i l l32 , /022,G37 
REPRESSIVE MEASURES jNONCOOPE RATI ON 
MOVEMENT,STRAINED RELATIONS,EAST 
BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
260 . PROBODH CHANDRA 
Blood bath in Bangladesh, 
1972, Adarsh Pub., New Delhi . P296. 
The programme of non-cooperation movement 
in East Pakistan discussed with spec ia l reference to 
reasons which were responsible for i t s f a i l u r e , and 
re s u l tan t repress ive measures by m i l i t a r y a l lgarchy. 
V3»1132,A361 'N? 
OFFENSIVE MEASURES,STRAINED RELATIONS, 
EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
261 , BLAIR (Harry w) 
Tradedies of March 2 5 . 
2 1 ; 
Scon Pol l t Wklv 4*. 1971,December 25; 25, 
A discussion on %iiy Mujibur Rahman and 
Avami Leagiie did not have some plan for an organised 
armed resistance. 
262. KAIHAN 
Bikshubdha Pakistani Agitated Pal^stan. 
1972, Sahilya Prakash, Calcutta. P198, 
This book gives a detailed analysis l inguis t 
moveatnt in fiast Pakistan, various stages of student 
agitation Ayub Khan's r\ile, movement for autonomy 
of East Pakistan as demanded by Fazl ul Haq, xMaulana 
Bha^ani and MuJibur Rahman. 
V3ill32,A361 M = B, 
MUKTI BAHNI^  OFFENSIVE MEASURES^  EAST 
BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
263. SRIVASTAVA (Prabhat) 
fire discovery of Bangladesh. 
1972, San Jay Pub., New Delhi. P172. 
I t i s a complete story of the struggle of 
East Bengalees from freedom and emancipation from 
21 D 
Vfeat Pakistan military junta. The author says, 
%rtille talking of energence of Bangladesh, that they 
paid the price of their independence with blood. In 
Chapt f i l l , under the heading l iberation struggle, 
gives account of the gueri l la warfare. Of the 
soldiers of the Miikti Bahini he writes that the 
soldiers of Mukti Bahini are des t i tutes . There i s 
not one among the soldiers vAio i s aware of the inhere 
abouts of h i s wife and children. Mukti Bahini includes 
man of Bast Bengal Begiment and East Pakistan Rifles 
because they were always hunilated by West soldiers 
who called then dalbhat eaters . Now with their guns 
pointing towards Pakistan the Bangalees were trying 
to show how non martial they are. 
73*1132, A3614 
CIVIL WARjEAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) ^^ 
AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
264. MOHAMMAD AYOOB 
Bangladeshi a struggle for Nationhood. 
1971, Vikas pub., Delhi. 
Collection of articles written by scholars 
2H 
of the School of Internat ional S t u d i e s . Offers an 
thought provaklng study of Palcistan Internal c r i s e s 
on the eye of war. 
V3»1132,A3614 D 
CAUSES,CIVIL WARjfiAST BENGAL(BANGLADSSH) 
AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
266. KASHYAP (Subhash Chandra) (Sd) 
Bangladesh* Background and perpspect ive . 
1971, New publishing House,Delhi , P386 
Col l ec t ion of a r t i c l e s from Indian I n s t i t u t e 
of Const i tut ional Reforms and Parliament Studies on 
the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s moting the demand for 
Bangladesh. Treats the subject from a h i s t o r i c a l 
po int of y l e v . 
V3>1132,A3614 D4 
DENIAL OF POLITICAL RIGHT,CAUSES,CIVIL WAR, 
EAST B£NGAL(BANQLADfiSH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS 
266. MU8AFFAIR AHMAD 
Bangladesh: struggle for independence. 
Ma^na^MM 1 0 , 3 ; 1971/72; 36-40 , 
According to the author struggle of the 
21i 
peopla of Bangladesh Is not struggle between centra-
U s e r s and secess ionists or between integration!st 
and dis integrat ionis ts . I t i s struggle for democracy, 
Justice and other values* I t i s a struggle against 
veiled colonialism and against the two-nation theory 
on the bais of ^ i c h Pak was founded. 
V3tll32,A3614,D5 
MIUTARY OLIGARCHY,CAUSES,CIVIL WAR, 
£AST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND >i[EST 
PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
267. Bangladesh - s i x months ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
tHa^ Ba^ MM lO; 1971/72, 6-8. 
Gives in brief the history of East Bengal's 
struggle for independence and India's inevitable 
envolvement in th i s cr i ses according to the art ic le 
in was military oligarchy \^ich was the iiltimate 
cause of this c r i s e s . 
2 6 8 . CHOWKIRY (AW) 
Bangladesh \^y it happened. 
Int Aff 48^2; 1972, April', 242-49. 
Analysis the reasons for disintegration of 
21 
Pakistan and India's military intervention. The 
art ic le i s highly censorious not of Pakistan at 
large but of the oligarchy belonging to i t s western 
region* 
V311132,A3614, D612 
EARTHQUAKE, 
r> 
269. MORAES (Dom) 
The tempest within* an account of Bast 
Pakistan, 
1971, Vikas Pub«, Delhi, P103. 
Is an expansion of an art ic le prepared on 
the cyclone % i^ch devasted East Pakistan in November, 
1970 and on the c r i t i c a l national election vdiich 
followed soon after. I t i s an accoiint by a Journalist 
\dio was on the scene at the c r i t i c a l moment. The 
apathy of the Pakistan central Govt, during the 
natural claims i s considered one of the causes of 
the f ina l cr i ses and movement, Dom Moraes signif icant 
contribution i s the recurrent expressions of Anti-Hindu 
and anti-India fee l ings he reparts from cross section 
of East Pakistan muslins both, urban and rural. 
21? 
270. FAROOQI (M) 
Pakistan* po l i c i es that led to break up. 
1972, Communist Party Publiaation,Delhi,pl06. 
Emergence of Bangladesh and part played by 
Mujib i s discussed from communist point of view. 
V3»1132,A3614,D7 (P157) 'N?! < N47 
DISCH|MINAII0N AGAINST BANGAL£ES,CAUSSS, 
CIVIL WAR,£AST B£NGAL(BANGLAD£SH) AND 
WSST PAKISTAN R£LATI(»IS 
271. DAS GUPTA 
Revolt in East Pakistan 1971, Calcutta,!) 175, 
Holds Wahabl movement responsible for making 
the Bengalees to agree to confederation with western 
part of Pakistan* In 1947 educated nuslims of East 
Bengal thought that the creation of Pakistan would 
assure them p o l i t i c a l power and professional opportu-
n i t i e s* But their hopes were belied upon west Pakistan 
muslims started making systematic ef forts to keep 
Bengalee l i terature and language in a subsordlnate 
position* Ihis disi l lusioned them and encouraged them 
to f ight for l iberat ion, for in the economic and 
213 
p o l i t i c a l sphere too they were neglected by central 
govemnent, 
V3»1132,A361,D91 (V3,4,91) 
Q£N£RAL ELBCTIONS IN PAKISTAN,CAUSES, 
CIVIL WAR, EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) 
AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
272. SINGHAL (Damodar P) 
The Tahya Kregine in Pakistan. 
1972, Prentice Hall,New Jersey, Chap P. 
Talking of 1971 e lect ions the author says 
the results made Punjabis afraid of Bengalee domi-
nation. The moment the assembly was summoned, 
Bengalee majority couldframe a constitution of i t s 
choice. Ihe Punjabis only hope was in the President's 
right to veto constitution framed by the National 
Assembly. Bhutto and Sheildi Mujibur Rahman, the two 
leaders held drametrically opposed views on most 
major i s sues . Bhutto chanploned islamic socialism a 
strong centre and army. Sheikh advocated intense 
Bengalee nationalism against West Pakistan, h is s ix 
point programme and s o c i a l i s t economic order, which 
a l l Bengalis endorsed the sheildi's s ix point programme 
213 
\dilch turned the e l e c t i o n in to referiredm. 
V3»1132,A3614,D91(W), 'N?! 
POLITICAL CAUSES,CIVIL WAR,EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAI4 RELATIONS 
273 . MANEKAR (DR) 
Pakistan co lon la l lan In East Bengal. 
1971, Somaya Pub, , Bombay, ^246. 
Besides the s tory of Vest Pakis tan's 
e x p l o i t a t i o n of East Bengal, g ives p o l i t i c a l causes 
which led to March 25,1971 catastrophe, Ihe auttior 
attempts to answer the question ^ y Mujib did not go 
underground and why Yahya Khan bought time for crack 
down and refused to y ie ld to the wishes of the 
majori ty . 
V3I1132, A3614,El- l 
WORLD POWERS ATTITUDE,CIVIL WAR,EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
274. MEHRUNNISA ALI 
East Pak crises^ ulemahy react ion . 
Pakistan Horizon 24,2', 1971; 34-38 . 
While d i scuss ing world's react ion to Bast 
Pakistan c r i s e s accuses India of in ter ference . 
2 2 J 
V3»1132,A3614,F1.1,G371 'N?! 
GENOCIDE, WORLD POWERS ATTITUDE,CIVIL WAR, 
EAST BENGAL(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS 
275. SULZBERGER (CL) 
A gttM that has to be done. 
Int Herald Trlb 1972,February 23*, 6i3. 
Pakistan mass slaughter of Bengali and I t s 
subsequent defeat by India, according to the author 
proved three things that Russians can be trusted, 
that jpierlca cannot be trusted and that China need 
not be feared. I t Is necessary the auUior says to 
honour mercy, Kindness, sympathy which are values 
taught to Aaerlcan society but the govt, appears to 
be lacking In these. 
V3« 1132,A3614 ElN4 •N71 
UNITED NATION'S ATTITUDE,CIVIL WAR,EAST 
BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS 
276. Ihreat to peace (ed i tor ia l ) . 
Int Herald Trlb 1971, January IP; 6:1. 
Pakistan has gone through motions of Inviting 
22i 
U,N. in tervent ion of a l l sor t s but on teirms c l e a r l y 
p r e j u d i c i a l to the i n t e r e s t of the repressed Bangalees 
and t h e i r India a l l i e s . 
V3»1132,A3614,E41 'N71 
CHINESE ATTITUDE,CIVIL WAR,EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN REUTIONS 
277. GEOBQE (TJS) 
East PalEistant China* s l a s t chance. 
Far East Econ Rev 74,51^1971,December 18;7-11 , 
Bast Bengal had tvo groups vitlriin the NAP 
according to Mr, George the pro-Peking and pro-communist 
groups* The war gave a s e t back to the Pro-Peking and 
u l t imate ly to China, Bangladesh prov is ional govt , had 
contact with U,s , and Russians representat ives at 
Calcut ta . 
V3»1132,A3614,E73 •N71 
UNITED STATES ATTITUDE,CI7IL WAR,EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
288, KOSHY (YS) 
U,S, a t t i tude towards Bangladesl^i. 
Mainstream 10 ,6 ; 1971; 10-11 , 
C r i t i c i s e s Nixon adminis trat ion's continuing 
4 l M •W 
of arms supplies to Pak in order to suppress the 
people of Bast Bengal. In addition to this regular 
flow of military aid, U.S. govt, i s eager to provide 
other economic assistance to Pakistan other aid 
giving nations like U.K. and Canada, have refused 
further aid to Pak imti l there i s firm evidence of 
progress towards p o l i t i c a l solution of East Bengal. 
289. lEUIS (Anthony) 
Nixon's Kitchen diplomacy. 
Int Herald Trib 1971,December 11; 4»3. 
While talking of Nixon administration 
indifference towards sast Bengal the paper says that 
there are times for quiet diplomacy, but to remain 
s i l en t in the face of borror on that scale i s to be 
too quiet. Indians had reason to doubt the appro-
priateness of Richard Nixon as mediator. They had 
observed in Nixon no sign of s ens i t iv i ty to the torment 
of mi l l ions . I t was well known that president Nixon 
l ikes and respected Yahya Khan. 
22J 
73ai32,A3614,G3lM 'W?l 
MUJIB'S ARREST,CIVIL l^ AR,EAST BENGAL 
(BANGLADESH) AND WEST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
290. Mujlb's road from prison to power. 
Time 1972, January 17*, 4-7 . 
According to the art ic le Bhutto had no 
choice but to set Mujlb free otherwise would have 
Increased Bengali's hatred against their former 
country men. I t further descresses the hard and 
magnitude of destruction caused by Pakistan army 
before surrender. I t destroyed nearly 1,000,000 
homes, rendered the 1400,000 farmers helpless by 
destroying their tools of work and their animals. 
I t smashed to pieces the Industrial machinery and 
burnt down even currency notes and coins. Calls 
Bangladesh world's newest and poorest nation. I t 
has been deprived of I t s resources which coxild earn 
I t lacks of foreign exchange. World Bank team 
observers ' 'cit ies looked l ike morning after nuclear 
attack." West ruined the economic structure completely 
means of communication were to ta l ly disrupted. 
23* 
7 3 1 1 1 3 2 , A3 614 ,037 
RBPRBSSIVB MEASURES,CI71L WAR,£AST 
BENGAL (BANGLADESH) AND MEST 
PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
291. MALIK (Amlta) 
The year of the vulture. 
1972, orient Longman, Delhi, p.159 
In this book Mrs. Malik t e l l s the story of 
murders and atroc i t i es committed by west military 
junta on the Bangalee. She interviewed the few %dio 
managed to escape and on the basis of th i s data weaves 
this gruesome acco'unt of repression and atroc i t ies 
by Pakistan soldiers . Bhe also gives facts revealed 
by foreign missionaries working in the refugee camps, 
292. MASCARENHAS (Anthony) 
Rape of Bangladesh.1971. 
Moving report on Pakistan a troc i t i e s by a 
Pakistani born Journalist vdio escaped to London gives 
f i r s t hand account of the atroc i t ies committed by West 
Pakistan army on East Bengalees. 
22 j 
293. Vengeance In victory* Bangladesh. 
Time 1972, January 3 ; 23-24. 
Describes post surrender repri lsals 
consequent upon defeat of West Pakistan army. For 
nearly nine months the Pakistan army had l e t loose 
a reign of terror - rapping vomen razing houses and 
shooting unarmed vi l lagers* The Bengali desire for 
revenge was sharpened by the discovery that even on 
the eve of surrender Pakistan soldiers did not stop 
frcm conmitting atroc i t ies 125-400 leading Bengalee 
in te l l ec tua l s were mxirdered a few hours before Indian 
army took control of Dacca. 
V3i 1132, A3 615,0371 'N71 
G£NOCIDB,CIVIL WAR,£AST BENGAL(BANGLADESH) 
AND WEST PAK RELATIONS 
294, CHOUDHURI (Kalyan) 
Genocide in Bangladesh. 
1972, orient Longman, Bombay, P228, 
The book attempts to trace the happenings 
in East Bengal and offers analysis why after army crack 
down the people of decided to have final break with 
223 
west Pakistan Mr. Choudhurl wrote '*thl8 book after 
Interrlevlng across section of refugees and slf lug 
a vast body of govt, docunents, press reports e t c . 
Himself a Journalists he attempts to give detached 
and matter of fact view of the repressions and 
their repercussions on the victims. He quotes an 
American journalist saying 'Ve saw the army shotting 
the c iv i l i ans indiscriminately I do not want to say 
too much because I am afraid of reprisals ." 
295. MUJIBUR R&HMAN (Shaikh) 
Bangladesh my Bangladesh) selected speeches 
and statements, edited by Rahmendu Majundar, 
1972, Orient Longman, New Delhi, P166. 
The book consists of 32 speeches and 
statonents made by shaikh between Oct. 28,1970 to 
March 26,1971. These speeches present in shaikh's 
own words 'unusual view of the events leading up to 
the proclamation of Independence by Bangladesh, 
Editorial notes have been provided for each se lect ion. 
Since i t i s ccMspiled by the person %iio was in Dacca 
t i l l May 71 i t lends poignancy to the account of how 
22? 
people resisted repressive measures adopted by 
western part of the country. 
V3» 1132, A3 614,0372 
MUROSBS,CIVIL WAR,EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH) 
AND WBST PAKISTAN J ^ "• c >x 
296. KABIR (Mofizullah) 
Experiences of an ex i le at home, 
1972, Pub, by Rezina Nazli Kablr, Dacea,P216, 
The author i s a Iftiiversity Professor from 
Bangladesh. Ihe book delineates the tragic drama of 
hunan agony in Bangladesh beginning with massacre of 
25 March,1971. In chapt, four Mr. Kablr gives f i r s t 
hand account how the intel3.eetual8 were interrogated 
and subject to a l l sorts of tortures in an attempt to 
make them confess about their anti-Pakistan act iv i t i e s* 
V3ill32,A3614,H51 'N? 
NEGOTIATIONS,CIVIL WAR,EAST BBNGAL(BANGLAISSH) 
AND WBST PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
297. HAZEI£URST (peter) 
Guilt and disaster over Pakistan. 
Manila Chron 1971,July 5*, 18»3 . 
Article gives detailed information of 
negotiation of Mujlb with Yahya Khan and blames Bhutto 
for the entire cr i s e s . 
298. HERBARI APUi£KSR 
Carnage and resistance in Bangladesh. 
New Age 19,39; 1971,September 26; 12»3. 
Report in the Daily world U.s, Comaunist 
party newspaper deals with the background in which 
Mujibur Rahman negotiated and the circimstances 
responsible for the fai lure of the negotiations. 
V3tll32, A3614,Za91 £M&RQENCS OF BANGLAD&SH 
299. Bangladesh recognition. 
lijM. 1972, February 14, 7. 
Bangladesh i s gaining international recog* 
n i t ion . Ihe note specualtes about Washington pol icy. 
Bangladesh has had diplomatic conquests but i s 
confronted with the problem of coping with internal 
turmoil, with the problem of Pakistan soldiers vho 
escapei and their Behari's sympathisers and, of West 
Pakistan crested trouble - Ihe memories of a troc i t ies 
committed by West army was too recent for cool thinking 
and harmony. 
300. GUPTA (Ranjit) and RADHAKRISHNA 
World meet on Bangladesh. 
1971, ImpeXf New Delhi, P304. 
Contains papers presented at an inter-
national conference on Bangladesh held in Delhi from 
Sept. 18 to 20,1971. I t touches upon various aspects 
of the emergence of Bangladesh and provides multi 
faceted study. 
301. HAZSI£URST (Peter) 
Bangladesh emergence and after af fects . 
The Times 1972, March 27*, 4»3 . 
The future of this unfortunate nation bom 
in blood hate and destruction does not promise to be 
peaceful. Mujib's p o l i t i c a l and economic programme, 
the commentator observes, can be summed up in two 
words "Joi Bangla". The law and order situation s t i l l 
remains precarious, with nti&ber of armed gueri l las 
s t i l l at large controlled by various pro-Pakistan, 
pro-ccxmnunist organisation %^ o have anti-Indian 
fee l ings . 
2 3 J 
302, XiPPSR ( S l l l o t L) 
PsLkistan and con sequence 8 of Bangladesh, 
?^9m<l m 45 ,4; 1972/73, 573-81. 
Review art ic le providing the situation in 
vhich Pakistan and new nation of Asia find themselves. 
While talking of after affects of Pakistan desmon-
berment, the author says tliat each of the muslia 
hinger-lands faces formidable problems one of the 
thorniest taks i s healing the wounds which destrojred, 
along with f i r s t state tdie nation. For Bangladesh 
some compensation must be rendered for suffering 
endured for Pakistan defect by Indian army and loss 
of Bangladesh weigh more heavily than the army's 
deeds which remain largely unknown on unbelieved at 
home* 
AS Sou'tti Asian states with different 
temperaments and problems, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
w i l l move in different direction the autiior forecast*. 
231 
V3ilI32,it3614,za91 (S) 'N71 
PSYCHOLOOICAL AFFBCIS,SMBR}ENCE OF 
BANGL/OSBSH 
308. IMITIAZ AHMAD 
Psychological repercussion, 
seminar 16o; 1972.February, 17-22, 
Focuses attention on relevance of emergence 
of Bangladesh to India. I t s psychological repercu-
ssions would be widespread according to the author. 
Inuaedlate aftermatch would be shi f t from ccxnmunal 
based p o l i t i c s to a secular approach. Pakistan was 
founded on the slogan of a homeland for musllms now 
to ta l nimber of musllms In India and Bangladesh would 
be more than those In a Pakistan. I t would help 
musllms In India to appreciate secularism. 
V3tll32,A3614,k^a91 {Tin9izA) ) 
WORLD AFFAIRS AND EMSRQSNCE OF BANGLADESH 
304. Bangladesh,India and Ubrld (edi tor ia l ) 
Marxist Rev. 4,l l ,197i;May; 446-661. 
Emergence of Bangladesh has had Impact on 
political climate of the world and India In particular 
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Pakistan too v i l l have to change I t s foreign policy. 
I t can not longer bank on the support of musllm 
nations of middle East against Bangladesh. China vould 
try to woe Bangladesh. 
305. RAJAN (MS) 
Bangladesh and after. 
Pacific Aff 4 5 T 2 ; 1 9 7 2 ; 191-205. 
Xhe struggle for Bangladesh and the successful 
establishment of th i s tlghth largest state in the world 
community has long tern significance in international 
af fa irs . I t had proved f a l l aclous the so-called two 
nation theory, on the implic i t acceptance of ^ I c h the 
partit ion cf India took place in 1947. I t s recognition 
as a state by a large nuaber of other states of the 
world s igni f i es virtual negation of t h i s . Ihis would 
have i t s affect on the Kashmir dispute too. The author 
ventures a hope that India, Bangladesh and Pakistan a l l 
three w i l l cooperate with each other for mutual benefit 
thereby mitigating the harm done to their people by 
three fold p o l i t i c a l division of ancient India. 
23 
According to writer exaggerated credit i s 
given by western press to the Soviet Union for the 
successful establishment of Bangladesh, 
An appealing aspect of Bangladesh i s the 
indifference of the vast majority of governments of 
the world to genocide. They were unable or unwilling 
to stop i t . He comfflents on the world's cynical 
attitude in the face of world largest and crul les t 
massacre, 
V3ill32,A3614,Za91 (Vtl9(zB)) 
DIPLOMACY AND SMSmSNCB OF 6ANGLADSSH 
306. RAJSSHWAR DAYAL 
Global Dimensions. 
Seminar 150*, 1972,February; 29-35. 
Deals with impact of emergence of Bangladesh 
on international a f fa irs . 
Talking of USA, says the irony of the 
great democracy, tiie USA, backing I ru ta l i t i e s of 
Pakistan has not been l o s t on world public opinion. 
Peking policy too has been similar. 
23i 
In the triangular tussal betwaon USA, China 
and USSR has scored deserved victory. The author 
further praises UK and France for their pudence In 
recognising Bangladesh. 
V3lll32,A3614,Za91 (W94) *N71 
NATIONAUSM AND BHBxCENCE OF BANGLAD&SH 
307. DINSSH SINGH 
Death of Jinnah's Pakistan. 
Statesman 1972, December 25* 3i2 . 
Emergence of Bangladesh has taken a l l sense 
out of Jinnah's two nation theory. Jinnah's myth of 
Islam as foundation of Pakistan has proved to be 
fa l lac ious . 
SOB. lAISSLSR (Richard S) 
P o l i t i c s of Pakistani a constitutional quest, 
1970, Cornell Univ. Press,London, P346. 
Provides analysis of the causes of break 
dovn of the old Pakistan, plus some basis for specu-
lation about the future of the tvo successor regimes. 
The book attempts to prove that rel igion was an 
23a 
Inadtquate 1x>nd for regloas as disparate as west and 
East Pakistan finergence of Bangladesh, I t s o f f i c i a l 
declaration of secularism, i s the f ina l proof of the 
f u l i t y of Jinnah*s creation, nationalism has trumphed 
over re l ig ion. 
V3ill32,i0614,Za91 (X) 'NTl 
BCONOMIC AFFECTS ,EMEICENC£ OF BANGLADESH 
309. CHATTOPADHYA (Boundhayan) 
Economic Dimensions. 
Seminar ISO, 1972, February*, 22-28, 
Surveys the foreign trade of Bangladesh and 
economic advantages l ike ly to accrue frc»n the emergence 
of Bangladesh, warns against taking passive attitude 
towards Bangladesh economic reconstruction, because 
a l l her imports from west Pakistan and most of her 
capital goods requirement have to be siqpplied by 
India. I t would be legitimate to presune that 
Bangladesh market for some time at least wi l l be 
helpless enough to be converted to a captive market. 
Ihe autiior says that Bengalee guerri l las who 
23 <~> 
are armed now may take into their heads to refuse 
to invite the 75 famous large Indian houses after 
having thrown out the domination of 22 west Pakistan 
fami l ies . 
310. RAO (VKH7) 
Bangladesh economy. 
1972, Institute of Bconomic Growth,Delhi. 
P199. 
The present voliae i s perhaps the f i r s t 
col lect ion of i t s kind about the economy of Bangladesh. 
I t addresses i t s e l f to a close scrutiny of the basis 
economic issues of that coisitry, v i z . , reconstruction, 
trade, aid, industrial isat ion, food problem and 
economic cooperation, with an analysis of the regional 
disparity between the two wings of the former state 
of Pakistan. The causes of economic stagnation of 
the area that i s now Bangladesh have been traced back 
to the discriminating po l i c i es with respect to foreign 
aid and disbursement through f i s c a l apparatus. 
The book i s of interest also to those irtio 
are looking for an analytical presentation of issues 
23? 
relating to colonialism. 
V3»1132,A3614,Za91 (Y) 
SOCIOLOGICAL AFFECTSfSMERQENCE OF 
BANGLADESH 
311« MUKHERJES (Ramakrishna) 
Nation building and nation building 
in Bangladesh. In Varma (SP) and Virendra 
Narain, Bdst Pakistan p o l i t i c a l system in 
cr ises^ emergence of Bangladesh. 1972, 
Department of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , Univ. of 
Rajasthan,Jaipur, P137-62. 
Bengal 's emergence as a d i s t i n c t i v e South 
Asian nation i s argued convincingly . Traces the 
h i s t o r y of Bangladesh from the regional i d e n t i t y of 
Bengal, and then steady emergence of muslim middle 
c l a s s which assumed the leading in seeking separate 
from Hindu India and from Vest Bengal in p a r t i c u l a r . 
According to the author, ne i ther the muslim middle 
c l a s s nor the des ire for independence from Hindu 
d(»Bination has disappeared. 
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V3»19»g 'N7 FOREIGN POLICY, PARIS TAN, 
Criticism 
312. SANGAT SINGH 
Pakistan' s foreign policy an appraisal. 
1970, Asia Publishing House,Delhi, P260. 
Highly c r i t i c a l of Pakistan's oligarchy 
in the west and of the Western regions obsession 
with India as the basic determinant of i t s foreign 
pol icy. 
V3«19(zP) 'N71 DEFENCE,PAKISTAN, 1971 
313. saLBRI (ZA) 
From offensive on Kashmir to defensive in 
£ast Pakistan. 
Pakistan Timaa 25,74',1971,August i; 4t3 . 
Analyses the national set up in Pakistan 
leading to its defence debility. 
V3» 19(22,93) BOUNDARIES,FOREIGN POLICY, 
PAKISTAN 
314. RAZ9I (Mu^aba) 
Frontiers of Pakistan* a study of frontier 
problems in Pakistan's foreign policy. 
1971, National Publishing House,Karachi ,P339. 
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Speaks of Pakistan as particularly frontier 
conscious country. According to Prof. Rlzvl, the 
reasons lay not only In h i s tor ica l and geographical 
factors , but much more In morbid social and p o l i t i c a l 
structure. Pakistan's frontier disputes with I t s 
neighbours Is discussed. Inevitably fr ic t ion with 
India takes up most space, and over Kashmir the 
discussion appears partisan. He says that Kashmir 
Integral part of Pakistan Is In the hands of India 
much against I t s Inhabitants wishes. 
V3» 195-1 'N71 WESTEHN POWERS - PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS 
316. SULBRI (ZA) 
Storm Is brewing. 
Pakistan Times 25,104*, 1971,May 23, 4*3. 
Accusses western countries, USSR and UK 
especia l ly , of antl-Paklstan propaganda to suit 
their own convenience. 
V3«1956 'N?! GREAT BRITAIN- PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
316. Friends of the rebels ( ed i tor ia l ) . 
Pakistan Times 25,205,1971,September 2 , 4 t l . 
24J 
Britain assailed for I t s unsympathetic 
attitude towards Pakistan, London has become the 
nerve centre of Pakistani rebels, says a r t i c l e . 
V3I1958 (zJ) NEUTRALITY POLICY, RQSS IAN-
PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
317* Peace In the balance (edi tor ia l ) 
Paigat^ ftB T4lMa 25,186;i971,August 13, 4*1. 
Cr i t i c i ses Indo-Sovlet treaty, the USSR 
neutrality Is doubted Russia and India are two 
b i t teres t anti Islamic countries, says the paper. 
V41.1958 (zF) qV2»193 
INDO PAK RELATIONS Influencing 
CHINA-RUSSIA CLASHES 
318. GUPTA (Bhabani Sen) 
Fulcrum. 
1971, Pegasus, New York, P216. 
The central th«ne i s the ideological and 
power conf l ict between China and Soviet Union over 
the Indo-Pak subcontinent. Pakistan's gro%ring friend_ 
ship with China and Soviet ef forts at getting in on 
the deal are well researched. 
24i 
V73U94 UNIIBD STATES- PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
319. MOHAN KUMAR MANGLAM 
latematlonal relat ions. 
Seminar 75*, 1965, November, 30-33. 
While discussing international relations 
the writer views US interference with suspicion a 
powerful American military group i s stationed in 
Pakistan. Building of radar at g i l g i t and supply of 
arms to Pakistan are a l l part of the USA attempt to 
bring to power to anti democratic governments in Asia 
to suit i t s strategic anti -sovlet aims, 
Wt94 NATIONAUSM 
320. DBULSCH (KW) 
The growth of nations. 
WM ?9X^n<}§ 5 , 2 ; 1953; 77-82. 
Describes some recurrent patterns of p o l i t i c a l 
and social integration of people according to the 
writer personnel security and group identif icat ion 
appear bound up with groups attainment of economic, 
power prestige domience, >ihlle taking of national 
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alurve the past half century he says '*it has been 
cuaraceerlsed by I t s negative element, vihether 
directed against colonial overlord or against a 
competitor group. 
x:75,2^g V2a93 'NTl < N65 
INDO PAK BSLATIOldS influencing INDIAN 
BCONOMIC PLANNING,1966-71 
321, RICHMAN (Barry) 
Economic development in China and India. 
Pacific Aff 45,i; 1972; 75-91. 
Discusses some of the conditioning factors 
in the economic development and makes comparison 
between China and India economic development. 
While talking of military and defence 
policy's impact on country's economy (page P5) he 
accepts that after the wars India stepped up her 
defence spending considerably. This has been a 
significant constrain on India's overall economic 
development, inspite of the positive efforts of 
China. 
24. 
x»75.3 4 g 721193 
INDO PAK RELATION influencing PAKISTAN 
ECONOMIC PLANNING 
322« Pakistan President (Ayub Khan) 
Pakistan's economic progress. 
;tnt Aff (London) 4 3 , i ; 1967,January, 1-11. 
This i s text of the address of Field 
Marshall Ayub Khan \diile talking of economic planning 
of Pakistan says "ve would l ike to be friends with 
India and se t t l e down as good neighbour but unfortu-
nately India so far given no evidence of her desire 
to reciprocate. Ve have some very grave problems 
with that country. I t i s only by facing up to them 
squarely that vt can lay the foundation of durable 
peace in this area." 
^ i f * * 
C H H Q M Q L Q G Y 
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1947 
Aug,17 - Radcllffe, Chalman of the Boundary Commission 
announced the findings as regards Bengal and Punjab. 
Sept. 8 - Joint statement by Prime Ministers of India 
and Pakistan issued, warning the armed bands in west and 
£ast Punjab to be shot \^en caught red-handed. 
Sept. 18 - Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan of Pakistan 
arrived in New Delhi. 
Sept. 20 - India and Pakistan issued a joint statement 
for the establishment of peaceful conditions in both the 
countries so that the minorities could l ive in security. 
Sept. 28 . India rejected Pakistan's proposal of Sept.22 
to ask the United Nations to send observers. 
Oct. 22 . Pathan and Afridl tribesmen Invaded Srinagar 
(Kashmir) from NWBP. 
Oct. 24 - Kashmir Government requested the Government 
of India for military aid to defend t^elr State from 
Invaders. 
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Oct, 26 - India pledged support to Kashmir against 
invaders and insurgents. 
Oct. 27 - Kashmir accceeded to India; o f f i c i a l 
announcement issued. 
Nov. 1 - India-Pakistan Joint Defence Council met in 
Lahore. No agreement reached on the Kashmir i s sue . 
Nov. 3 - Pakistan terns for Kashmir announced. 
Nov. 9 - Tripartite agreement between the Government 
of India, U.K. and Nepal on the future of Gurkha troops. 
Nov. 25 - Prime Minister Nehru's speech in the Legis-
lat ive Assffably on Kashmir ^ e r e he said "a carefully 
plaimed and well-organised raid into Kashmir with 
deliberate object of seizing the State by force and 
then declaring i t s accession to Pakistan.** 
Nov.28 - Talks held between Prime Minister Nehru and 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. 
D«c. 9 - India's agreements with Pakistan on outstanding 
i s sues l ike asse ts , l i a b i l i t i e s , divis ion of sterl ing 
balances and military stores e t c . 
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Dec« 10 - Agreement for thB avoidance of double taxation 
of income between India and Pakistan.(Ministry of Finance 
Notif ication No«28). 
Dec. 12 - Financial agreement between India and Pakistan 
announced in Indian Parlionent. Pakistan to get 
Rs.750,000,000 from the balance of the cash of the 
undivided India. 
Dec. 22 . The Joint Defence Council of India and Pakistan 
met in New Delhi and considered matters arising out of 
the partit ion of the armed forces. 
1948 
Jan.l * India informed the United Nations in a memo-
randin that she might send troops into Pakistan unless 
Pakistan ceased to aid Muslim raiders in Kashmir. Prime 
Minister Nehru stated to the Press in New Delhi that such 
a step would be "justified in self-defence". 
Jan.6 - Security Council took up India's C(»nplaint 
charging Pakistan wit^ aggression in Kashmir. 
24.' 
Jan. 7 - U.N. Security Council agreed to postpone 
consideration of India's complaint and urged both the 
countries to abstain from any action vhlch might 
aggravate the s i tuation. 
Jan.11 * The Joint Defence Council met in Lahore and 
discussed the division and delivery of arms and equiiment 
of the old Indian Army. 
Jan, 15 - Leader of the Indian delegation N.Gopalasvaai 
Ayyangar informed the ON Security Council that the 
situation in Kashmir was serious and i t might f lare up 
into a f u l l scale conf l ic t with Pakistan. 
Jan.17 • UN Security Council called India and Pakistan 
to end s tr i fe in Kashmir and Join together for nego-
t i a t i ons . 
Jan.20 •> Security Council decided to set up a three-
member 191 commission for investigation and mediation 
in the Kashmir dispute. 
Jan. 20 - Indian and Pakistani delegates reached a 
deadlock in New York over Kashmir. 
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Jan«25 - Security Council asked the Indian and Pakistani 
delegates to draw up specific proposals to se t t le the 
Kashmir question, 
Feb,24 - State of Junagadh, whose accession to India was 
the subject of portest by Pakistan in the Security 
Council, voted In favour of India in a popular referendia 
on 20 February^ Announcement made by India's Ministry of 
States to this e f f ec t . 
March 8 - India offered to hold another plebisc i te in 
the State of Junagadh under in supervision. 
April 19 - India and Pakistan signed a Charter intended 
to protect the Hindu-Muslim Minorities in both countries. 
I t was agreed .at a joint conference that both Dominions 
should stop mass exodus and encourage refugees to return. 
April 19 - India advised the Security Council that i t 
could not agree to the plan for the settlement of the 
Kashmir problem. 
April 21 - Security Council recommended a free and 
impartial p lebisc i te in Kashmir. 
24a 
May 2 - Prime Minister I /hru stated In New Delhi that 
although the military campaign in Kashmir would be 
vigorously pressed, India was not thinking in terms of 
a conf l ic t with Pakistan, and Pakistan territory would 
not be violated. 
May 4 - Indo-Pak Joint A^greement on canal dispute 
between East and West Punjab issued in New Delhi. 
May 6 - India formally rejected the Security Council's 
plan for UN supervision over a p lebisc i te in Kashmir. 
June 3 - The Security Council adopted a resolution 
'that the Kashmir Commission should study and report 
on issues other than the Kashmir p leb i sc i t e ' • Prime 
Minister Nehru in a l e t t er dated June 5 to the Council 
protested against the enlargement of the scope of the 
Kashmir Commission. 
Jime 15 - UN Commission on Kashmir held i t s f i r s t 
meeting in Geneva. 
Aug. 9 - United Nations Kashmir Commission asked the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to send military 
observers in Kashmir. 
2 5 J 
Agg.lS - ON Kashmir Comrii.ission proposed a cease-fire 
agreement between India and Pakistan. 
Sept,6 - The United Nations Kashmir Commission 
announced the receipt of replies from the Governments 
of India and Pakistan to i t s ceasefire proposals, 
Sept,15 - The President of the Security Council called 
the Council to meet for discussion on the Indian action 
in Hyderabad, 
Sept. 28 - Security Council adjourned consideration of 
Hyderabad situation. 
Oct. 2 - Prime Minister Nehru declared that India vould 
continue to res i s t to the ulaost Pakistan's aggression 
in Kashmir. 
Dec, 6 - Representatives of India and Pakistan met in 
New Delhi to consider the migration problems, especial ly 
those in East and West Bengal. 
Dec.15 - Agreement signed between Indian and Pakistani 
Ministers in New Delhi providing for the establishment 
of a tribunal to se t t l e boundary disputes between East 
25 
and West Bengal and betwasu Sast Bengal and Assam. 
It was decided to set up an Inter«>Dominion Information 
and Consultation Committee, 
1949 
Jan, 1 - Ceasefire put into ef fect between Indian and 
Pakistani troops in Kashmir, 
Jan. 7 - Iftiited Nations Kashmir Commission announced 
terms for the proposed plebisc i te in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Jan. 11 - Indo*Pakistan ministerial l eve l conference 
on Kashmir opened. 
Feb, 2 - Indian Parliament ratified the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tarriff made with Pakistan, vhich 
India had signed provisionally on 8 June 1948. 
Feb. 5 - UN Kashmir Ccxuaission arrived in Karachi for 
discussions with Indian and Pakistan regarding the 
implementation of truce and plebisc i te in Kashmir. 
Feb. 14 - UN Commission on Kashmir had a meeting in 
New Delhi with the Secretary-General of the External 
Affairs Ministry Girja Shankar Bajpai. 
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March 12 - ladla and PcVlstan agreed on a provisional 
truce l ine to replace the exist ing ceasefire l ine in 
Jaaunu and Kashmir, 
March 21 - Admiral Chester W. Nlmitz appointed Kashmir 
Plebisc i te Administrator by the Security Coimcll. 
May 25 - Indo-Pakistan trade agreement. 
June 6 - Kashmir Commission announced that neither 
India nor Pakistan had accepted the Commission's truce 
proposals of 1 April without reservation. 
June 24 - Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement signed in 
Karachi. 
July 6 - UN Commission for India and Pakistan requested 
india and Pakistan to agree to a Joint meeting of three 
mil itary representatives in Karachi to establish a 
ceasefire l ine in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
July 18 - Joint military conference between India and 
Pakistan commenced in Karachi to decide on a cease-fire 
l ine in Kashmir. 
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July 26 - Agpeemei.t rsudiaM on a cease-fire l ine in 
Kashmir in the Joit.t military talks held in Karachi, 
Aug« 27 - UN Commission on Kashmir decided to send a 
delegation to India and Pakistan with secret proposals 
to secure an agreement on truce in Kashmir. 
Aug. 31 - President Trunan and Prime Minister Attlee 
appealed to both India and Pakistoi to accept the 
UN Kashmir Commission's l a t e s t proposal for a truce. 
Sept. 4 •> Prime Minister Nehru in a public meeting in 
Allahabad disapproved President Trunan's and Prime 
Minister Att lee ' s intervention in the Kashmir dispute. 
He said that no attempt had been made to understand 
the basic cause of the conf l ict i . e . the aggression 
by Pakistan against Kashmir. 
Sept. 10 - UN Commission on Kashmir announced the terms 
of i t s proposal of 30 August for the submission to 
arbitration of differences between India and Pakistan 
on the truce provisions of the Commission resolution 
of 13 August 1948. 
2bi 
I>ec,12 - The membus o£ the UN Kashmir Ccnnmlssion 
appointed by the S')ciL?ity Council reported their 
fai lure in their mission, 
1950 
Jan. 6 - Prime Minister Nehru disclosed that he had 
proposed to Pakistan that they could ban war as a 
method of solving their problems. 
Feb, 5 - Indo-Pakistan Boundaries* Decision by the 
special tribunal on the boundary disputes; two relating 
to the frontier between East and west Bengal and the 
others to the Sast Bengal-Assam frontier. Radcliffe 
Award revised. The tribunal was presided over by 
Justice Algot Bagge of Sweden. 
Feb. 7 - Government of India White Paper on Indo-
PcUcistan trade relations published. 
Feb. 24 > In a Joint resolution the United States , 
Britain, Cuba and Norway asked the Security Council to 
appoint a mediator to se t t l e the Kashmir dispute. 
The resolution called for demilitarization of Kashmir 
25i 
within 5 months and G i s s d i t l o n of the Commission for 
India and Pakistan '*»hioh had fai led to set t le the 
dispute. 
March 14 - Security Council voted the appointment of 
a Mediator to Supenrice demilitarization in Kashmir 
and prepare the way for a plebisc i te within five 
months. I t also liquidated the Commission for India-
Pakistan. India rejected i t , 
April 2 - Prime Minister Llaquat All Khan of Pakistan 
arrived in New Delhi for discussions with Prime Minister 
Nehru. 
April 8 - India-Pakistan Minorities Agreement (Nehru-
Llaquat Fact) signed in New Delhi at the conclusion of 
talks between Llaquat All Khan and Nehru. 
April 8 - Prime Minister Nehru placed the Indo-Pakistan 
agreement on minorities on the table of the Parliament. 
April 12 - Sir Owen Dixon, member of the Australian 
Court of Justice, appointed UN Bepresentatlve for 
India and Pakistan. 
2b -3 
April 21 - Limited Tradr Agreement between India and 
Pakistan signed in Karachi* A balance of trade would 
be maintained in transRCtions covered by th i s agreement. 
April 26 - Prime Minister Nehru arrived in Karachi for 
t a lks with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on Indo-
Paklstan r e l a t i o n s , 
April 27 - Joint Statement between Prime Minister Nehru 
and Liaquat Ali Khan^ issued in Karachi. ( I t was agreed 
to continue regular meetings to discuss problems between 
t h e i r coun t r i e s ) . 
May 4 - Prime Minister Nehru addressed a Joint meeting 
of Indian and Pakis tani press in New Delhi. 
May 23 - Indo-Paklatan Agreement on exchange of 
pr isoners reached. 
May 30 - Indo-Pakistan trade t a lk s began in New Delhi. 
June 28 • India and Pakistan reached (complete agreement) 
for the settlement of movable asse t s abandoned by both 
Hindus and Muslims in 1947, 
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Aug, 25 - Prima Mnl ?cor of Pakistan offered 357 tons 
of rice to India I j r rel ief of the earthquake victims 
in India. 
Sept. 16 * UN Representative reported inabi l i ty to 
secure agreement on demilitarization in Kashmir. 
Nov. 24 - Prime Minister Nehru announced that India's 
efforts for an Indo-Pak 'No -War' declaration had 
fa i l ed . 
Dec. 22 - Joint Communique issued at the 3nd of a 
conference between India and Pakistan on financial 
matters stated that agreement had been reached on 
outstanding problems. 
1951 
Feb. 25 - India and Pakistan signed a trade agreement 
in Karachi (Pakistan would supply raw .iute, raw cotton 
and foodgrains in return for Indian coal, s t e e l , 
t e x t i l e s and cement). 
March 1 - Kashmir* Statement by N.B. Rau before the 
UN Security Council, 
March 21 - Joint mava by United Kingdom and the United 
S t a t e s of America fo:^ ix renewed attempt to s e t t l e the 
Kashmir d i spu te . 
March 30 - Securi ty Council passed the Joint UK-USA 
resolut ion providing for the appointment of Dr. Frank C. 
Graham as the ^ representa t ive to demi l i t a r ize Kashmir 
and arrange for a p lebesci te to decide the future of 
the s t a t e . (India abstained and did not accept the 
r e so lu t i on ) . 
April 30 - Dr. Frank Graham appointed UN Mediator, 
May 7 - Boundary Dispute: India-Pakistan accord on 
Hydrographers f indings in a Conference of Indian and 
Pakis tani o f f i c i a l s in Calcut ta . 
June 18 - Indo-Pakistan Permit Conference held in 
New Delhi (June lP-20,1961). 
July 2 - Dr. Frank Graham, ON Mediator in the Kashmir 
d i spu t e , arrived in New Delhi from Pakis tan . 
July 5 - Violat ion of Kashmir cease- f i re line* India 
complained ceasef i re v io la t ions by Rakistan to the 
Secur i ty Council. 
JlsQ.y 27 > Pakistan Prime Minister Llaquat All Khan in 
a message to the Indian Prime Minister suggested a 
5-polnt plan to ease the tension between India and 
Pakistan; Nehru invited for talks in Karachi. 
July 30 - Prime Minister Nehru rejected Pakistan Prime 
Minister's invi tat ion, but invited Prime Minister 
Llaquat All Khan to Delhi for talks on common matters. 
Aug. 8 • Prime Minister Nehru's statement on Kashmir 
in Parliament. 
Sept. 16 - Prime Minister Nehru reiterated h is offer 
of a " No War" declaration to Pakistan in a public 
meeting in Lucknow. 
Nov. 3 - Prime Minister Nehru's offer of Non-aggression 
Pact with Pakistan in a Press Conference in New Delhi. 
Nov. 10 - UN Security Council approved the Angle U.S. 
resolution on Kashmir in Paris . 
Nov. 10 - UN Security Covncil passed a resolution 
instructing Dr. Frank Graham to continue h i s e f forts to 
reach an agreement between India and Pakistan on the 
issue of the demilitarization of Kashmir. 
28.J 
Dec. 22 - Dr. Frank Grt.i .'ill I the vJI'I spsc ia l Rspresentative 
in India and Pakistan presented h i s supplementary report 
on the demi l i t a r i za t ion of Kashmir to the Securi ty 
Council. 
iMXf ^i K 1952 
Jan, 31 - Sec\iPity Council decided tha t Dr. Frank Graham 
should continue h i s mediation e f fo r t s on Kashmir xmder 
previous resolut ions and present h i s f i n a l report to 
the Council by 31 March. 
March 10 - Kashmir* 'Pakistan must withdraw completely 
from Kashmir' Prime Minister Nehru re i t e ra t ed I n d i a ' s 
decision at a Press Conference in Madras. 
March 25 - The Goalpara-Rangpur Boundary: Chief 
S e c r e t a r i e s ' Conference held in Dacca. 
Sept. 24 > Dr. Frank Graham suln i t ted h i s fourth report 
on Kashmir dispute to the Tecuri ty Council, 
Sep t , 24 - Government of India expressed concern to 
the Pakistan Government regarding the inf lux of non-Muslim 
migrants fr<»i £ast Bengal in to West Bengal. 
2f)i 
Nov, 6 - United Kltigdoii-. introduced a resoluuion in the 
Securi ty Council urging India and Pakistan to enter 
negot ia t ions for demi l i t a r i za t ion in Kashmir. 
Dec. 23 - India and Pakistan urged by Securi ty Council 
to negot ia te with UN Representative on Kashmir i s s u e . 
Dec. 28 - Prime Minister Nehru stated tha t India would 
not accept the Securi ty Council 's resolut ion on Kashmir 
in a meeting witii Journa l i s t s in Trivandrum. 
1953 
Jan, 19 - Settlement of Indo-Pakistan dispute over 
Air route between India and Kabul. 
•Jan. 23 - India and Pakistan agreed to continue 
negot ia t ions on the Kashmir quest ion. A. meeting of 
the represen ta t ives of both countr ies at a m i n i s t e r i a l 
l eve l to be held in Geneva under the auspices of 
Dr. Frank P. Graham, the ON representa t ive for India 
and Pakis tan, beginning 4 Febanary, 1953. 
J n . 29 - Prime Minister Nehru's proposal for a 'No-War 
Declarat ion ' rejected by Pakis tan . 
2()^ 
Jan. 31 - India and Pakistan agreed to l i b e r a l i s e 
the passport systemt Agreement concli:Kled In New Delhi, 
Feb. 4 - Indo-Paklstan t a lks on Kashmir under the 
Chairmanship of Dr. Orahama opened In Qeneya. 
July 25 - Prime Minister Nehru had discussions with 
Pakistan Prima Minister Mohammed All In Karachi. In a 
Jo in t C(»munlque they expressed t h e i r readiness to 
resolve a l l d isputes by nego t i a t ions . 
Aug. 16 - Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad All arrived 
In Nev Delhi for t a lks with Nehru on Kashmir. 
Aug. 20 - Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan agreed 
In a communique to appoint a P l eb i sc i t e Administrator 
for Jammu and Kashmir by the end of Apr i l , 1954. 
Sept . 30 • A Conference between India and Pakistan at 
S e c r e t a r i a t l eve l commenced In Calcut ta . I t discussed 
outstanding Issues between Pakistan and the adjacent 
areas of Ind ia . 
Oct. 22 - India and Pakistan j o in t l y announced that 
South Africa must suspend I t s segregation policy before 
a Round Table Conference could be he ld . 
26J 
Nov, 15 - Prime Minister Nehru expressed India's grave 
concern over the reported talks between Pakistan and 
the United State on a military pact. 
Dec. 21 - India and Pakistan Expert Committee on Kashmir 
met in New Delhi in pursuance of the agreement reached 
between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan during 
their talks in New Delhi in August 1953. 
1954 
Oct. 28 - UN asked India, Pakistan and South Africa to 
have direct talks on the issue of the people of Indian 
origin in South Africa. 
1955 
March 15 - India-Pakistan Joint Communique issued 
stating that the two Governments had reached f u l l 
agreement in talks on movable evacuee property and 
banking arrangements. 
May 14 - Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali arrived 
in New Delhi for talks with Nehru on the Indo-Pakistan 
relations^ Joint Communique issued on May IS. 
26 ; 
May 17 - India-Pakistan .Ministerial Talks, New Delhi* 
Agreement reached on ttie prevention of border incidents 
and preservation of shrines and holy places in both 
countries. 
June 21 - India-Pakistan agreement on Indus Waters 
signed in Washington with the good of f ices of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
July 12 - Indo-Pakistani Conference to discuss the 
opening of passenger traff ic between India and West 
Pakistan began in New Delhi. 
July 13 - An Indian trade delegation l e f t New Delhi 
for Karachi. 
July 19 - Trade agreement between India and Pakistan 
signed in Karachi. 
Aug. 29 - I t was announced in New Delhi that the India-
Pakistan Trade Agreement had been ratified by both partties. 
1956 
March 10 - India protested to the countries participating 
in the Karachi meeting of the SEATO Council against their 
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consideration of the Kasljiir problem at the instance 
of Pakistan. 
A.pril 11 -> India-Pakistan boundary talks between survey 
o f f i c i a l s of both countries on the demarcation of boundary 
began in New Delhi. 
May 6 - Minority exodus from £ast Pakistan* Indo-Pakistan 
Ministerial Conference in Dacca decided to eliminate 
factors that led to th is exodus. 
Aug. 24 - Indo-Pakistan conference on Measures to control 
floods opened in New Delhi. 
Sept. 26 - India and Pakistan reached on accord for the 
use of the waters of the Indus River System. 
Dec. 4 - Prime Minister Nehru uni lateral ly declared in 
a statement in Hajya Sabha that India would never go to 
war against Pakistan except in self-defence. 
1957 
Jan. 24 - Kashmir* Security Coisicil reiterated decision 
for free p leb i sc i t e , 
Feb. 14 - Britain Australia, Cuba and USA sponsored a 
resolution on Kashmir at the UN Security Council. 
2 !'' ' D J 
Feb, 21 - KashmlrJ Securi ty Council requested Gunnar 
Jar r ing to seek a solut ion towards the settlement of 
the Kashmir problem, 
April 5 - UN Securi ty Council representa t ive Gunnar 
Jar r ing arrived in New Delhi to inves t iga te and attempt 
mediation between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, 
April 29 - UN Representative Jar r ing reported tha t he 
was unable to suggest concrete proposals for a solution 
of Kashmir i s sue , 
April 30 - Jarr ing report on Kashmir released in 
New York. 
May 6 - India and Pakistan to continvie negot ia t ions 
with the World Bank on the Canal Waters Dispute* jo in t 
announcement made. 
Aug, 3 - Prime Minister of Nepal Dr. K.I.Singh 
supported I n d i a ' s stand on Kashmir. 
Aug. 21 - India protested to the ON Securi ty Council 
over the Mangla Dam projec t of Pakis tan . 
Oct. 12 - India informed the World Bank of her wil l ingness 
to extend discussions on the Canal Water Dispute with 
Pakis tan . 
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Nov. 16 « ON Security Council resolution to ask 
Dr. Frank Graham to v i s i t the subcontinent to seek a 
settlement of the Kashmir problem. 
Nov. 18 - India cr i t ic i sed the five-power resolution 
on Kashmir. 
Dec. 2 - ON Security Council approved fe the five-power 
resolution on Kashmir, reviving the Graham Mission. 
1958 
Jan. 12 - ON Representative In India and Pakistan 
Dr. Frank Graham arrived In New Delhi. 
March 8 - East Pakistan Government and West Bengal 
Government agreed to a Joint scheme of periodical 
demarcation of the rivers in the Indo-Pakistan border 
area. 
March 21 - India and Pakistan reached an agreement for 
the enforcement of a cease-fire along the Surma Valley 
frontier of Cachar in Assam. 
June 3 - Pakistan police f ir ing near Faxilka: seven 
Indian policemen k i l l ed . 
J 
June 13 - India and Pakistan agreed to close their 
respective Dlpl(xnatlc Missions In Bombay and Lahore. 
Aug. 2 - India lodged a protest to Pakistan on the 
border Incidents at the Uussalnlwala Head Works. 
Aug. 30 - Indo-Paklstan conference on border disputes 
commenced In Karachi. 
Sept. 1 - Indo-Paklstan Canal Water Dispute: statement 
In Lok Sabha. 
Sept. 3 - Indla-Paklstan Joint Communique on border 
disputes Issued In New Delhi. 
Sept. 9 - Prime Minister of Pakistan Feroze Khan Noon 
arrived in New Delhi. 
Sept. 12 - India-Pakistan joint statement on border 
disputes Issued in New Delhi. (Nehru-Noon Agreement). 
Dec. 5 - Ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan 
on the Sylhet border. 
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Feb, 25 - Jo in t Communique by the Goverrment of Pakistan 
and India on border disputes issued in New Delhi . 
April 17 - Trans i t ional ad hoc agreement on Canal Waters 
signod between India and Pakistan in Washington. 
May 4 - India rejected the Joint defence proposal of 
Pakistan President : Announcement by Prime Minister Nehru 
in at Hajya Sabha. 
July 22 - India-Pakistan trade review conference began 
in New Delhi , 
Apg. 7 - India lodged a p ro tes t with the UN Securi ty 
Council over the construct ion of the Mangla Dam in the 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. 
Sept. 1 - President Ayub Khan stopped over at Palam 
Airport in New Delhi on h i s way from Karachi to Dacca. 
Sept . 1 - Joint statement by President Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India issued in 
New Delhi . 
Sep t . 17 - India and Pakistan signed an agreement in 
London on major issued of canal waters d iv i s ion . 
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Oct, 15 - Xndo-Paklstan eas tern border problem* t a lks 
began In New Delhi. 
Oct, 23 - Indo-Pak Joint comm\uilq\ie on Bast Pakistan 
border t a lks Issued In New Delhi . 
Dec. 3 - India and Pakistan signed a limited payment 
agreement in Karachi. 
1960 
Jan. 4 - Xndo-Paklstan Financia l Talks* Joint Communiqua 
issued in New Delhi a t the conclusion of b i l a t e r a l t a l k s 
on the outstanding p a r t i t i o n i s s u e s . 
Jan. 11 - Joint Communique issued on the Indo-Pakistan 
Western border t a lk s at m i n i s t e r i a l l eve l in Lahore. 
Feb. 29 - Indo-Pakistan Canal Waters issue* World Bank's 
statement on the proposed t r ea ty between India and 
Pakistan to s e t t l e the question of Indus Waters. 
March 4 - The Pakistan Commander-in-Chief General Musa 
arrived in New Delhi . 
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March 14 - Pakis tani delegation led by M.Hafizur Behman, 
Pakistan Minister for Commerce, arrived in New Delhi for 
trade t a lks with the Government of Ind ia . 
March 21 - Two years Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement 
signed in New Delhi . 
March 27 - Joint Communique Issued in Rawalpindi at 
the end of the 4-day t a lk s between the Finance Ministers 
of India and Pakis tan, 
July 3 . - The Indo-Paklstan t a lks on water resources 
concluded in New Delhi. 
Nov. 27 - The Indo-Paklstan Joint information consxxl-
t a t l ve committee had i t s t%io-day de l ibe ra t ions in 
Rawalpindi. 
Dec. 5 - Prime Minister Nehru made a statement in the 
Lok Sabha on the t ransfer of Berubarl to Pakis tan. 
1961 
Jan. 19 - A 60-member goodwill delegation from Pakistan 
headed by the West Pakistan Governor M.A.M. Khan arrived 
in Amrltsar. 
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Feb, 22 - Indo-Pakistan property talks* Meeting held 
In Rawalpindi under the Indo-Pakistan Moveable Property 
Agreement. 
Feb, 25 - The meeting of the Indo-Pakistan Implementa-
t ion Committee on moveable property and banking agree-
ments between the two countr ies concluded in Rawalpindi, 
April 6 - Government of Ind i a ' s decision to go ahead 
with the construct ion of the Farakka Barrage announced, 
July 6 - Jo in t Communique issued in Calcutta at the 
end of the two-day conference of the Ministers of 
Rehabi l i ta t ion of Pakistan and India on the Indo-Pakistan 
moveable property and banking agreement, 
July 21 - l^e Indo-Pakistan boundary demarcation t a l k s 
concluded in Dacca, 
Aug, 11 - A formal p ro t e s t by India to Pakistan for 
kidnapping Col, Bhattacharya lodged. 
Aug. dl - India-Pakistan conference for revision of the 
Punjab-West Pakistan border commenced in New Delhi. Both 
the delegat ions were led by the i r respective Sec re t a r i e s , 
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Sept, 26 - Talks between India and Pakistan on the 
d iv i s ion of Berubari began in Calcut ta , 
Nov, 11 - Lt, Col, G.Bhattacharya of Indian Army 
convicted and sentenced to 8 years regorous imprAsanmcnt 
in Dacca, 
Nov, 30 - Off ic ia ls Jc of India and Pakistan exchanged 
bank notes and accounts on the occasion of exchange of 
safe-deposit lockers and b?mk accounts of evacuees 
between the two countr ies in New Delhi under the Indo-
Paklstan Moveable Property Agreement, 
1962 
Jan. 8 - India and Pakistan delegat ions conducted 
t h e i r fourth meeting in Dacca on water resources, 
Jan. 16 - India asked UN Secur i ty Council to r e j ec t 
Pak i s t an ' s request for a meeting to discuss Kadimir, 
May 10 - I n d i a ' s note to the High Commissioner of 
Pakistan in India regarding Slno-Paklstan border 
nego t i a t ions . 
27 i 
June 2 - Jo in t Communique betveen Indin and Pakistan 
issued at the end of trade t a lk s in New Delhi, 
June 22 - Securi ty Council cordLuded debate on Kashmip, 
The Co'oncil adjotimed af te r a resolutionK sponsored by 
Ireland was vetoed by the Soviety IJhion. No resolut ion 
was adopted, 
Cept, 26 - Indo-Pakistan conference oil Berubari began 
in Calcutta* 
Nov, 9 - Indo-Pakistan trade t a lk s began in New Delhi, 
Nov. 19 - Prime Minister Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha 
on the border s i tuaoion, 
Dec, 27 - Min i s t e r i a l t a lks between India and Pakistan 
on Kashmir and rela ted problems opened in Rawalpindi, 
In a Jo in t commuaique issued at the end of t a lk s the 
two Ministers made an appeal for a voluntary moratorium 
on statements , c r i t i c i sms or propaganda l i k e l y to 
prejudice the success of nego t i a t ions . 
27 J 
Dtc, 2P - Pnkisstan and Caina decided to sign a boundary 
agreement on the basis of the ' loca t ion and alignment 
of the boxjndary ac tua l ly e x i s t i n g ' between Sinkiang and 
Pakistan-occvQiied port ion of Kashmir. 
1963 
Jan. 15 - Pakistan delegation headed by Pak i s t an ' s 
Minister for Indus t r i e s and I a tu ra l Resources and Works 
Z.A, Bhutto arrived in Mew Delhi for the second round of 
t a lks on Kashmir and related mat ters with Svaran Singh, 
I n d i a ' s Minister for Railways, 
Feb, 7 - The Indian delegation to the th i rd round of 
the indo-Pakistan ta lks on Kashmir and other related 
mat ters arrived in Karachi, 
March 18 - I'ext oi" the Government of I n d i a ' s p ro tes t 
lodged with the UN Securi ty Council against recent Sino-
Paldstan border agreement released, 
April 22 . Fif th round of Indo-PakistRn m i n i s t e r i a l -
lovol t a lk s on Kashriir and other related mat ters opened 
In Karachi, 
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May 7 - Prime Minister Nenru's statement in Lok Sabha 
on Indo-Pakistan ta lks . 
May 16 - Indo Pakistan talks on Kashmir issuet Sixth 
round held in New Delhi, 
Aug* 2 - India agreed to provide the necessary f a c i -
l i t i e s required by Nepal for the flow of her transit 
trade to Pakistan. 
Aug. 6 - The 2-day Indo-Pakistan Conference on boundary 
i ssues between East Pakistan and West Bengal concluded 
in Calcutta. 
Sept. 1 - Trade agreement with Pakistan signed in 
Krachi. 
Dec. 19 - Prime Minister Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha 
on movement of US seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean. 
Dec. 19 - Indo-Pakistan Conference on border demar-
cation, particularly relating to the Eastern Sector, 
began in New Delhi. 
1964 
Feb, 3 - Kashmir Question discussed in the UN Security 
Council. 
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Feb. 5-10 - Debate on Kasl^lr In UN Security Council^ 
Statement by M.C.Chagla leader of the India Delegation. 
April 7 • Indo-Pakistan Home Minister's conference 
began in New Delhi, The conference concluded on 
11 April. 
April 11 » Joint Ccxnmunique issued in New Delhi at the 
conclusion of the Conference of the Home Ministers of 
India and Pakistan. 
May 7 « Debate on Kashmir in UN Security Council: speech 
by M.C. Chagla, Leader of the Indian Delegation (Subse-
quent speeches on 12 and 18 May). 
1966 
March 6 - India protested to the Security Council 
against Pakistan's progressive annexation of areas of 
Kashmir under i t s I l l e g a l occupation. 
March 10 - India and Pakistan delegates clashed at the 
Afro-Asian Islamic Conference held in Bandung. 
April 5 - Pakistan gave away over 2,000 square miles 
of Indian territory in Kashmir to China under the 
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Sino-Pak boundary agreement, 
April 17 - Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri repeated 
h i s 'no-war pact' offer to Pakistan, 
April 23 - Pakistan launched an assault along a 60 mile 
front from Ding to Chhad in the Rann of Kutch, 
April 28 - Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 's speech 
in Lok Sabha on Pakistan's armed agression on the 
Mutch Border, 
June 30 - Agreement on Kutch cease-fire between India 
and Pakistan signed in New Delhi. 
Aug, 6 - Pak in f i l t ra tors crossed into India territory 
a l l along the 470 mile ceasefire l ine in Kashmir, 
Aug, 16 - Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 's statement 
in Lok Sabha on Kutch Agreement, 
Aug, 28 - India sent a protest note to Pakistan in 
connection with harrassment of minorit ies , 
&ept, 1 - Pakistanis launched a large-scale attack on 
Chhamb and Jaurian across the international border of 
Jeoigu and Kashmir, 
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Sept, 3 - Prime Miaister L>\1 Bahadur Shastri 's broadcast 
to the Nation on Pakistani agression against India. 
Sept, 5 « Fighting broke out between India and Pakistan 
on the Western border. 
Sept, 6 - Defence Minister Y.B, Chavan's statement in 
Parliament on Pakistani agression against India, 
Sept, 7 - China accused India of agression against 
Pakistan, 
Sept, 10 - Defence Minister Y,B, Chavan's statement in 
the Parliament on Pakistani aggression against India. 
Sept, 11 - U.Thant, Secretary General of the United 
Nations, arrived in New Delhi to negotiate the cease-
f ire between India and Pakistan, 
Sept, 16 - Chinese ultimatua to the Indian Government, 
Sept, 20 - UN Security Council resolution relating to 
the conf l ict between India and Pakistan, 
Sept. 23 * ius a result of UN efforts a ceasefire was 
ordered by India and Pakistan, 
28J 
Nov. 5 - Prime Ministar Lai Bahadur S h a e t r i ' s statement 
in Parliament on the Indo-Pakistani con f l i c t , 
Dec. 10 - Prime Minister Lai Bahadur S h a s t r i ' s statement 
in Parliament on proposed Tashkent t a l k s . 
1966 
Jan.3 - Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Sahastr i and 
President Ayub Khan of Pakistan arrived in Tashkent in 
the Uzbekistan Republic of USSR to begin t he i r t a lk s 
under Soviet auspices for the res to ra t ion of normal 
r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s . 
Jan. 10 - A 10-point Agreement (Tashkent Declarat ion) 
signed on January 10,1966 by ^ i c h India and Pakistan 
re-af f i red t h e i r obl iga t ions imder the ON Charter not 
to have recourse to force and to s e t t l e t he i r d isputes 
through peaceful means without prejudice to t he i r 
basic pos i t ions on the Kashmir i s s u e . 
Jan. 11 - prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shas t r i died in 
Tashkent. 
28i 
Jan, 21 - Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army General 
Mohaomed Musa arrived in New Delhi for talks with the 
Chief of the k Indian Staff on the proposed mil itary 
withdrawals by two sides under the Tashkent Agreement. 
Agreement signed on January 22,1966. 
Jan. 29 - A f inal docuaent setting 1ti± forth an agree-
ment for the withdrawal by India and Pakistan of their 
armed personnel signed in Lahore at the Joint meeting 
of military representatives of the two countries under 
the auspices of General Tulic Marambic representative 
of the \M Secretary-General. 
Feb. 3 - India and Pakistan, acting on the Tashkent 
Declaration, exchanged prisoners of war near 
Hussainiwala. 
Feb, 15 - Prime Minister Mrs, Indira Gandhi's statement 
in Lok sabha on the Tashkent Declaration. 
Feb. 25 - India and Pakistan fu l f i l l ed their commitment 
under the tashkent Declaration by completing before 
midnight of February 25 the withdrawal of troops from 
each other's territory. 
28^ 
March 1 - India and Pakistan had a ministerial type 
conference in Rawalpindi in pursuance of the Tashkent 
Declaration. External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh's 
statement in Parliament on March 4,1966 on the subject, 
March 2 - The US State Department confir-nad in 
Washington that the United States had l i f ted the ban 
on sales of 'non-lethal' military equipment to India 
and Pakistan. 
March 12 - India lodged protests to Pakistan for 
providing f a c i l i t i e s in i t s territory to the Mizo to 
commit acts of rebellion sd and subversion. 
March 15 - In a debate on foreign affairs in the 
National Assembly in Dacca the Pakistan Foreign 
Minister Z.A. Bhutto said that Pakistan could not 
enter into a 'no-var pact' vith India as long as 
Kashmir dispute existed. 
March 26 . The Government of India decided to return 
to third countries their Pakistan-bound cargoes detailed 
by India during the h o s t i l i t i e s in August,1965. 
April 1 - India to get more waters next sixmner 
0 0 •'i 
following the agreement signed in New Delhi between the 
Indiia Commissioners of India and Pakistan on the second 
phase of the Indus Waters Treaty which cfime into ef fect 
on April 1, 
May 28 - The 83rd Indo-Pakistani Survey o f f i c i a l s ' 
conference for the demarcation of the West Bengal-East 
Pakistan border concliided i t s 2.day session In Dacca 
agreeing to begin the demarcation work at Hil i and 
Berubari on June 9 simultaneously, 
July 4 - Government of India announced i t s unilateral 
decision to release a l l cargoes, other than military 
contraband, detained as a result of the 1965 armed 
conf l ic t , 
July 19 - India and Pakistan agreed in New Delhi to 
exchange the three ships detained by each during 1965 
conf l ic t , 
Aug, 7 - India and Pakistan reached an af»reement on 
international airl ine f l i gh t s between the tvro countries. 
The agreement was reached after two days of talks between 
Civi l Aviation Secretary V.Shanker and Marshal Asgar Khan, 
Pakistan's Civil Aviation Chief in Karachi. 
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Sept, 13 - The A^ rmy Chiefs of India and Pakistan, 
General P.O. Kumar am angalam and Lt. General A.M. Yahya 
Khan, met in New Delhi and agreed on the steps to be 
taken to ensure maintenance of peaceful conditions 
particularly in the border areas. 
1967 
April 16 - India protested to US for the supply of 
arms to Pakistan. 
Aug, 4 - India's proposal to Pakistan for joint explo-
ration of concrete measures for restoration of normal 
relations betveen the tvo countries. 
Oct, 30 - Indo-Pak survey o f f i c i a l s conference on 
demarcation of Assam-East Pakistan border concluded, 
Nov, 1 - Tele-communication l inks between India and 
Pakistan established, 
Nov, 9 - India moved three-power resolution on West Asia 
in UN Security Cotincil, 
Jan. 3 - The Calcutta High Court stayed the transfer 
of a portion of Berubari, an Indian vi l lage in JaApaiguri 
D i s t r i c t , to Pakistan under the Nehru-Noon Agreement of 195 
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Jan, 6 « Government of India expelled M.M. Ahmed, 
the Counsellor In the Pakistan High Commission, for 
distributing money and arms to subversive elements 
In India. 
Feb, 19 • The International Kutch Tribunal announced 
i t s award on the demarcation of the India-Pakistan 
border in the Gujarat-West Pakistan area, 
Feb, 20 - Statement by Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
to Lok Sabha on the International Tribunal Award on the 
Rann of Kutch, 
Feb, 28 - Kutch Tribunal A.vard» Lok Sabha indirect ly 
endorsed the Sovemment stand that the Avrard should be 
implemented, 
March 4 - India and Pakistan talks on Kutch border 
began in New Delhi, 
April 2 - India-Pakistan Agreement on Tele-communication 
signed in New Delhi for the instnllaticm of improved 
equipment on the three major telecommunication routes 
between the two countries. 
May 13 - India and Pakistan talks on Faraka Barrage 
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began In New Delhi, The talks concliided on 25 May. 
July 24 - Statement by Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
in Lok Sabha on the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan. 
Sept. 1 - Pakistan Prasident Mohammed Ayub rejected 
India's offer of a No-war Pact, 
Sept, 20 - India and Pakistan agreement for the demar-
cation of Kutch boundary on a sector-wise basis , 
Nov, 13 - Prime Minister Mrs, Indira Gandhi's speech 
at the Conference on vVar Dangers in New Delhi 'on foun-
dations of poace*. 
Dec. 9 . India and Pakistani Farakka Barrage talks 
commenced in New Delhi, The talks concluded on 
19 December, 
Dec, 27 * Border demarcation conference between India 
and Pakistan began in Calcutta, 
1999 
Jan, 1 - Prime Minister Mrs, Indira Gandhi in a press 
conference commenting on President Ayub's views on the 
proposed 'no-war pact' said that i t was no use trying 
to have such a pact unless differences are se t t led . 
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March 22 - Secretary leve l meeting India and Pakistan 
on the eastern r ive r s issue and the Farakka barrage 
s tar ted In Islamabad* 
April 4 - India and Pakistan resimed t a lks on Kutch 
border demarcation. 
Apri l 7 - Pakistan gave up claim to Kutch h i l l f ea tu re , 
April 10 - Pakistan President Yahya Khan in a press 
conference in Rawalpindi desired 'poacefnl and equi-
table* settlement of a l l d isputes with India , including 
tha t of JaTomu and Kashmir and Farakka, 
June 2 - India addressed a l e t t e r to the President of 
Secur i ty Council concerning the Kashmir quest ion, 
June 21 -> China completed second l ink road connecting 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir ^^th Aksai Chin, 
June 22 - Prime Minister Mrs, Ind i ra Gandhi's l e t t e r 
to President Yahya Khan of Pakis tan. 
Jiane 25 - The Ministry of External Affairs protested 
to the High C(»iml88lon of Pakistan and the Chinese 
fiabassy in New Delhi against the construction of 
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another road by these two countries in Indian territory 
under the i l l e g a l occupation of Pakistan. l!he road i s 
frcxn a place called Nor Khm in northern Kashmir to 
the Khunjer Ab Pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border, 
July 4 - Demarcation of the Kutch-Sind Border 
completed in accordance with the Award of the Inter-
national Tribunal, Plenopotentlarias of India and 
Pakistan countersigned the maps of the demarcated 
places in Islamabad, 
July 15 - India and Pakistan had third round of 
talks on Farakka issue in New Delhi, 
July 22 - Second Ministerial Tripatite Meeting. 
Statement in Lok Sabha by the Minister of External 
Affairs Dinesh Singh regarding the reported building 
of new road by the Chinese inside the Indian territory 
of Kashmir, 
July 28 - Joint machinery to se t t l e Indo-Pak disputes' 
President Yahya Khan agreed to Mrs. Indire Gandhi's 
suggestions. 
28.) 
Aug, 1 - President Yahya Khan of Pakistari in reply 
to Mrs, Gandhi's l e t t e r for a Joint mpchitvery to 
examine various i ssues bstv/een the tx^ro coimtlsies said 
tha t h i s country was ready to en te r in to a dialogue 
with India for improving re l e t Ions provided 'deep-
scatod' matters were se t t led f i r s t . 
Aug. 7 - Pakistan z-efused entry to Coni8x-3 Ind ies . 
Aug, IE > i i in i s t e r of External Affairs Dinesh Singh's 
statement on reported US Mil i tary shipment to Pakistan 
in Lok Sabha. 
Sept . 18 - India rejected Pak note on Kashmir. 
Sept, 25 - India debarred from f i n a l session of Rabat 
Islamic Conference, 
Oct, 18 - Indo-US b i l a t e r a l t a l k s held in Washington 
on Vietnam i s sue , Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s , Kashmir and 
Asian Secur i ty , The Indian delegation was headed by 
Foreign Secretary T,N. Kaul and the US delegation by 
Under Secretary of Sta te £ l l i o t Richardson, 
29 J 
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Feb, 24 - Indo-Pak talks on Ganga waters l^ egan in 
Islamabad* 
March 3 •> Joint Commimique issued at the end of the 
talks on Farakka Barrage between India and Pakistan 
in Islamabad. 
April 1 - Svq)ply of waters from rivers SutleJ, Beas 
and Rayi to Pakistan in accordance with the Indus 
Waters Treaty of 1960, discontinued. 
July 21 - India and Pakistan agreed in a Joint 
Conmimique that Farakka should be the point of delivery 
of Ganga waters to Pakistan Delegations met from 
July 16 to 21 in New Delhi. 
Oct. 19 - India's note to Pakistan on Kashmir. 
Oct. 23 - Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi had talks 
in New York with US Secretary to State Rogers on the 
issue of US arms supply to Pakistan. 
Nov. 9 - Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh's 
statement in lok Sabha on arms supply to Pakistan by 
U5A and USSR. 
29i 
1971 
Jan. 30 - Indian Airlines' Fokker Friendship aircraft 
hijacked to Lahore at a gun point by t%ro hijackers, 
Feb. 2 - The Hijacked Indian Airlines' Fokker Friend-
ship aircraft blovn up in Lahore in fxill view of the 
airport authorit ies , troops and police and i t s 
destruction fu l ly televised by the Lahore Ty, 
Feb. 3 - Government of India suspended with immediate 
ef fect the over-f l ights of a l l Pakistani a ircrafts , 
c i v i l or mil i tary, over the territory of India. 
Feb. 9 - India warned Pakistsi in a note to pay com-
pensation for the destruction of the aircraft and 
return the two Hijackers to stand t r i a l in India. 
March 15 -> Blanket ban on overfl ights of a l l aircrafts 
between West and Sast Pakistan imposed by IZJDK India. 
March 27 - India expressed i t s concern over the 
happenings in East Bengal. External Affairs Minister 
&waran Singh's statement in both Houses of Parliament. 
March 28 - Free Bengal Radio announced a Provisional 
Bangladesh Government. 
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May 6 •> India appealed to the United Nations to take 
up direct responsibil i ty for re l ie f of the refugees 
frcm Bengal Desh as i t had done in Palestine and 
other places. 
July 9 - Indo-Pakistan accord on ascertaining Bengali 
Diplomats' allegiance* 
July 16 - India signed the convention on the 'suppre-
ssion of unlawful seizure of Aircraft' on hijacking. 
Aug. 9 - Indo-Soviet Treaty* 20-year Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Co-operation signed in New Delhi. 
Aug. 10 - l^ Senator Sdward M, Kennedy arrived in 
New Delhi. 
Aug. 30 - Bangladesh Mission opened in New Delhi. 
Appeal for recognition. 
Oct. 14 - Prine Minister Mrs. Indlre Gandhi l e f t 
New Delhi on a tour to s ix European countries. 
Oct. 28 - External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh told 
the Consultative C(xnmlttee of Parliament for the 
Ministry that India could count upon the Soviet Union 
for to ta l si^port in the event of a confl ict with 
Pakistan. 
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Nov. 6 - ON High C(xiunlsslonar for Refugees arrived 
In New Delhi. 
Nov. 22 - Ihree of four Pakistan Sabre Jets which 
intruded into India were shot down by Indian Gnats 
after an engagement. 
Nov. 23 - Three Pakistan Sabres violated Indian 
space and were shot do\m. 
Dec. 1 * The United States suspended % a^t i t called 
the l icensing of arms shipments to India. 
Dec. 3 - President V.V. Girl proclaimed a state of 
emergency in the country. 
Dec, 3 - Pakistan launched a premeditated air strike 
at 5.45 p.m. on a nimber of Indian a i r f i e lds . Pakistan 
amy shelled Indian positions in the Western Sector. 
Dec. 3 •> Pakistan made a formal declaration of war 
with India. 
Dec. 3 - lAF attacked a niaber of places in Western 
Pakistan. 
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Dec. 4 - In the easterr sector Indian troops In concert 
with the Muktl Bahinl moved into Bangladesh at several 
points . 
Dec. 6 - India accorded recognition to the Gana 
Prajatantri Bangladesh. 
Dec. 6 • Pakistan liroke off diplomatic relations with 
India. 
Dec. 8 - General Manekshaw, Chief of the Army Staff, 
called the Pakistani occupation forces in Bangladesh 
to surrender immediately to the Indian Army. 
Dec. 9 - In a statement in Parliament the Defence 
Minister announced that Pakistan's largest suhma-rine, 
US bui l t Ghazi, was sunk off Vishakha Patnam on the 
night of December 3 / 4 . 
Dec. 10 - India guaranteed safe conduct for planes 
from several countries to evacuate foreign nationals 
fron Karachi, Islanabad and Dacca. 
Dec. 14 - The Soviet Union used i t s veto for the third 
time to block a US-resolution cal l ing for an immediate 
Indo-Pakistani cease-fire and troop withdrawal. 
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Dec. 16 - Prime Mlni8*'Air Mrs, Indira Gandhi announced 
in Parliament that West Pakistan forces in Bangladesh 
have surrendered unconditionally in Dacca at 4,31 p.m. 
Lt. General Niazi signed the instrvment of surrender 
on behalf of the Pakistan Eastern Ccunmand Lt. General 
J.S* Aurora, GOC-in-C of the Indian and Bangladesh 
Forces in the eastern front accepted the surrender. 
Dec. 17 •> India ordered a unilateral ceasefire on 
the Wester Front. 
Dec. 17 - President Yahya Khan accepted cease-f ire . 
1972 
Jan. 9 - Indo-Bangladesh Cooperation*, Joint Communique 
issued at the end of the f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t of the 
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad to India. 
Feb. 9 - Joint Statement issued in Calcutta after 
tdks between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Accord on the withdrawal of Indian armed 
forces from Bangladesh by March 25. 
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Feb. 14 - India in a la t ter to the UN Secretary-
General, offered to hold direct talks with Pakistan 
'at any t ine , at any l eve l and without pre-condition'. 
March 12 • Indian armed forces withdrawn from 
Bangladesh at a ceremonial parade in Dacca. 
March 18 - Joint declaration signed in Dacca between 
Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Prime Minister 
Mujibur Rahman. 
March 19 - A. 25 year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Peace signed by Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 
April 25 - Chairman of the Policy fta Planning 
Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, D.P. 
Dhar l e f t for Islamabad for talks with Mr. Bhutto's 
emissary. 
April 30 - India and Pakistan agreed to a suDimit 
meeting between Mrs. Indire Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto 
at the end of May or the beginning of June. Communique 
issued after the meeting of the special emissaries 
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of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister 
of India at Muree and Rawalpindi. 
May 5 - Pakistan troops in ba t t a l ion strength attacked 
an Indian posi t ion in Kaiyan area , 16 km, south-east 
of Tithwal in Kashmir. 
May 12 > Prime Minister Mrs. Indire Gandhi received 
the highest award of the Mexican Academy of I n t e r -
na t iona l Law The Hexican Order of Law, Culture and 
Peacs* for her role in the l i be ra t ion of Bangladesh. 
May 13 - In a report to the Securi ty Coimcil the 
UN Secretary-General called on India and Pakistan for 
' S t r i c t observance' of the December 17,1971 cease - f i r e , 
June 28 - 'Sunmit' t a lks between Prime Minister 
Mrs, Indire Gandhi and President Z.A. Bhutto began in 
Simla. 
July 1 - Prime Minister Mrs. Ind i ra Gandhi's News 
Conference in Simla with Pakis tani j o u r n a l i s t s . 
July 3 - Simla Accord J Agreement by Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi 
and President Z.A. Bhutto signed in Simla. 
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July 14 - India welcomed Pak i s t an ' s gesture in 
allowing President G i r i ' s a i r c r a f t to overfly i t s 
t e r r i t o r y from Kabul. 
July 16 - Pak i s t an ' s National Assembly r a t i f i ed 
Simla Accord, 
July 26 - Union Cabinet approved the Simla Agreement, 
July 28 . The Simla Agreement reached between India 
and Pakistan on July 3 , formally r a t i f i ed by India , 
Aug, 10 - Representatives of Army Chiefs of India and 
Pakistan reached axi agreement on the procedure for the 
de l inea t ion of the l ine of control in Jaromu and Kashmir 
as i t requested from the cease- f i re of DaGember 17,1971, 
Meeting held at Snchf=tcgrh (Jemniu). 
• • • • 
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RESQLOTION OF THE COMMISSION QF AUSUST 13.1948 
The United Nations Conmission for India and 
Pakistan having given careful consideration to the 
points of view expressed by the representatives of 
India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the 
State of Jammu and Kaidimir, and 
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation 
of h o s t i l i t i e s and the correction of conditions the 
continuance of %ihich i s l ike ly to endanger inter-
national peace and security are essent ia l to implemen-
tation of i t s endeavours to a s s i s t the Government of 
India and Pakistan in effecting a f ina l settlement of 
the solution. 
Resolves to sulnit simultaneously to the 
Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal 
PART I 
Ceasefire Orden 
A. The Government of India and Pakistan agree 
that their respective High Commands wi l l issue separate] 
and simultaneously a ceasefire order to apply to a l l 
forces under their control in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir as of the ear l i e s t practicable date or dates 
30J 
to bfl mutually agra«d upon within four days after the 
proposals have been accepted by both Govemmeiits. 
B* The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan 
Forces agree to refrain fraaiL taking any measures that 
might augment the military potential of the forces under 
their control In the s tate of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(For purpose of these proposals, forces under 
their control shall be considered to Include a l l forces , 
organised and unorganised, fighting or participating In 
h o s t i l i t i e s on their respective s ides ) . 
C. The Commander-ln>C!hlef of the forces of India 
and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary 
local changes In present disposit ions vihlch may f a c i l i t a t e 
the ceasef ire . 
D* In I t s discretion and as the Commission may 
find practicable, the Commission wi l l appoint military 
observers who, under the authority of the Commission and 
with the co-operation of both commands, wi l l supervise 
the obseirvance of the ceasefire order. 
£• ISie Government of India and the Government 
of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective people 
to a s s i s t In creating and maintaining an atmosphere 
favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 
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PART II 
Truce agreement: 
Simultaneously with the i^ceptance of the 
proposal for the Immediate cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s 
as outlined in part I , both Governments accept the 
following principles as a basis for the foraulation 
of a truce agreo&ent, the deta i l s of which shall be 
%rork0d out in discussion between their representatives 
and the Commission, 
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in 
the territory of the State of Jasunu and Kashmir const i -
tutes a material change in the situation since i t was 
represented by tiie Government of Palcistan before the 
Security Council, the Government of Pakistan sgrees 
to withdraw i t s troops from that State . 
2 , The Government of Pakistan wi l l use i t s 
best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State 
of Jaamu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals 
not normally resident therein who have entered the state 
30^ 
for th« purpose of f ighting, 
3 . Pending e f ina l solution, the territory 
evacuated by the Pakistani troops wi l l be administered 
by the local authorities under the surveillance of the 
Commission. 
B 
1. When the Commission shall have notified 
the Government of India that the tribemen and Pakistan 
nationals referred to in Part I I , A, 2 hereof, have 
withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation iidiich was 
represented by the Qovemment of India to the Security 
Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian 
forces in the State of Janunu and Kashmir, the Government 
of India, agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of i t s 
forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with 
the Commission. 
2 . Pending the acceptance of the conditions 
for a f ina l settlement of the situation in the State 
of Jsmmu and Kashmir, the Indian Government wi l l maintain 
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within the l i n e s eicisting a t tiie moment of the ceasef i re 
the minimtEi stronr,th of i t s forces vdiich in sgraement 
with the Comraisrion ere considered necessary to essiL.t 
l oca l au tho r i t i e s in the ohservance of law f.n6 order . 
The CoffliHission wi l l have observers stationed ^ e r e i t 
deems necessary. 
3 , The Government of India w i l l undertake to 
ensure tha t the Government of the Sta te of Jammu and 
Kashmir w i l l take a l l measures within i t s power to make 
i t pub l ica l ly known that peace, law and order w i l l be 
safeguarded and tha t a l l human and p o l i t i c a l r i gh t s 
w i l l be guaranteed. 
1, Upon s igna ture , the f u l l t ex t of the truce 
agreement or a communique containing the p r inc ip le s 
thereof as agreed upon between tlrie two Governments and 
the Commission, wi l l be made publ ic . 
PAST I I I 
The Government of India end tliQ Government of 
Pakistan reaffirm t h e i r vitsti that the future s t a tus of 
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the Sta te of JcBBrau end Keshasir sha l l he determined in 
accordance with the ft w i l l of the people and to t ha t 
end, upon acceptance of the truce agreeitent both 
Govemaieats agree to enter into consul ta t ions with 
the Commlaeion to determine f a i r and equi table 
condit ions >ihtreby such free expression wi l l be 
assured. 
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SUMMARY OF TH£ NEHRU ABDULLAH AGREEMENT 
MADE ON 24TH JULY 1952. 
! • C i t i z e n s h i p . A common c i t i z e n s h i p was 
recognized with special privilege for State subjects. 
2 . The Head of the State to be recognised by 
the Indian President on the recommendation of the 
State Legislature. The State to decide the process 
of e lect ion of the Head of the State . Appointment to 
be for f ive years. 
3 . For h i s tor ica l and sentimental reasons, a 
State f lag to be recognised, but the Indian National 
Flag to continue to have the same status as elseidiere 
in India. 
4 . The President of India to retain powers to 
reprieve and commute death sentences. 
5 . The President of India to exercise h i s 
emergency powers under Art. 352 of the Indian 
Constitution, in such matters as invasion and external 
or internal disturbances in Kashmir. But in the case 
of internal disturbances, action to be taken only with 
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the concurrence of the State . 
6. The application of principles of fundamental 
r ights , as defined In the Indian Constitution, to apply 
In Kashmir subject to certain modifications. For 
example the Kashmir decision not to award compensation 
to dispossessed landlords contrary to the Indian 
guarantee. 
?• The SuprsBie Courtof India to ret&in original 
jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in Art.131* 
Such disputes are Uiose between States or between a State 
and the Goyemment of India* The State A<^yisory Tribunal 
to be abolished and i t s functions are to pass to the 
Supreme Court of India. Ili ls in e f fect made the Supreme 
Court the f ina l court of appeal in a l l criminal and 
c i v i l matters. 
8 . Financial agreement between India and Kashmir 
including the d i f f i c u l t question of customs had s t i l l 
to be worked out. 
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TASHKENT DECLARATION 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having 
discussed the exist ing relations between India and 
Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore 
normal and peaceful relations between their countries 
and to promote understanding and friendly relations 
between their peoples. They consider the attainment 
of these objectives of v i t a l importance for the 
welfare of the 600 mill ion people of India and 
Pakistan. 
I 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan agree that both sides wi l l exert a l l 
e f forts to create good neighbourly relations bet%reen 
India and Pakistan in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation 
under the Charter not to have recourse to force and 
to se t t le their disputes through peaceful means. 
They considered that the interests of peace in their 
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region and partictilarly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-
continent and, indeed, the Interests of the peoples 
of India and Pakistan were not served by the conti-
nuance of tension betvreen the two countries. I t vras 
against th i s backgrotmd that JaDmu and Kashmir was 
discussed, and each of the sides set forth i t s 
respective posit ion. 
II 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan have agreed that a l l armed personnel of 
the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 
25 February,1966 to the positions they held prior to 
5 August 1966, and both sides shall observe tiie ceane' 
f i r e terms on the cease-fire l i n e . 
I l l 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India 
and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
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IV 
Ih« Prima Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan have agreed that both sides wi l l discourage 
any propaganda directed against the other country, and 
wi l l encourage propaganda vhich promotes the development 
of friendly relations between the two countries. 
V 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of 
Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India 
to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to 
India wi l l return to their posts and that the normal 
functioning of di]^l(»atic missions of both countries 
w i l l be restored. Both Governments shall observe the 
Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplcnnatic Intercourse, 
VI 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards 
the restoration of econcxaic trade relat ions, communi-
cat ions , as well as cultural exchanges between India 
and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the 
t i l J 
existing agreements between India and Pakistan. 
VII 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan have agreed that they v l l l give instructions 
to their respective authorities to carry out the 
repatriation of the prisoners of war. 
VIII 
The prime Minister of India and the President of 
Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue 
the discussion of questions relating to the problems 
of refugees aid evictions illegal immigrations. They 
also agreed that both sides will create conditions 
which will prevent the exodus of people. They further 
agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets 
taken over by either side in connection with the 
conflict. 
IX 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of 
Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue 
meetings both at the highest and at other levels on 
matters of direct concern to both countries. Both 
sides have recognized the need to set up Joint 
Indl&n-Paklstanl bodies which w i l l report to their 
Governments In order to decide what further steps 
should be taken. 
The Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan record their fee l ings of deep appreciation 
and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the 
Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers of the U.s.S.R. for their 
constructive, friendly and noble part In bringing about 
the present meeting which has resiilted In mutually 
satisfactory resu l t s . Iliey also e3q)ress to the 
Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their 
sincere thankfulness for their oven^elalng reception 
and generous hospi ta l i ty . 
They Invite the Chalman of the Council of 
Ministers of the U.s.S.R. to witness th is Declaration. 
Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan 
Lai Bahadur Shastrl Mohammed Ayub Khan 
Tashkent, 10 January 1966. 
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Sit PftlBt Proga 
(1) Sstabllshment of a federation 'On the basis of 
the Lahore Resolution and the Parliamentary framework 
of government with supremacy of legis lature d irect ly 
elected on the basis of adult franchise'• 
(2) Federal goyemment shall deal with only tvo 
subjects, that i s defence and foreign affairs and a l l 
other residuary subjects should rest in the federating 
states* 
(3) There should be either tvo separate but free ly 
convertible currencies for the tvo wings or one 
currency for the %rtiole country provided that effected 
constitutional provisions were made to stop the f l i gh t 
of capital from East to Wsst Pakistan. There should be 
separate banking reserves and separate f i s c a l and 
monetary policy for East Pakistan. 
(4) Deniel to the Central Government of the right of 
Taxation vesting of tax provisions in the hands of the 
federating states with the Central Government receiving 
afixed share. 
9 1 ) 
Old 
(5) Foreign trade; five steps shall be taken) 
(a) %ere should be two separate accounts for 
foreign exchange earnings* 
(b) Samlngs of East Pakistan shall be tmder 
the control of East Pakistan and same for Vfest 
Pakistan. 
(c) Foreign exchange requirements of the federal 
government shall be met by the two wings either equally 
or In ratio to be fixed. 
(d) Indigineous products shall move free of duty 
within the two wings. 
(e) Constitution shall empower the Unit 
Governments to establish trade and commercial relations 
with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements 
%rlth foreign countries. 
(6) Set up a Militia or para military force by 
East Pakistan. 
t i l i 
The following i s th« text of the treaty of peace, 
friendship and cooperation bet%reen the Republic of 
India and the Onion of Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republic. 
Desirous of expanding and consolidating the 
exist ing relations of sincere friendship between th«n. 
Believing that the further development of friend-
ship and cooperation meets the basic national interests 
of both the States as well as the interest of last ing 
peace in Asia and the world. 
Determined to promote the consolidation of 
imiversal peace and security and to make steadfast 
ef forts for the relaxation international tensions and 
the f inal elimination of the remnants of colonialism. 
I^holding their firm fai th in the principles of 
peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States 
with different p o l i t i c a l and social systems. 
Convinced that in the world today international 
problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by 
conf l i c t . 
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Reaffimlag tht lr determination to abide by th« 
purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter, 
The Republic of India on the one side, and the 
Union of Soviet Soc ia l i s t Bepublic on the other s ide, 
have decided to conclude the present treaty, for which 
purposes the folloving plenipotentiaries have been 
appointed• 
On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran 
Singh, Minister of External Affairs. 
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Soc ia l i s t 
Republic Mr. A,A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
uho, having each presented their credentials , v^lch are 
found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed 
as follows* 
Article I 
The high contracting parties solemnly declare 
that enduring peace and frelndship shall prevail between 
the two coTontries and their peoples. Sach party shall 
respect the Independence, sovereignty and terr i tor ia l 
Integrity of the other party and refrain from 
interfering in t^e other's internal af fa irs . The high 
31o 
contracting parties sliall continue to develop and 
consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, gooC 
neighbourliness and comprehensive co>operaticn exist ing 
between thex on the basis of ths aforesaid principles , 
as well as those of equality and mutual benefit . 
Article II 
Guided by the desire to contribute in every 
possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of 
their people, the high contracting parties declare 
their determination to continue their efforts to 
preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout 
the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general 
and ccMsplete disarmament, including both nuclear and 
conventional, under effect ive international control. 
Article III 
Guided by their loyalty to the lof ty ideal of 
equality of a l l peoples sand nations, irrespective of 
race or creed, the high contracting parties condemn 
colonialism and racialism in a l l foras and manifes> 
tat ions , and reaffirm their detennination to strive 
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for t h e i r f i n a l snd cot&pletd e l i ta iaa t lon . 
Th<3 high contract ing p a r t i e s sha l l co-ope rata 
vi th other Gfcates to achieve these aims and to sapport 
th<3 just aapi ra t ians of the peoples in the i r s truggle 
against colonaialism and r ac i a l domination. 
Art ic le IV 
llie Republic of India respects the peace-loving 
pol icy of the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic aimed 
a t strengthening fr iendship and co-operation with a l l 
na t i ons . 
The Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic respects 
I n d i a ' s policy of non-alignment and r e a f f i m th&t 
t h i s policy cons t i tues an important fac tor in the 
maintenance of universal peace and lessening of 
tensions in the world. 
Ar t ic le V 
Deeply in teres ted in ensuring universal peece 
and secur i ty , at taching greet importance to the i r 
mutual co-operation in the in t e rna t iona l f ie ld for 
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achieving these alms, the high contracting parties 
w i l l maintain regular contacts with each other on 
major International problems affecting the Interests 
of both the s tates by means of meetings and exchanges 
of views between their leading statesmen, v i s i t s by 
o f f i c i a l delegatlona and special envoys of the two 
Governments, and through dlplcmatlc channels. 
Article VI 
Attaching great Importance to econcnlc, 
s c i ent i f i c and technological co-operation between them 
the high contracting parties wi l l continue to conso-
l idate and expand mutually advantageous and compre-
hensive cooperation in tiiese f i e l d s as well as expand 
trade, transport and camnunications between them on 
the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit 
and most-favoured exist ing treataient, subject to the 
exist ing agreements and the special arrangements with 
contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet 
trade agreement of Dec. 26,1970. 
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Article VII 
The high contracting parties shall promote 
further develoixaent of t i e s and contacts between them 
In the f i e l d s of science, art , l i t erature , education, 
public health press , radio te l ev i s ion , cinema, 
tourism and sports. 
Article VIII 
In accordance with the traditional friendship 
established between the two countries each of the 
high contracting parties solemnly declares that I t 
shall not enter into or participate In any military 
all iance directed against the other party. 
Each high contracting party undertakes to 
abstain from any aggression against the other party 
and to prevent the use of i t s territory for the 
commission of any act which might I n f l i c t military 
damage on the other high contracting party. 
Article IX 
Each high contracting party undertakes to 
abstain from providing any assistance to any third 
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party that engages in armed conf l ict with the other 
party. In the event of either party being subjected 
to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting 
parties shall Immediately enter Into mutual consulta-
tions In order to remove such threat and to take 
appropriate ef fect ive measures to ensure peace and the 
seaurlty of tiielr countries. 
Article X 
Bach hifth contracting party solemnly declares 
that i t shall not enter into any obligation, secret or 
public) with one or more States , vhich i s incompatible 
vith thif. treaty. Each high contrr-cting party further 
declares that no obligation ex i s t s nor sl isl l any 
obligation be entered into , between i t s e l f and any 
other State or States , which might cause military 
damage to the other party. 
Article XI 
This treaty is concludea for the duration of 
20 years and will be automatically extended for each 
successive period of five years unless either high 
r 
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contracting party declares i t s desire to terminate I t 
by giving notice to the other high contracting party 
12 months prior to the expiration of the treaty. The 
treaty v i l l be subject to rat i f icat ion and wi l l ccMse 
into force on the date of the exchange of instrixnents 
of rat i f icat ion vhich wi l l take place in Moscow within 
one month of the signing of this treaty. 
Article XLl 
Any difference of interpretation of eny art ic le 
or ar t ic les of this treaty which may arise between the 
high contracting parties wi l l be settled b i la tera l ly 
by peaceful means in a sp ir i t of mutual respect and 
understanding, 
Tliu said plenipotaatiaries have signed the 
presoiit treaty in Hindi, Russian and Snglish, a l l 
Ujxts being equally authentic and have affixed h e r e t o 
their sea ls . 
Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in 
the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one. 
on behalf of the On behalf of the 
Republic of India Union of Sovlety Soc ia l i s t 
(Sd.) Swaran Singh Republics 
Minister of External Affairs* (Sd.) A.A. Gromyko 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
ti »v .v 
SIMLA AQHEEMENT 
Agretaent on Bilateral Relations 
Between India and Pakistan 
Following i s the text of the Agreement on 
Bi lateral Relations between the Government of India 
and the Goyemment of Pakistan signed at Simla, 
July 2 , 1972. 
1. The Government of India and the Government 
of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put 
an end to the conf l ict and confrontation that have 
hitherto marred the relat ions , and work a for the 
promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship 
and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-
continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote 
their resources and energies to the pressing task of 
advancing the welfare of the peoples. 
In order to achieve this objective, the Government 
of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as 
follow8< 
( i ) That the principles and purposes of the 
'J2! tJ ^ (J 
Charter of the United Nations shall govern the 
relations between the tvo countries. 
( I I ) That the two countries are resolved to 
se t t l e their differences by peaceful means through 
bi lateral negotiations or by any other peaceful 
means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending 
the f inal settlement of any of the problems between 
the two countries, neither side shall uni lateral ly 
alter the situation and both shall prevent the 
organisation, assistance or encouragement of any 
acts deterlmental to the maintenance of peaceful and 
harmonious relat ions . 
( I I I ) That the prerequisite for reconci l iat ion, 
good neighbourliness and durable peace between them 
i s a commitment by both the countries to peaceful 
co-existence, respect for each other's t err i tor ia l 
Integrity and sovereignty and non-interference In each 
other's Internal a f fa irs , on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit , 
(Iv) That the basic Issues and causes of conf l ict 
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vhldi have bedevilled the relations between the two 
countries for the^last 25 years shall be resolved by 
peacefiil means. 
(v) That they shall always respect each other's 
national unity, t err i tor ia l Integrity, p o l i t i c a l 
Independence and sovereign equality. 
(v l ) That in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, they wi l l refrain from the threat 
or use of force against the terr i tor ia l integri ty or 
p o l i t i c a l independence of each other, 
2 . Both Governments wi l l take a l l steps within 
their power to prevent host i le propaganda directed 
against each other. Both countries wi l l encourage 
the dissemination of such information as would promote 
the development of friendly relations between them. 
3 . In order progressively to restore and 
normalise relations between the two countries step by 
step, i t was agreed thats 
(1) Steps shall be taken to resuae communications' 
postal , telegraphic, sea, land including border posts 
and air l inks including overf l ights . 
(J M t 
( i i ) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote 
travel f ac i l i t i e s for the nationals of the either 
country* 
( i i i ) Trade and cooperation in econoaic and 
agreed f ields will be resuied as far as possible* 
(iv) Exchange in the f ields of science and 
culture will be promoted. 
In this connection, delegations from the two 
countries %rill meet fr(» tisM to tine to work out the 
necessary details . 
4 . In order to init iate the process of the 
establishment of durable peace, both the Governments 
agreed thatt 
( i ) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be with-
drawn to their side of the international border. 
( i i ) In J«mu and Kashmir the line of control 
resulting from the ceasefire of December 17,1971 shall 
be respected by both sides without prejudice to the 
recognised position of either side. Neither side shall 
seek to alter i t unilaterally irrespective of mutual 
difference and l ega l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Both s ides 
fur ther undertake to refra in from the th rea t or the 
use of force in v io la t ion of t h i s l i n e , 
( l i i ) The withdrawals shal l commence upon entry 
in to force of t h i s Agreement end sha l l be completed 
within a period of 30 days the rea f t e r , 
6, This Agreement wi l l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n 
by both countr ies in accordance with t h e i r respect ive 
cons t i tu t iona l procedures, and wi l l come into force 
wltn effect from the date on which the In s t r i nen t s of 
Rat i f ica t ion are exchanged, 
6, Both Qovemments agree tha t t h e i r respect ive 
Heads w i l l meet again a t a mutually convenient time in 
the fliture and t h a t , in the meanwhile, the represen-
t a t i v e s of the two sides wi l l meet to discuss fur ther 
the modal i t ies and arrangements for the establishment 
of durable peace snd normalisation of r e l a t i o n s , 
including the questions of r epa t r i a t i on of pr i soners 
of war and c i v i l i a n in t e rnees , a f i n a l sett lement of 
Jammu and Kashair and the resmptlon of dlploaatlc 
relations. 
2ulfiqar All Bhutto 
President, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Indira Gandhi 
Prime Minister 
Republic of India 
Simla, 2nd J\ay,1972. 
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TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS MOVED IN THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
1,*UNITED STATES* DRAFT RESOLUTION 
The Securi ty Council 
Having heard the statements of the represen-
t a t i v e s of India and Pakis tan, 
Convinced tha t h o s t i l i t i e s along the India-
Pakistan border cons t i tu te an Immediate th rea t to 
i n t e rna t i ona l peace and secur i ty , 
1, Cal ls upon the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to take a l l steps required for an immediate 
cessat ion of hos t i l l i t l e s^ 
2 , Ca l l s for an immediate withdrawal of armed 
personnel present on the t e r r i t o r y of the other to 
t h e i r own sides of the India-Pakistan borders', 
3 , Authorizes the Secretary-General , at the 
request of the Government of India or Pakis tan, to 
place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to 
•UN Doc,S/10416, moved on 4 December 1971. 
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report on the implementation of the cease-fire and 
troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP 
personnel; 
4 . Calls upon the Gove mm en t s of India and 
Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best 
e f forts toward the creation of a climate conducive 
to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan; 
5 . Calls upon a l l States to refrain from any 
action that would endanger the peace in the area; 
6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan 
to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the 
Secretary-General offering good of f ices to secure and 
maintain peace in the subcontinent; 
7« Bequests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council as soon as possible on the imple-
mentation of th i s resolution. 
(J J J 
2 . BELGIUM, ITALY AND JAPAN* DRAFT HESOLUTION* 
The Security Council 
Noting the report of the Secretary-General 
(S/10410 and Add. 1 and S/10412) of 4 and 3 December 
1971, 
Having heard the statements of the represen-
tat ives of India and Pakistan, 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have broken 
out between India and Pakistan \^ich constitute an 
immediate threat to international peace and security, 
Mindful of i t s responsibil ity under the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Calls upon the Governments concerned forth-
with, as a f i r s t step, for an immediate cease-fire and 
for a cessation of a l l military a c t i v i t i e s ; 
2 , Urges the Governments concerned, in accordance 
with the principles envisaged in the United Nations 
Charter, to intensify their ef forts to bring about 
•UN Doc. S/10417, moved on 4 December 1971. 
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condit ions necessary for the speedy and volimtary 
r epa t r i a t i on of the mi l l ions of refugees to t he i r 
homes*, 
3 , Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l 
S t a t e s with the Secretary-General for rendering 
ass is tance to and re l ieving the d i s t r e s s of those 
refugees', 
4 , Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council promptly and current ly infonred on the 
situation*, 
5 , Decides to follow closely the s i tua t ion and 
to meet again as soon as necessary, 
3 . UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS» 
DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
The Securi ty Council 
Having considered the l e t t e r of nine members 
of the Secur i ty Council (S/10411) and the report of 
the Secretary-General (S/10410), 
*UN Doc, S/1041F, moved on 4 December 1971. 
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Cal ls for a p o l i t i c a l sett lement in East Pakistan 
^ i c h would inev i tab ly r e s u l t in a cessat ion of 
h o s t i l i t i e s ; 
Ca l l s upon the Government of Pakistan to take 
ineasures to cease a l l acts of violence by Pakis tani 
forces in East Pakistan which have led to de te r io ra t ion 
of the s i t u a t i o n , 
4 . ARGENTINA, BJRUNDI. NICARAGUA, SIERRA lEQNE. 
The Secur i ty Council 
Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 
3 December 1971 (S/10410, S/10410/Add.l), 
Having heard the statements of ths represen-
t a t i v e s of India and Pakis tan. 
Gravely concerned at the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s 
along the borders of India and Pakis tan , 
Convinced tha t h o s t i l i t i e s along the India-
Pakistan border cons t i tu te an immediate t h rea t to 
i n t e rna t i ona l peace and secur i ty . 
•ON Doc.S/10419, moved on 4 December 1971. 
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Becogniasing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subsequent s tage, within the framework of the 
Charter , with the i ssues which have given r i se to the 
h o s t i l i t i e s . 
Recognizing fur ther the need to take preliminary 
measures to bring about an immediate cessat ion of 
h o s t i l i t i e s and effect a withdrawal of armed forces 
to the i r own side of the India-Pakistan borders , 
1. Cal ls upon the Government of India and Pakistan 
to take forthwith a l l measures for an immediate cease-
f i r e and withdrawal of t h e i r armed forces on the 
t e r r i t o r y of the other to t h e i r own side of the India-
Pakistan border*, 
2 , Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Co'jncil promptly and Currently informed on the s i t i i a t ion . 
5 . GHIHA: DR/JT RESQLailOH* 
The Secur i ty Council 
Having heard the statements of the represen ta t ives 
of Pakistan and India* 
*UN Doc.S/10421, moved on 5 December 1971, 
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Noting In pa r t i cu l a r tha t India has launched 
la rgo-sca le a t tacks on Pakis tan, thus gravely under-
mining the peace in the Indo-Paklstan subcontinent. 
Strongly condemning the Indian Government's ac ts 
of creat ing a so-called 'Bangla Desh* and of subvert ing, 
dismembering and committing aggression against Pakis tan. 
Cal ls upon the Government of India to withdraw 
i t s armed forces and armed personnel sent by i t from 
Pakistan t e r r i t o r y immediately and uncondit ionally and 
c a l l s upon the Government of Pakistan to withdraw the 
armed forces which i t has sent in to Indian t e r r i t o r y 
for counter -a t tacks . 
Ca l l s upon India and Pakistan to cease h o s t i l i t i e s 
and to withdraw respect ive ly from the In t e rna t iona l border 
between India and Pakistan and to disengage from each 
other so as to create conditions for a peaceful sett lement 
of the disputes between India and Pakis tan. 
Cal ls upon a l l S t a t e s to support the Pakistan 
people in t h e i r jus t struggle to r e s i s t ladian aggression, 
9 3 J 
Roqaests the Secretary-General to s u l n i t as 
ear ly ar, possl'cle a report to the Secur i ty Council on 
the implsraentation of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . 
6, ARGENTINA. BBLSIUM^ BURUNDI^  ITALY^ 
JAPAN f NICARAGUAf SIERRA LEONB^  
AND SOMALIA* DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
ine Securi ty Council , 
looting the reports of the Secretary-General 
(S/10410 and Add. 1 and S/10412) of 3 and 4 December 
1971, 
Having heard the statements of the represen-
t f i t iyes of India and Pakistan, 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have broken 
out between India and Pakistan ^ i c h cons t i tu te an 
iTimediate threat to in ternat iona l peace and secur i ty . 
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subsequent s t a g e , within the framework of the Charter 
of the United Nat ions , with the i s s u e s vhich have given 
r i s e to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
•UN Doc,S/10423, moved on 5 December 1971. 
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Convinced «that an ear ly p o l i t i c a l solut ion 
would be necessary for the res to ra t ion of condit ions 
of normalcy in tiie area of conf l i c t and for the re turn 
of the refugees to t he i r homes. 
Mindful of tlie provisions of the Charter of th« 
United Nations, in pa r t i cu l a r of Ar t ic le 2.paragraph 4 , 
Recalling the Declaration on t;he Strengthening 
of In te rna t iona l Secur i ty , p a r t i c u l a r l y paragraphs 4,5 
and 6. 
Recognizing fur ther the need to take immediate 
measures to bring about an ioimediate cessat ion of 
h o s t i l i t i e s and ef fec t a withdrawal of armed forces to 
t h e i r own side of the India/I'aklgtftn borders , 
Mindful of i t s r e spons ib i l i t y under the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1, Ca l l s \:^ )on the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to take forthwith a l l measures for an immediate 
cease- f i re and witlidrawal of t h e i r arjied forces on the 
t e r r i t o r y of the other to t l ielr own side of the Ind i a / 
Pakistan borders*. 
9 3/ 
a 2 . Urges that efforts be intensif ied in order 
to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for 
the voluntary return of the Sast Pakistan refugees to 
their homes^ 
3 . Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l 
States with the Secretary-General for rendering 
assistance to and relieving the d i s tress of those 
refugees^ 
4 . Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council prcMDptly and currently informed on the imple-
mentation of this resolution^ 
5 . Decides to follow the situation c lose ly and 
to meet agd. n as soon as necessary, 
7« BELGIDM. ITALY. JAPAN. NICARAGUA. 
SIERRA LSQNE AND TDNlSlAl 
DRAFT |ffi§Q]t,ro(ffl* 
Ihe Security Council 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have broken 
out between India and Pakistan vdiich constitute an 
*UN D o c , S/10425, moved on 5 December 1971. 
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Immediate threat to international peace and security. 
1. Calls upon the Governments concerned forthwith, 
as a f i r s t step, for an immediate cease-fire*, 
2* Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council promptly and currently informed of the implemen-
tation of this resolution^ 
3 . Decides to continue to discuss the further 
measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the 
area. 
8 . USSR* AMBWDKKNT TO DRAFT RSSOLUTION 
CONTAINa;D U TETDOC. S / 1 0 4 2 5 * 
1. In operative paragraph 1, replace the words 
•the Governments concerned' by the words ' a l l parties 
concerned' \ at the end of the same paragraph, add 
the words 'the cessat ion of a l l military operations'. 
2 . Between operative paragraphs 1 and 2 , insert 
the following asoperative paragraphs 2 and 3: 
2. Calls upon the Government of Pakistan 
siaultaneously to take ef fect ive action towards a 
• DN D o c , S/10426, moved on 6 December 1971. 
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p o l i t i c a l settlament In Sast Pakistan, giving Immediate 
recognition to the wi l l of the East Pakistan population 
as expressed In the e lect ions of December 1970*, 
3« Declares that the provisions of operative 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution constitutes a 
single whole, 
3 , Benxsnbor the ramalning operative paragraphs 
accordingly. 
9. USSRi REVISED AMENDMENT TO DRAFT 
qfiSQLUTIQM S/10425* 
1. In operative paragraph 1, replace the words 
'the Governments concerned* by the words ' a l l parties 
concerned**, at th^nd of tiie same paragraph, add the 
vords 'and cessation of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s ' . 
2 , Between operative paragraphs 1 and 2 , Insert 
the following as operative paragraphs 2 and 3: 
2 . Calls upon the Government of Pakistan 
slnultaneously to take effect ive action towards a 
p o l i t i c a l settlement In East Pakistan, giving Immediate 
•UN Doc,,5/la426/HBv,l, moved on 6 December 1971. 
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rocognltloQ to the wi l l of the Kast Pakistan population 
as «xpre8 8ed in the e lect ions of December 1970^ 
3 , Declares that the provisions of operative 
pj^ragraphs 1 and 2 of th is resolution constitute a 
single i^ole^ 
3 , Renimber ttie remaining operative paragraphs 
accordingly. 
10. OHIQH OF SOYISI SOCIALIST EEPIBLICS» 
DRAFT ^SQLgTIQP?* 
The Security Council 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have Iroken 
out between India and Pakistan which constitute an 
immediate thr&at to interrietional peece Pnd seciirity, 
1, Calls upon a l l parties concerned forthwith, 
as a f i r s t step, for an immediate cease-fire and 
cession of a l l hos t i l i t i e s ' , 
2 . Calls upon the Government of Pakistan 
simultaneously to take effect ive action towards a 
p o l i t i c a l settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate 
•UN Doc.,SA0425, moved on 6 December 1971. 
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recognition to the v l l l of ^ e East Pakistan population 
as e^qpressed in the e lect ions of December 1970^ 
3 . Declares that the provisions of operative 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of th i s resolution constitute a 
single idiole^ 
4 . Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Couacll pr(Miptly and currently informed of the imple> 
mentation of th i s resolution^ 
5 . Decides to continue to discuss the further 
measures to he taken in order to restore peace in the 
area. 
11. ABSENTINA. BURUNDI. JAP AN .NICARAGUA. 
SIBRRA I£ONE AND SOMALIA: 
DRAFT RESOLOTIQW* 
Ihe Security Council 
Having considered the item on i t s agenda as 
contained in docunent S/Agenda/1606. 
Taking into account that the lack of unanimity 
of i t s permanent members at the 1606th and 1607 meetings 
*UN Doc,8/10429,moved on 6 December 1971. The Resolution 
was passed the some day at i t s 1606th meeting-Ra solution 
303 (1971). 
4 J S/"^ 
of the Security Council has prevented i t from exercising 
i t s primary responsibil i ty for the maintenance of inter-
national peace end security. 
Decides to refer the question contained in 
document S/Agenda/1606 to the twenty-sixth session of 
the General Assembly, as provided for in General Assembly 
resolution 377 A(V) of 3 November 19v*;o. 
RLSOLUTIQK* 
"Zhe Security Council, 
'Voting the reports of the Secretary-General of 
3 and 4 December 1971, 
'liaving heard the statements of the representatives 
of India and Pakistan, 
'Oravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have broken 
out between India and Pakistan whicli constitute an 
iflunediate threat to international peace and security, 
*Read by the French representative on 6 December 1971, 
not moved formally as i t was l ike ly to face 'exceptions 
and object ions' . Text taken from UN Doc.S/PV 1606,p.22. 
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'Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subsequent stage, vlthln the framework of the Charter, 
with the issues ^ I c h have given rise to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
'•Convinced that a rapid po l i t i ca l solution wi l l 
be necessary for the restoration of conditions of 
normally in the region of the conf l ict and for the 
return of refugees to their h<»nes, 
•'Conscious of the responsibi l i ty incumbent upon 
i t under the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the 
Iftiited Nations, 
"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to 
order forthwith, as a f i r s t step, an immediate cease-
f i r e , the cessation of a l l military a c t i v i t i e s and 
mutual disengagement*, 
"2. Urges that ef forts be deployed to create 
the necessary conditions for the voluntary return of 
refugees from Sast Pakistan in accordance with the 
Charter; 
"3. Asks a l l States to co-operate f u l l y with 
34i 
the secretary-General with a view to lending ass is tance 
to these refugees end a l ldv la t ing t he i r pligh;;; 
*'4, Bequests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council promptly and regular ly info lined of the implemen-
ta t ion of the present resolution^ 
' 5 , Decides to follovf tlie s i tua t ion c lose ly and 
to meet again as soon as necessary". 
13 • DMITSD STATfiS OF AMERICAt 
The secur i ty Council, 
Noting the repor ts of the secretary-General of 
3 and 4 Decen.ber 1971 and Securi ty Council resolut ion 
303(1971) of 6 December 1971, 
Noting General Assembly resolu t ion 2798(XX71) of 
7 December 1971, adopted by a vote of 104-11-10, 
Noting furthijr tiiet the Government of Pakistan 
hag accepted a cease-f i re and withdrawal of armed forced 
as set for th in General Assembly resolut ion 2^793(XXVI), 
and I n d i a ' s f a i l u r e to do so, 
•ON Doc, S/10446, moved on 12 December 1971. 
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Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s continue 
between India and Pakistan vhlch constitute an Immediate 
threat to international peace and security, 
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter 
of the United Nations, with the issues which have given 
rise to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
Convinced that an early p o l i t i c a l solution would 
te necessary for tiie restoration of conditions of 
noraalcy in the area of confl ict and for the ret\im of 
the refugees to tlisir homes, 
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in 
particular of Article 2 , paragraph 4 , 
jRecallinI the Declaration on the Strengthening 
of International Security, particularly paragraph 4,5 
and 6, 
Recognizing further the need to take immediate 
measures to bring atout an immediate cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s between India and Pakistan and effect a 
withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of 
24ii 
the ladla-Pakistan borders, 
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and of the Security Council's respons ibi l i t ies 
under the relevant provisions of the Charter, 
1. Calls upon the Government of India forthwith 
to accept a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces 
as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2798(XX7I)^ 
2 . Calls upon the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to take forthwith a l l measures for an immediate 
cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the 
territory of the other to their own side of the India-
Pakistan borders*, 
3 . Urges that efforts be intensif ied in order to 
bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the 
Bast Pakistan refugees to their homes', 
4 . Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l States 
with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to 
and relieving the dis tress of those refugees^ 
0 o 47 
5, Calls vc^on a l l parties concerned to take a l l 
possible measures and precautions to safeguard the 
l i v e s and well-being of the c iv i l i an population in 
the area^ 
6, Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Security Council promptly and currently informed on 
the implementation of the present resolution*, 
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter aS. and 
idM to meet again as circttnstances warrant. 
14. UNITED STATES OF AMBRICAt HEVISED 
DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
The Security Council, 
Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 
3 and 4 December 1971 and Security Council resolution 
303 (1971) of 6 December 1971, 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2798(XXVI) 
of 7 Decanber 1971, adopted by a vote of 104-11-10, 
Noting further that the Government of Pakistan 
has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed 
•UN Doc.S/10446/Rev. 1, moved on 13 December 1971. 
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forces as set forth in General Assembly resolution 
2793(XX\ri), and the Government of India's l e t t er in 
doctaaent &/10445, 
Regretting that the Government of India has 
not yet accepted an x ijncondltlonal and immediate 
cease-fire and withdrawal as set forth in General 
Assembly resolution 2793(XX\ri), 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s continue 
between India and Pakistan ^ i c h constitute an immediate 
threat to international peace and security. 
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter 
of the United Nations, withJUn* issues which have given 
rise to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
Convinced that an early p o l i t i c a l solution viould 
be necessary for the restoration of conditions of 
nonaaliy in the area of confl ict and for the return 
of the refugees to their hw&es. 
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in 
particular of Article 2 , paragraph 4 , 
30 
Recalling the dec:{Rratlon on the strengthening 
of international security, particularly paragraphs 4,5 
and 6, 
Recognizing further the need to take immediate 
measures to bring about an immediate cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s between India and Pakistan and ef fect a 
withdrawal of their armed forces of (sAc) their own 
side of the India-Pakistan border. 
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and of the security Council*s responsibi l i t ies 
under the relevant provisions of the Charter, 
1, Calls upon the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to take forthwith a l l measures for an immediate 
cease-f ire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the 
territory of the other to their own side of the India-
Pakistan borders', 
2 , Urges that e f forts be intensif ied in order to 
bring about speedily and in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Cheffter of the United Nations, 
conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the 
35J 
East Pakistan refugees to their homes; 
'6, Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l s ta tes 
with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to 
and relieving the d is tress of those refugees', 
4 , Calls upon a l l parties concerned to take a l l 
possible measures and precautions to safeguard the l i v e s 
and well-being of the c iv i l ian population in the area; 
5 , Bequests the secretary-General to keejk the 
security Council promptly and currently informed on the 
implementation of the present resolution', 
6, Decides to remain seized of the matter and to 
meet again as circuastances warrant, 
15, ITALY. JAPAN* DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
!Die security Council, 
Noting the reports of the secretary-General of 
3 and 4 December 1971 and Security Coxmcil resolution 
303(1971) of 6 December 1971. 
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and of the §ecurity Council's respons ibi l i t ies 
•DN Doc.s/10451, moved on 13 December 1971, 
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uader the relevant provitilons of the Charter, 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2793(XX7I) 
of 7 December 1971, 
Noting with appreciation the reply of the 
Government of Pakistan to the l e t t er of tl-ie Secretary-
General concerning General Assembly resolution 279G 
(XXVI) contained in dociaaent s/10440, 
Noting further the reply of the Government of 
India, contained in docunent S/10445, 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s continue 
between India and Pakistan ^ i c h constitute an immediate 
threat to international peace and security, 
Recognizing the need to deal a l so , within the 
framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with 
the i ssues tdiich have given rise to these h o s t i l i t i e s . 
Recognizing that a last ing solution must be 
based on a p o l i t i c a l settlement in Pakistan which 
respects the rights and interests of i t s people. 
Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening 
of International security, particularly paragraphs 4,5 
and 6, 
9 K -) 
Recognising furthc-r the need to taha immediate 
measures to bring about an immediate cessat ion of 
h o s t i l i t i e s and wittidrawal of a l l asmed fo rces , 
1, Calls upon a l l Member S t a t e s , in conformity 
with t h e i r obl iga t ions under the Charter of the United 
Nat ions, to ref ra in from any action or th rea t of action 
l i k e l y to worsen the s i tua t ion in the Indo-Paklstan 
sub-continent or to endanger i n t e rna t i ona l peace^ 
2 , c a l l s xxpon a l l p a r t i e s ooncemed to take 
for thwi th , as a f i r s t s t ep , a l l measures to bring 
about an immediate cease-f i re and cessat ion of a l l 
h o s t i l i t i e s ; 
3 , Urges India and Pakistan both to carry on 
operat ions of disengagement and withdrawal so as to 
bring about the end of confrontation and the return 
to normalcy in the area of con f l i c t ; 
4 , Cal ls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l Sates 
with the Secretary-General for rendering ass is tance to 
and re l i ev ing the d i s t r e s s of the Sast Pakistan refugees; 
5 , c a l l s upon a l l p a r t i e s concerned to take a l l 
o^ j 
possible measurar. and prc-cautions to safcgtiard the 
l i v e s and well-being of the c iv i l i an population in 
the area and to ensure the f u l l observation of a l l 
the Geneva Conventions*, 
6» Decides to appoint, -with the consent of 
India and Pakis tan , a Committee composed (of three 
Members) of the Securi ty Council to a s s i s t tliem in 
t h e i r e f f o r t s to bring about normalcy in the area 
of conf l i c t as v « l l as to achieve reconc i l i a t ion in 
accordance with the p r inc ip les of t^e Charter and in 
keeping with the aforesaid reso lu t ions and to report 
to the Council^ 
7, Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Securi ty Council promptly and cixrrently inforaied on 
the iiaplementation of the present resolution*, 
8 , Decides to remain seized of the matter and 
to meet again as circimstances warrant. 
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16. POUNDS DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
The Secur i ty Council, 
Gravely concerned over the m i l i t a r y conf l i c t on 
the Indian subcontinent, \diich cons t i t u t e s an immediate 
t h r ea t to in te rna t iona l peace and secur i ty , 
Having heard the s ta tensn ts ty the Foreign 
Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of 
Pakis tan , 
Decides tha t : 
1, In the eas tern tlieatre of conf l i c t the power 
w i l l be peacefully t ransferred to the lawfully e lec ted 
represen ta t ives of Um people neaded by Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, ^^ 'ho would immediately be released*, 
2 , Immediately af ter tae beginning of the process 
of power t r ans fe r , thu mililiary act ions in a l l the areas 
w i l l be ceased snd an i n i t i a l cease- f i re w i l l s t a r t for 
a period of 72 hours', 
3 , After the immudiate commencouent of the i n i t i a l 
period of c e a s e - f i r e , ihe Pakistan armed forces w i l l 
*UN Doc.8/10453, moved on 14 December 1971. 
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start withdrawal to the pra-sat locations in tha 
aastam thaatra of conflict with a view to evacuation 
from the eastern theatre of conflict; 
4 . Similarly, the entire Vfttst Pakistan civilian 
personnel and other parsons willing to return to West 
Pakistan, as well as the entire East Pakistan civilian 
personnel and other persons in wast Pakistan willing 
to return heme, will be given an opportunity to do so 
under the supervision of the Onited Nations, with the 
guarantees on th« part of a l l appropriate authorities 
concerned that nobody will be subjected to repressions^ 
5* As soon as within the period of 72 hours the 
withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and their concentra-
tion for that purpose will have started, the cease-fire 
wil l became permanent. As soon as the evacuation of 
the west Pakistan armed forces wil l have started, the 
Indian armed forces will start their withdrawal from 
the eastern theatre of military operations* Such with-
drawal of troops will begin actually upon consultations 
with the newly establi^ed authorities organised as a 
35J 
result of the transfer of power to the lawfully 
elected representatlTes of the people headed by 
Sheikh Majiibur Rahman; 
6, Recognizing the principle according to 
which territorial acquisitions made through the use 
of force will not be retained by either party to the 
conflict, the Qovemment of India and Pakistan %dll 
immediately begin negotiations through appropriate 
representatives of their aimed forces with a view to 
the speediest possible implementation of this principle 
in the western theatre of military operations. 
Xhe Security Council, 
Gravely concerned over the military conflict on 
the Indian subcontinent, %diich constitutes tit an 
immediate threat to international peace and security, 
Having heard the statements by the Foreign 
Minister of India and the Deputy Minister of Pakistan, 
*aN Doc,S/10453/Rev.l, moved on 15 December 1971. 
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Decides thati 
1* In the eastern theatre of conflict, the power 
will be peacefully transferred to the |i representatives 
of the people, lavfully elected in December 1970^ 
2, IsBnediately after the beginning of the process 
of pover transfer, the military actions in a l l the areas 
wil l bs ceased and an in i t ia l cease-fire \d l l start for 
a period of 72 hours^ 
3« After the Immediate commencement of the 
in i t ia l period of cease-fire, the Pakistan armed forces 
v i l l start withdrawal to the pre-set locations in the 
eastern theatre of conflict with a view to evacuation 
from the eastern theatre of conflict^ 
4 . Similarly, the entire west Pakistan civilian 
personnel and other persons willing to return to west 
Pakistan, as well as the entire Bast Pakistan civilian 
personnel and other persons in West Pakistan willing 
to return home, will be given an opportunity to do so 
under the si;qpervision of ^ e United Nations, with the 
guarantees on the part of a l l appropriate authorities 
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conctmed that nobody v l l l ba subjected to repressions^ 
5« As soon as within the period of 72 hours the 
withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and their concen-
tration for that purpose wil l have started, the cease-
fire will become permanent. Ihe Indian armed forces 
will be withdrawn from £ast Pakistan. Such withdrawal 
of troops wil l begin Uj^ on consultations with the newly 
established authorities organized as a result of the 
transfer of power to the lawfully elected represen-
tatives of the people*, 
6* Recognizing the principle, accoiKling to which 
territorial acquisitions made through the use of force 
will not be retained by either party to the conflict, 
the Governments of India and Pakistan will immediately 
begin negotiations through appropriate representatives 
of their aimed forfies with a view to the speediest 
possible implementation of this principle in the western 
theatre of military operations* 
35j 
18. FRANCS AND UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELANDt DRAFT RESOLUTION* 
Ih« security Council, 
Gravely concerned at the sitiiatlon in South Asia, 
vhlch constitutes a threat to International peace and 
security. 
Mindful of I t s responsibi l i t ies under the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recognizing the urgent need to deal e f fec t ive ly 
with the basic causes of the present conf l i c t , 
Recognizing furUier that any last ing solution must 
Include a p o l i t i c a l settlement \dilch respects the 
fundamental rights and Interests of the people, 
Deeply distressed at the enormity of hunan 
sufferings that has occurred in the area in recent 
months and restdted in the ^ o l e s a l e displacement of 
mil l ions of people from East Pakistan, 
Gravely concerned that a l l necessary measures 
should be taken for the preservation of hunan l i f e and 
*DN Doc,s/10455, moved on IS December 1971. 
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th« observance of the Geneva convention of 1949, 
! • Calls upon the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to ins t i tute forthwith an innedlate and 
diirable cease-fire and cessation of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s 
in a l l areas of conf l ict in the western theatre and 
similarly c a l l s for an ianediate and dureble cease-
f i re and cessatidan of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s by a l l forces 
in East Pakistan, u> remain in e f fect unti l operations 
of disengagements leading to witl:idraval Ixavs taken 
place in both Uieatres^ 
2 , Calls for the urgent conclusion of a com-
prehensive p o l i t i c a l settlement in accordance with the 
wishes of the people concerned as declared through 
their elected and acknowledged representatives and 
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
Ubited Nations Charter*, 
3« Calls upon a l l Member States to refrain from 
any action viiich may aggravate the situation in the 
sub-continent or endanger international peace^ 
4* Calls upon a l l those concerned to take a l l 
ob i 
measures necessary to preserve hunan l i f e and for the 
obsenrance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to 
apply f u l l y their provisions as regards the protection 
of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and c iv i l i an 
population* 
5 , Calls for f i d l international assistance in 
the re l ie f of suffering and the rehabilitation of 
refugees end their return in safety and dignity to 
their homee* 
6, Invites the Secretary-General to appoint a 
special representative to lend h i s good of f ices in 
particular for the solution of hmanitJirlan problems^ 
?• Bequests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Co\Bicil as soon as possible on the 
implnaentation of this resolution. 
Xhe Security Council, 
Gravely concerned with the situation in the 
India-Pakistan subcontinent, which constitutes an 
*JJS Doc«s/10456, moved on 15 December 1971. 
o b ,v 
loaedlate threat to p^aca. 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2793(XXVI) 
of 7 December 1971, 
1. Urges the Government of SndLkv Pakistan to 
immediately release a l l p o l i t i c a l prisoners so that 
the elected representatives of East Pakistan resixne 
their mandate^ 
2 . Decidesi 
(a) An immediate cease-fire on a l l fronts* 
(b) A disengagements of a l l those engaged in 
h o s t i l i t i e s , includinn the vdthdravBl of Um prmed 
force* under the respective command of India and 
Pakistan to their ovn side of the border and the 
cease-f ire l ine in Jammu and Kashmir"^  
3 . Requests the Secretary-General to appoint 
a special representative with a view to* 
(a) Supervising the orderly process of the 
above-mentioned operations^ 
(b) Assisting the elected representatives of 
East Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan to reach 
e ?fc ) 6J 
a comprehensive settlement, compatible with the 
principles of the Charter*, 
(e) Establishing the pvopitious conditions for 
tiie voluntary return of the refugees^ 
(d) Normalizing the relations between India and 
Pakistan; 
4« 'Requests the Sdcretary-GQnar&l to keep the 
Council constantly Infomed of the Implementation of 
this resolution. 
20. U^Jt p i^y qfiS9iTOQW* 
The Security Council, 
Gravely concerned by the conflict in the Indo-
Pakistan subcontinent, \rfiich constitutes an immediate 
threat to international peace and security, 
1. Calls upon a l l the parties concerned to take 
steps for bringing about immediate ceasefire and 
cessation of a l l hos t i l i t i e s on the eastern and 
western fronts^ 
2. Calls upon the simultaneous conclusion of a 
•UN Doc,S/10457, moved on 15 Dgcember 1971. 
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p o l i t i c a l settl«B«nt in aeeordance with the wi^«8 of 
the people of Bast Pakistan as declared through their 
already elected representatives^ 
3» Calls iqjon a l l those concerned to take a l l 
measures necessary to preserve hman l i f e and to observe 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949^ 
4* Bequests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council promptly and currently informed of the imple-
mentation of th is resolution^ 
5 . Decides to continue to discuss the further 
measures to be tak«n in ordtfr to restore paace in the 
idiole area. 
21 . UHIOK OF SOVIET SQCIAUST REPUBLICSl 
DRAFT RSSOLOTIOW* 
The Security Comei l , 
For the purpose of rostoration of peace on the 
Hindustan subcontinent, 
1. welcomes the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s in £ast 
Pakistan and esqpresses the hope that the state of cease-
*UH Doc.s/10458, moved on 16 December 1971. 
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f i r e v l l l be obsenred by both s ides , \rtiich would 
guarantee, without delay, milffipeded transfer of 
power to the lawful representatives of the people 
elected in Decoaber 1970, mid appropriate settlement 
of problems related to the conf l ic t in this area^ 
2 . Calls for immediate cease-f ire and cessation 
of a l l other military actions along the entire border 
between India and West Pakistan and along the cease-
f i re l ine of 1965 in Jammu and Kashmir, i^looming in 
th i s connexion the statement of the GoTemment of 
India about their decision to cease-fire unilateral ly 
and cease a l l other military actions in th i s area 
beginning froa 14s30 hours GKT on 17 December 1971, 
urgently c a l l s !4)on the Government of Pakistan to tal» 
an ident ical decision without delay^ 
3 . Calls iq>on a l l Menber States of the United 
Nations to render comprehensive assistance for the 
speediest cessation of mil i tary actions and to refrain 
from any steps liiich could Impede normalization of the 
situation on the Hindostan subcontinent. 
3 6 J 
22. JAPAN AtJD UNITED STATES OF AMERICAt 
The Security Comcily 
Gravely concerned with the situation in the 
India-Pakistan sub-continent which const i tutes an 
ionediate threat to inter-national peace and security. 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) 
of 7 December 1971, 
Taking note of the statement made at the 
1617th meeting of the Security Council by the Foreign 
Minister of India, that h i s country has no terr i tor ia l 
ambitions, 
1. Deaands that a durable cease-f ire and 
cessation of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s in a l l areas of conf l ic t 
be s t r i c t l y observed and remain in e f f e c t unti l 
operations of disengagement take place, leading to 
prompt withdrawal of the anaed forces from a l l the 
occupied territories^ 
2 . Calls iq>on a l l Member States to refrain from 
•IHJ Doc.S/10456, moved on 16 December 1971. 
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any action i^leh may aggravata the situation in the 
sub-continent or endanger international peace^ 
3 . Calls upon a l l those concerned to take a l l 
measures necessary to preserve human l i f e and for t^e 
observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to 
apply in f u l l their provisions as regards the pro-
tection of vounded and s ick, prisoners of war and 
c iv i l i an population^ 
4« Calls for international assistance in the 
re l i e f of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees 
and their return in safety and dignity to their homes 
and for f u l l co-6peration with the Secretary-General 
to that e f f ec t ; 
5, nsquests the Secretary-General l;o strengthen 
as appropriate the staff of Ot^ EPRO, headed by h i s 
special representative, in order to provide a l l possible 
assistance for the solution of hmanitlirlan problems^ 
6« Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council promptly and currently Informed on the 
implementation of th is resolution^ 
36J 
7* Decides to eontinuB to discuss the further 
measures to be taken in order to restore peace in 
the ^ o l e area* 
23 . JAPAN AND UHITfiP STAISS OF AMERICAi 
Ihe security Couici l , 
Gravely concerned with the situation in the 
India-Pakistan sub-continent \diich const i tutes an 
iamediate threat to international peace and security, 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2793(XXVI) 
of 7 December 1971, 
faking note of the statement made at the 
1617th meeting of the Security Coxmcil by the Foreign 
Minister of India, that h i s country has no terr i tor ia l 
aabitions, 
1. Demands that an immediate and durable cease-
f i r e and cessation of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s in a l l area of 
conf l ic t be s t r i c t l y observed and remain in effect 
unt i l operations of disengagement take place, leading 
to prompt withdrawal of the armed forces from a l l the 
•ON Doc,s/10459/Rev,l, moved on 16 December 1971. 
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occupied territories^ 
2» Calls VEpoa a l l Member States to refrain from 
any action %ihich may aggravate the situation in the 
sub-continent or endanger international peace^ 
3 , Calls iqpon a l l those concerned to take a l l 
measures necessary to preserve hunan l i f e and for the 
observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to 
apply in f u l l their provisions as regards UIB protection 
of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and c iv i l i an 
population^ 
4 , Calls for international assistance in the 
re l ie f of suffering and the rehabil itation of refugees 
and their return in safety and dignity to their hones 
and for f u l l cooperation with the SecretaryvGeneral 
to that e f f ec t ; 
5 , Invites the Secretary-General to appoint a 
special representative to lend h i s good of f i ces in 
particular for the solution of huoanitarian problems^ 
6, Bequests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Coxmcil promptly and cxirrently informed on the imple-
mentation of th i s resolution; 
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7* D«clde8 to continue to discuss the further 
measures to be t&lcen In order to restore peace in the 
whole area, 
aft. RESOLUTION 307 1971* 
24 . AIX«>TED BY THE SfiCURITY CQONCIL AT ITS 
leg l lT MEETING.on 21 DECEMBER 1971* 
The Security c o m c i l , 
Having discussed the grave situation in the 
subcontinent % i^ch remains a threat to international 
peace and security, 
Noting General Assembly resolution 2793(XXVI) of 
7 December 1971, 
Noting tiie reply of the Government of Pakistan 
on 9 December 1971 (document S/10440}; 
Noting the reply of the Government of India on 
12 December 1971 (docvnent S/10445), 
Having heerd the statements of the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Pakistan and the Foreign Minister of India, 
•UN Doc,S/HBS/307,1971. This resolution i s based on 
the Draft Resolution, UN Doc.S/10466,ffloved on 21 December 
1971 by ;>rgentina, Burundi,Japan,Nicaragun,sierra Leone, 
and Somalia* 
d i L 
Noting further the stittement made Bt the 1617th 
meeting of the Security Council by the Foreign Minister 
of India containing a laii lateral declaration of a cease-
f i re in the western theatre, 
Noting Pakistan's agz««nent to the cease-fire 
in the western theatre with e f f ec t from 17 December 1971, 
Noting that consequently a cease-fire and a 
cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s prevai l , 
! • D«aands that a durable cease-f ire and cep^sation 
of a l l h o s t i l i t i e i in a l l areas of conf l ic t be s t r i c t l y 
observed and remain in e f fect unti l withdrawals take 
place, as soon as practicable, of a l l armed forces to 
their respective terr i tor ies and to posit ions which 
f u l l y respect the Cease-fire Line in Jammu and Kai^ imir 
supervised by the United Nations Military Observer 
Grovq? in India and Pakistan^ 
2, Calls upon a l l Member States to refrain from 
any action which may aggravate the situation in the 
subcontinent or endanger International peace^ 
3 . Calls iQ>on a l l those concerned to take a l l 
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measures necessary to presejrT-e himan l i f e and for the 
observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to 
opply in f u l l theip provisions as regards the protection 
of wounded and s ick, prisoners of war and c iv i l i an 
population^ 
4 , Calls for international assistance in the 
re l ie f of suffering end the rehabilitation of refugees 
and their return in safety and dignity to their homes 
and for f u l l co-operation with the Secretary- General 
to that e f fec t ; 
5 . Authorizes the Secretary-General to appoint 
i f necessary a special representative to lend h i s j»ood 
of f i ces for the solution of humanitarian problems', 
6, Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Council informed without delay on develoi»ents relating 
to the implementation of th is resolution^ 
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter and 
to keep i t under active consideration. 
Q 7 ) 
liot-tDumri, INDONESIA, i T / a r , JAFAr;, 
Th« Oen«r&l Assembly, 
Noting the reports of the secretary-Generel of 
3 and 4 December 1971 and the l e t t e r from the President 
of the Security Covmcil tranaoiltting tlie text of Cotmcil 
resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971, 
Gravely concerned Uiat h o s t i l i t i e s have brolnn 
out between India &nd Pakistan viiich constitute an 
immediate threat to international peace and security, 
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a 
subsequent stage, within the framevork of the Charter 
of the United Nations, with the issues which have given 
rise to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
Convinced thet an early p o l i t i c a l solution woiild 
be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy 
•UN Doc.A/L. 647, moved on 7 December 1971. 
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in the ftreo of confl ict Piid for the return of the 
refugees to their homes, 
Mindful of the provisiong of the Charter, in 
particular of Article 2 , paragraph 4 , 
Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening 
of International Security, particularly paragraphs 
4 , S and 6, 
Recognizing further the need to take lamedlate 
measures to bring about an immediate cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s between India and Pakistan and e f f e c t a 
withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side to 
tJie India-Pakistan borders, 
lUndful of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and of the General Assembly's respons ib i l i t i es 
under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of 
Asseobly resolution 377-A(V) of 3 November 1950, 
1. Calls upon the Govemnents of India and 
Pakistan to take forthwith a l l neasures for an inmediate 
cease-f ire and withdrawal of their aimed forces on the 
territory of tlia other to their av?n side of the India-
Pakistan borders^ 
9 7 . 
2 . Urges that •ffortp be intensified In order 
to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the 
purposes sad principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return 
of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes^ 
3 . Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l 
States with the Secretary-General for rendering 
assistance to and rel iering the d i s tress of those 
refugees^ 
4 . Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
General Assenbly and the Security Coimcil promptly 
and currently informed on the implementation of the 
present resolution^ 
5« Decides to follow the question c lose ly and 
to meet again should the sitixation to demand^ 
6, Calls p iipon the Security Council to take 
appropriate action in the l ight of the present 
resolution. 
26. ALQSRIA, AICENXIIJA, BRAZIL, BURUNDI, 
CAMEROON, CHAD, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, 
ECUADOR, GHANA, GUATEMALA, HAITI, 
HONDURAS, INDONESIA, ITALY, IVORY COAST, 
JAPAN, JORDAN, UBERIA, UBYAN ARAB 
REPUBLIC, MOROCCO, NETHERLANDS, NICARAGUA, 
PANAMA, PARAGUAY, SIERRA LBOME, SOMALIA, 
SPAIN, SUDAN, TUNISIA, URUGUAY, VAMEM, 
ZAIRE AND ZAMBIAi REVISED RESOLUTION* 
Th« General Assembly, 
Noting the reports of ^ e Secretary-General 
of 3 and 4 December 1971 and the l e t t e r from the 
president of the Security Council transmitting the 
text of Cotncil- resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 
1971, 
Gravely concerned that h o s t i l i t i e s have broken 
out between India and Pakistan ^ i c h constitute an 
immediate threat to international peace and security, 
Hecognizing the need to deal appropriately at 
a subssquent stage, within the framework of the Charter 
of the United Nations, with the i s suss lAich have given 
rise to the h o s t i l i t i e s , 
Convinced that an early p o l i t i c a l solution %R>uld 
be necessary for the restoration of conditions of 
*10( Doc*A/L.647/Rev.l. moved on 7 December 1971. The 
Resolution was adopted by the AsMmbly the same day-
2793(XXVI). 
T''> I'i 
normalcy In the area of conf l ic t and for tha return 
of the refugees to their homes, 
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in 
particular of Article 2 , paragraph 4 , 
Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening 
of International security , particularly paragraph 
4 , 5 &nd 6 , 
Becognizing further the need to take immediate 
measures to bring about an immediate cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s between India and Pakistan and e f f ec t a 
withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side 
of the India-Pakistan borders, 
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and of the General Assembly's respons ibi l i t ies 
under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of 
Assembly resolution 377A(V) of 3 November 1950, 
1* Calls upon the Government of India and 
Pakistan to take forthwith a l l measures for an immediate 
cease-f ire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the 
territory of the other to their own side of the India-
Pakistan borders^ 
0 "; :^  
2« Urges that efforts be Intensified in order 
to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the 
purposes end principles of the Charter of the Iftiited 
Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return 
of the East Pakistan refugees to their hoines^ 
3 . Calls for the f u l l co-operation of a l l 
States vith the Secretary-General for rendering 
assistance to and relieving the d i s tress of those 
refugees^ 
4« Urges that every effort be made to safeguard 
tne l i v e s and well-being of the c i v i l i a n population in 
the area of conf l i c t ; 
5« Requests the Seeretary-GeneraJ. to keep the 
KUXBOBCkl]! tff»ff—li Assembly and the Security Council 
promptly and currently infomed on the :Lmplementation 
of the present resolution^ 
6« Decides to follow the question c lose ly and to 
meet again should the situation so demand; 
7. Calls i:qM>n the Security Council to take 
appropriate action in the l ight of the present 
resolution. 
3?J 
27. UMIOM OF SQYIfiT SOCIALIST aKPOBIJCSt 
Th« G«n«ral Assembly, 
Grarsly coneenied that h o s t i l i t i e s have bz^ken 
out between India and Pakistan \iiieh constitute an 
iamediate threat to international peace and security, 
1, Calls upon a l l parties concerned forthwith, 
as a f i r s t step, for an imnediate cease-fire and 
cessation of all^ h o s t i l i t i e s ^ 
2 . Calls upon the Government of toMoL Pakistan 
slmiiltaneously to take ef fect ive action towards a 
p o l i t i c a l settlement In East Pskistan, giving immediate 
recognition to the wi l l of the East Pakistan population 
as expressed in the e lect ions of December 1970^ 
3» Declares that the provisions of operative 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of th i s resolution constitute a 
single %diole^  
4* Bequests the Secretary-General to keep the 
Security Council and the General Assembly promptly and 
*ldl Doc,A/L, 648, moved on 7 December 1971. 
currflntly liifora«d on the implementation of the 
present resolution^ 
5« CfliLls tqpon the Seeiirity Council to take 
appropriate measures in the light of the present 
resolution. 
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SCH£DULS - A 
Vsl l and the following 
J'j,\P2, P3j. ^4], iPS. 
P by ConmunlAy and (SD) 
A Strained relations 
Ai Movement. 
All Movement against specific community. 
A12 Movement against specif ic Culture. 
A13 Movement against specific Language. 
A14 Provisioafilott'tonomy, 
A15 Secession!sn 
A2 Discontent, unrest 
A3 Action 
A31 Unorganised 
A311 PeUt ions . 
A312 Resignations. 
A313 MmorandUBs. 
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A32 Passlyo r«8i8teac«. 
A321 Disobedience. 
A322 Non-cooperation, boycott 
A36 Organized 
A3 61 Offensive 
A3611 Str ikes , Agitations. 
A3612 Sabotage including in f i l t ra t ion 
A3613 Espionage 
A3614 Civi l War 
^P3J 
D Strained relations by cause 
Dl Sociological and cultural 
D2 Ascendency of West 
08 Economic e x p l o i t a t i o n 
D4 Denial of political rise. 
D6 Military Oligarchy. 
D6 Apathy of Govt. 
D71 With reference to natural c lamit ies . 
D611 Floods 
D612 Earthquakes. 
D613 Pestilence. 
38, 
D614 F«mia« 
D7 Dlscremiaatlon against specific race. 
DB Constitutional consensus. 
D91 Others. 
£ Attitude of Foreign powers by Q,D, 
£a (By kind to be got by S D) 
F Attitude of others. 
Fl Political parties. 
F2 Journalist. 
F3 Intellectuals. 
F4 Public 
F6 Further divisionby SD 
LP4. 
G3 Retaliatory measures 
G31 Arrests 
G32 Trials 
033 Banning of Polit ical Parties, 
034 Razakar Movement 
035 Sabotage. 
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G36 
Q37 
0371 
0372 
0373 
0374 
H5 
U51 
062 
U53 
S^ionag« 
R«presslr« m9 
Genocid* 
Murder 
Rap« 
others 
Rapproachment 
Negotiation 
Mediation 
Adjudication. 
LP6-
Za After affects of re ta l ia t ion 
Zal Refugee influx 
ZaZ Casualties • 
ZB21 Sick, Wounded. 
Za22 Disabled 
Za3 Orphans 
Za4 Pregnant %iomen. 
ZaS Fanities separation. 
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:^ a7 TrlBlt 
if^ a?! War crimes 
Za72 Razakar collobratlon 
Za73 Reprisals 
ZaS Repatriation 
ZaBl Specific group (further by (SD) ) 
Za91 Btaergeace of N§tion or dlsmeaberment of 
a country. 
38 J 
Sdiadult - B 
fQmm BSUTMS 
P2 of VI 19 and following foci in (P2), (P3), (P4) 
P2 
£s4 tensions 
zz41 (byeaust) 
Z241q ecxamunal 
%xAlvi partit ion 
S241v po l i t i ca l dominancs 
ze41y socio cultural 
ZZ412 bound ry disputs 
za4121 land further by GD and AD 
ZZ4122 terr i tor ia l waters 
ZZ4123 air 
za413 others (to be got by SD) 
zzS provocation 
zz51 ultima tui 
zz52 threat 
zz53 blockade 
zzS4 eoerosion 
zz55 subversion 
38? 
ZZ551 
sz56 
sz69 
(«M) 
(zM2) 
(sM21) 
(s)&2) 
(SM23) 
(SN3) 
(xKai) 
(sKa3) 
(xK34) 
(sM39) 
inf l l tratorg (1 
propagwida 
further divlsic 
war 
by kind 
land 
naval 
air 
(by Matfaod) 
gvktrrilla 
conventional 
nuclear 
others by (SD) 
(P3) 
A 
All 
A12 
A2 
A21 
A22 
Conduct of war 
declaration 
noti f icat ion 
Strategy and t 
intervention 
retal iat ion 
383 
A23 Self defenct 
A24 aggression 
A2S war seizures 
A251 arms 
A252 rations 
A253 others 
A26 Cargoes 
A27 espionage 
A28 hot pursuit 
A291 l o g i s t i c s 
A292 occv^atlon 
A293 destruction 
A294 combined forces (Including along Muktl Bahnl) 
A295 combined operation (Navy alrforce and army) 
A296 Civi l defence 
A2961 passive e .g . blackout 
A2962 f i r s t aid e .g . rescur f i re 
A297 diversionary tact ics 
A29e Others 
£ He suit of war 
9 8^ 
El Victory 
B2 defeat 
F after affects of wars 
Fl Casual!ties 
F l l Sick 
F12 Wounded 
F13 disabled 
F14 War dead 
F15 miesing 
F16 Civil ian victims 
F3 Wars Prisoners 
F31 t r i a l s for war crimes 
F32 repatriation 
F321 Hiaantarian aspect 
F322 legal 
F323 p o l i t i c a l 
F6 Economic c r i s i s 
F7 P o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y 
F8 Foreign gain 
F81 by GD 
39J 
P82 (By kind) 
F82x econoalc 
F82Y diplomatie 
F82M Military 
F89 (other by SD) 
0 attitude of others 
(by GD (SD) In addition to 
G31 
032 
G33 
G34 
H 
a i 
H2 
H3 
U4 
H6 
Journalists 
intellectuals 
Opposition pa. 
masses 
Rapproaehment 
adjudication 
arbitration 
mediation 
negotiation 
direct talks 
H61 (by leve l of talks as P2 of v and the 
following) 
H51211 ministerial further by (SD) 
H5134 emissary 
39i 
H619 others 
H7Z1 agreement further by CD and AD 
U7Z2 award 
U7Z3 treat ies 
(ACI for E7zUz3) 
24 a signing 
z4b declaretlon 
24c i^ l l f l cat lon 
24d interpretation 
z4e execution 
24f repudiation 
(P4) 
za Cassation of hostilities 
zal capitulation (surrender) 
sail conditional 
zaI2 unconditional 
za2 axnistic (ceasefire) 
za3 safe conduct 
zb obstacles 
zbl territorial disputes 
39'! 
ib2 Intanxal opposJ.tion 
sb3 soclo-culttu-al 
zM recognition of Bangladesh 
zb6 povt 
zb6 others by (SD) 
39J 
A- Int«mal relations V t l l 
B- Sxternal relations Vtig 
Tti9 terms anunsrated in the schedule A and B 
are l i s t ed in this Index. However terms denoting ideas 
the nuBibers for %Alch are indicated to be derived by 
using such devicQs as (AD) (QD) and (SD) are not included. 
The nuttbar fvom the schedule given against each Index 
i s preceded by an abbreviation for facet formula e .g . 
P2 for round 1 level 2 , 
A: ;n^rnal wlaUong 
VI11 
Action 
[P2] A3 
Adjudication 
[P4J H53 
After affects of retai i«*loa 
[P5j Zal 
Agitation 
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P2 A3 611 
Apathy of Govt, 
P3 D6 
Arrests 
P4 031 
Ascendency of Vest 
P3 D2 
Attitude of 
Foreign Powers 
>& P3 Ea 
Inte l lectuals 
P3 F3 
Journalists 
P3 F2 
Po l i t i ca l parties 
P3 Fl 
Public 
P3 F4 
Banning of P o l i t i c a l parties 
P4 G33 
Boycott 
P2 A322 
39, 
Casualties 
P5 Za2 
Civi l War 
P2 A3 615 
Collaboration 
i r t 
Retaliation 
P4 G34 
Trials 
P5 Za72 
Constitutional Consensus 
P3 DB 
Denial of PoUUca l rights 
P3 D41 
Disabled 
P5 Za22 
Discontent 
P2 A2 
Discremination against Specific race 
P3 D7 
Disobedience 
39u 
P2 A321 
Earthquake 
P3 D612 
Economic exploitation 
P3 D3 
Baergence of nation 
P5 Za91 
Espionage 
I r t 
Retaliation 
P4 G36 
Strained relations 
P2 A3 613 
Family separation 
P5 LBS 
Famine 
P3 D614 
Floods 
P3 D611 
Genocide 
P4 0371 
39? 
Quarrlllas 
P2 A36151 
Intel lact i ials 
P3 F3 
Joiimalists 
P3 F2 
Mediation 
P4 H52 
Memorandiai 
P2 A313 
Military Oligarchy 
P3 D5 
Movement 
P2 Al 
Against specific 
Culture P2 A12 
Language P2 AI3 
Group P2 All 
Murder 
P4 G372 
Natural Calamities 
39J 
P3 D61 
Negotiation 
P4 A51 
Non-cooparatlon 
P2 A322 
Offensive action 
P2 A361 
Organised action 
P2 436 
Orptians 
PS Za3 
Passive reslstence 
P2 i32 
Pestilence 
P3 D613 
Petit ion 
P2 A311 
Po l i t i ca l parties attitude 
i r t 
cr i ses 
P3 Fl 
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Retaliation 
P4 G33 
Pregnant women 
P5 Za4 
prisoners of war 
P5 Za4 
Provisional autonomy 
P2 A14 
public's attitude 
P3 F4 
Rape 
P4 G373 
Rapproachment 
P4 H5 
Refugee influx 
P5 Zal 
Repatriation 
P5 Za8 
i r t 
Povs 
P5 Za81 
40J 
Specific group 
P5 Za82 
Repressive measures 
P4 G37 
Beprisals 
P5 Za73 
Resignations 
P2 A312 
Retaliatory measures 
P4 G3 
Sabotage 
irt 
Retaliatory measures 
P4 G35 
Strained relations 
P2 A3 612 
Secessionian 
P2 A15 
Sick 
P5 Za21 
Socio-cultural cause 
40i 
P3 Dl 
irt 
Strained relations 
P2 A 
irt 
Cause 
P3 D 
Strikes 
P2 A3611 
Trials 
irt 
After affects of retaliation 
P5 Za7 
irt 
Colloboration 
P6 Za73 
war crimes 
P5 ^ Za71 
irt 
Betaliation 
P4 G32 
4U 
Unorganised action 
P2 A31 
Unrest 
P2 A2 
war Crimes 
P5 Za71 
Wounded 
P5 Z9Z1 
40J 
B. EXIEBMAL HEUTIQNS 
V»19 
Adjudication 
P3 HI 
After maths of War 
P3 F 
Aggression 
P3 A24 
Agreement 
P3 H7Z1 
Air 
irt 
Boundry dispute 
P2 Z24123 
War 
P2 (zM23) 
Arbitration 
P3 H2 
Armistic (Cease fire) 
P4 Za2 
Arms seizure 
P3 A251 
4Ui 
Award 
P3 H7z2 
Black out 
P3 A2961 
Blockada 
P3 2961 
Boundry dispute 
i r t 
Obstacles to rapproachaent 
P4 Zbi 
Tensions 
P2 Z2412 
i r t 
Air P2 Z24123 
Land P2 zz4121 
water P2 224122 
Capitulation (Surrender) 
P4 Zal 
Cargoes 
P3 A26 
CasualiUes 
P3 Fl 
40 
Caast f i re 
S«e 
Armlstlc 
cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s 
P4 Za 
Ciyi l Defence 
P3 A296 
Civi l ians 
P3 F16 
Coersion 
P2 zz54 
Coabined forces 
P3 A294 
Combined operations 
P3 A295 
Commiaial tension 
P2 zz41q 
C«nditional capitulation 
P4 2all 
Conduct of War 
P3 A 
40 
Conventional war 
P2 (zK33) 
Declaration 
i r t 
Agreement 
Award 
Treaties 
P3 ACI z4a 
War P3 All 
Defeat 
P3 S2 
Destruction 
P3 A293 
Direct talks 
P3 H5 
Disabled 
P3 F13 
Diversionary tact ics 
P3 A297 
Bconoaic cr i ses 
P3 F6 
4 0 / 
fimlssary talks 
P3 H5134 
Ssplonage 
P3 A27 
Execution 
P3 iiCl z4e 
Fire 
P3 A2962 
Foreign power attitude 
P3 03 
Foreign gain 
P3 F8 
i r t 
Diplomatic 
P3 F82V 
Economic 
P3 F82X 
Military 
P3 F8M 
Guerilla War 
P2 (zM31) 
403 
Hot pursuit 
P3 A28 
Hxaianltariati aspect of POWS repatriation 
P3 F321 
Inf i l trators 
P2 ZS5511 
Intellectuals attitude 
P3 F32 
Internal opposition 
P4 Zb2 
Interpretation 
P3 ACI z4d 
Intervention 
P3 A21 
Journalist attitude 
P3 G31 
Land 
i r t 
Boundry dispute 
P2 224121 
War 
P2 (zM21) 
4U3 
Legal aspect of POWS repatr iat ion 
P3 F322 
L o g i s t i c s 
P3 A291 
Mediation 
P3 H3 
Min i s t er ia l t a lks 
P3 H51211 
Missing 
P3 FIS 
Naval war 
P2 (zM22) 
Negot ia t ions 
P3 H4 
N o t i f i c a t i o n 
P3 A12 
Nuclear War 
P2 (zM34) 
Obstacles to rapproachment 
P4 Zb 
Occupation 
P3 A292 
419 
Opposition parties attitudt 
P3 Q33 
Partit ion 
P2 Z241. 
P o l i t i c a l aspaet of rapatriation 
P3 F323 
r o U t i c a l ?>o«iaanea 
P2 zMlW 
JPoUtical 8tabiU%y 
P3 F7 
Povt 
i r t 
Af tar affacts of war 
P3 F3 
Obstaelas to approaehaant 
P4 zbe 
Bapattiation 
P3 F32 
Trials 
P3 F31 
Propaganda 
P2 Z256 
4 1 1 
Provocation 
P2 zz5 
Public attitude 
P3 G34 
Rapproachment 
P3 H 
Ratification 
P3 ACI z4c 
Rations seizure 
P3 A252 
Recognition of nation 
P4 Zb4 
Repatriation 
P3 F32 
Repudiation 
P3 ACI z4f 
Rescue 
P3 1292 
Result of war 
P3 fi 
Retaliation 
P3 A22 
412 
Safe conduct 
P4 2a3 
Self Defence 
P3 A23 
Sick 
P3 P l l 
Signing 
P3 ACI z4a 
Socio-cultural 
i r t 
Obstacles 
P4 Zb2 
Tensions 
P2 224lY 
Strategy and tact ics 
P3 A2 
Subversion 
P2 2251 
Surrender 
See 
Capitulation 
Talks by level 
413 
Tensions 
P2 zz4 
Caust 
P2 zz41 
Ttrritorlal dispute 
See 
Boundry dispute 
Threat 
P2 zz52 
Trials 
P3 F31 
Ultimatum 
P2 zz51 
Victory 
P2 £1 
War 
P2 (zM) 
Ir t 
Kind 
P2 (zM2) 
Methods 
P2 (zMS) 
4H 
War Crimes 
P3 F31 
War d«ad 
P3 F14 
War Prisoners 
See 
POWS 
War selziares 
P3 A26 
Wounded 
P3 F12 
I y PS 3{; 
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Oivan b«lov i s an alphabetical index to the 
authors and the subjects of the docunents l i s ted 
In 'Part III Classified Part' of the bibliography. 
Xhe ser ia l nusber I s given as the Index nunber 
against each entry in this section* 13ie alphabetical 
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